Clinton Jenkins v. Smithsonian Institution

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 13, 2024
DocketDC-0752-20-0794-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Clinton Jenkins v. Smithsonian Institution (Clinton Jenkins v. Smithsonian Institution) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clinton Jenkins v. Smithsonian Institution, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CLINTON JENKINS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-0752-20-0794-I-1

v.

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, DATE: August 13, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Clinton Jenkins , Largo, Maryland, pro se.

David Larson , Esquire, and Katherine Bartell , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed the appeal as untimely filed. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to find that the appellant constructively received the notice of proposed removal on April 15, 2020, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND On April 10, 2020, the agency mailed to the appellant’s address of record its decision removing him from Federal service, effective April 25, 2020. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 24-29. On August 10, 2020, the appellant filed an appeal challenging his removal, 107 days after the effective date. IAF, Tab 1. In response to the timeliness order issued by the administrative judge, the appellant stated that he did not receive the removal decision until July 2020. IAF, Tab 6. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal as untimely, finding that the appellant failed to keep the agency apprised of his current mailing address as required by 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b)(3) and finding that the appellant constructively received the decision after the agency placed it in the mail to his address of record. IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID) at 4. The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that the agency should have used other means to notify him of the removal decision. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. 3

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The appeal was untimely filed. The appellant bears the burden to prove by preponderant evidence that his appeal was timely filed. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(B). A removal appeal must be filed no later than 30 days after the effective date of the action being appealed, or 30 days after the date of the appellant’s receipt of the agency’s decision, whichever is later. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b)(1). Regarding the receipt of agency documents, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b)(3) provides that documents may be deemed constructively received under certain circumstances: An appellant is responsible for keeping the agency informed of his or her current home address for purposes of receiving the agency’s decision, and correspondence which is properly addressed and sent to the appellant’s address via postal or commercial delivery is presumed to have been duly delivered to the addressee. While such a presumption may be overcome under the circumstances of a particular case, the appellant may not avoid service of a properly addressed and mailed decision by intentional or negligent conduct which frustrates actual service. Here, it is undisputed that the agency mailed the decision to the appellant’s address of record on April 10, 2020. IAF, Tab 7 at 24-29. We find that the appellant constructively received the decision 5 days later, on April 15, 2020. See Williamson v. U.S. Postal Service, 106 M.S.P.R. 502, ¶ 7 (2007) (recognizing a presumption that documents placed in the mail are received in 5 days). The appellant’s assertion that he did not receive the decision until July 2020, when it was resent to his new address, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of constructive receipt because he did not keep the agency apprised of his current address and he may not avoid service of a properly addressed and mailed decision by negligent conduct. IAF, Tab 6 at 4; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b)(3). The effective date of the removal was April 25, 2020, ten days after constructive receipt. IAF, Tab 1 at 4. Therefore, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b)(1), the appellant’s appeal was due by May 25, 2020, i.e., 30 days 4

after the effective date. The appellant’s August 10, 2020 appeal was therefore untimely by 77 days.

The appellant has not shown good cause for the delay in filing his appeal. The Board may waive its regulatory filing time limit for good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(c). To establish good cause for the untimely filing of an appeal, a party must show that he exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). To determine whether an appellant has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of his excuse and his showing of due diligence, whether he is proceeding pro se, and whether he has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune which similarly shows a causal relationship to his inability to timely file his petition. Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table). Though he is proceeding pro se, the appellant’s 77-day delay in filing is not minimal. See Rosati v. U.S. Postal Service, 91 M.S.P.R. 122, ¶ 7 (finding a nearly 2-month delay was not minimal), aff’d, 53 F. App’x 95 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The appellant’s assertion that he did not receive the decision until July 2020 does not amount to good cause for the reasons stated above. See Little v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 183, ¶¶ 8-10 (2017) (applying 5 C.F.R.

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Rosati v. Merit Systems Protection Board
53 F. App'x 95 (Federal Circuit, 2002)

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Clinton Jenkins v. Smithsonian Institution, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clinton-jenkins-v-smithsonian-institution-mspb-2024.