FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Jun 29, 2026 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK CLINTIN G. HICKMAN, No. 4:26-CV-05012-RLP
Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL v.
DIERTRICH, in his individual capacity, and AALIYA VARGAS, in her individual capacity, Defendants.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Clintin Hickman’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. 22. Mr. Hickman initiated this action pro se. See ECF No. 1. By separate Order the Court granted Mr. Hickman leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 5. For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Hickman’s Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is therefore granted. This action arises out of an interaction between Plaintiff Clintin Hickman
and City of Pasco police Officers Joshua Dietrich and Aaliyah Vargas on September 20, 2025. ECF No. 21. On that day, Mr. Hickman was filming a public sidewalk, which included nearby businesses. ECF No. 21, ¶10. While not stated
explicitly, it can be inferred that minors were present in his general surroundings. Id. at ¶15. The Amended Complaint alleges that officers approached Mr. Hickman and informed him that people had made police reports of his activity, which was
causing a domestic disturbance. Id. at ¶¶22, 23. As in his original Complaint, Mr. Hickman alleges he “was not detained, arrested, or cited, and Defendants ultimately disengaged and returned to their patrol vehicles.” Id. at ¶26.
Mr. Hickman filed this action on January 26, 2026, against the City of Pasco and Officers Dietrich and Vargas, alleging claims for violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. ECF No. 1. The Court dismissed the original complaint for failure to state a claim. See ECF No. 20 at 2. Mr. Hickman filed an Amended
Complaint on April 27, 2026. ECF No. 21. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). A complaint that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12, dismissal may be warranted based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a cognizable legal theory. Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admission v.
United States, 141 F.4th 1056, 1065 (9th Cir.). In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5
(2014); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and are held to a less
stringent standard than those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts' treatment of pro se filings;
accordingly, we continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.”). Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009). “Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.” Id. at 232. Mr. Hickman alleges liability based on
violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. Each alleged constitutional violation is addressed. 1. First Amendment Retaliation To bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) he
was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant’s actions would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity, and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or motivating
factor in the defendant’s conduct.” O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 932 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006)). The First Amendment protects the right to film matters of public interest.
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995). Not all filming is protected. Solomon v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 2025 WL 1678174 at *1 (9th Cir. June 12, 2025) (upholding dismissal of First Amendment retaliation claim
based on plaintiff’s filming sidewalk of Fashion Show Mall). Mr. Hickman does not plead that he was filming matters of public interest. Rather, his Complaint makes clear that officers approached him because of reports
he was filming minors and causing a domestic disturbance. While Mr. Hickman may attempt to make a case for why his activity on the date in question warranted constitutional protection, this right is not “clearly established.” Officers Dietrich
and Vargas are therefore entitled to immunity on Mr. Hickman’s First Amendment Retaliation claims. 2. Fourth Amendment The Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful seizures. Mr. Hickman’s
Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants “attempted” to seize him but lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe he had committed any crime. He alleges that because an ordinary person wouldn’t feel free to leave, this was an
“attempted seizure.” He alleges that he suffered harm, including intimidation and interference with his liberty. The Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful seizures. Although a seizure may occur where an individual is detained or believes he is “not free to
leave,” see Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (1988), by Mr. Hickman’s own admission, “[n]o arrest or seizure ultimately occurred, and Defendants disengaged and returned to their patrol vehicles.” ECF No. 1 at 6.
Having failed to plead the violation of a clearly established right, Officers Dietrich and Vargas are entitled to immunity on Mr. Hickman’s Fourth Amendment violation claims.
Municipal Liability Under Monell, “[a] government entity may not be held liable under § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force
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FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Jun 29, 2026 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK CLINTIN G. HICKMAN, No. 4:26-CV-05012-RLP
Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL v.
DIERTRICH, in his individual capacity, and AALIYA VARGAS, in her individual capacity, Defendants.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Clintin Hickman’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. 22. Mr. Hickman initiated this action pro se. See ECF No. 1. By separate Order the Court granted Mr. Hickman leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 5. For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Hickman’s Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is therefore granted. This action arises out of an interaction between Plaintiff Clintin Hickman
and City of Pasco police Officers Joshua Dietrich and Aaliyah Vargas on September 20, 2025. ECF No. 21. On that day, Mr. Hickman was filming a public sidewalk, which included nearby businesses. ECF No. 21, ¶10. While not stated
explicitly, it can be inferred that minors were present in his general surroundings. Id. at ¶15. The Amended Complaint alleges that officers approached Mr. Hickman and informed him that people had made police reports of his activity, which was
causing a domestic disturbance. Id. at ¶¶22, 23. As in his original Complaint, Mr. Hickman alleges he “was not detained, arrested, or cited, and Defendants ultimately disengaged and returned to their patrol vehicles.” Id. at ¶26.
Mr. Hickman filed this action on January 26, 2026, against the City of Pasco and Officers Dietrich and Vargas, alleging claims for violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. ECF No. 1. The Court dismissed the original complaint for failure to state a claim. See ECF No. 20 at 2. Mr. Hickman filed an Amended
Complaint on April 27, 2026. ECF No. 21. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). A complaint that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12, dismissal may be warranted based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a cognizable legal theory. Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admission v.
United States, 141 F.4th 1056, 1065 (9th Cir.). In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5
(2014); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and are held to a less
stringent standard than those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts' treatment of pro se filings;
accordingly, we continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.”). Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009). “Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.” Id. at 232. Mr. Hickman alleges liability based on
violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. Each alleged constitutional violation is addressed. 1. First Amendment Retaliation To bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) he
was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant’s actions would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity, and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or motivating
factor in the defendant’s conduct.” O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 932 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006)). The First Amendment protects the right to film matters of public interest.
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995). Not all filming is protected. Solomon v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 2025 WL 1678174 at *1 (9th Cir. June 12, 2025) (upholding dismissal of First Amendment retaliation claim
based on plaintiff’s filming sidewalk of Fashion Show Mall). Mr. Hickman does not plead that he was filming matters of public interest. Rather, his Complaint makes clear that officers approached him because of reports
he was filming minors and causing a domestic disturbance. While Mr. Hickman may attempt to make a case for why his activity on the date in question warranted constitutional protection, this right is not “clearly established.” Officers Dietrich
and Vargas are therefore entitled to immunity on Mr. Hickman’s First Amendment Retaliation claims. 2. Fourth Amendment The Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful seizures. Mr. Hickman’s
Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants “attempted” to seize him but lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe he had committed any crime. He alleges that because an ordinary person wouldn’t feel free to leave, this was an
“attempted seizure.” He alleges that he suffered harm, including intimidation and interference with his liberty. The Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful seizures. Although a seizure may occur where an individual is detained or believes he is “not free to
leave,” see Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (1988), by Mr. Hickman’s own admission, “[n]o arrest or seizure ultimately occurred, and Defendants disengaged and returned to their patrol vehicles.” ECF No. 1 at 6.
Having failed to plead the violation of a clearly established right, Officers Dietrich and Vargas are entitled to immunity on Mr. Hickman’s Fourth Amendment violation claims.
Municipal Liability Under Monell, “[a] government entity may not be held liable under § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force
behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, , 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). To allege municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead
“that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff's] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the
constitutional violation.” Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). Policies that lead to liability under Monell can include “written policies” and “unwritten customs and practices,” as well as a “failure to train” employees. Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021).
“[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011) (internal citations omitted). Liability requires proof that “the need for more or different training [was] so
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390,
109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989). Mr. Hickman alleges the “City of Pasco failed to adequately train and supervise its officers regarding citizens’ First Amendment right to record in public
and the limits of lawful detention and seizure.” ECF No. 21 at 6. He fails, however, to allege specific facts showing that the City of Pasco was on actual or constructive notice in their training program that would tend to cause violations of citizens’ constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint fails to suggest an
obvious need for training that could support a theory of municipal liability. Leave to Amend “A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to
amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Swearington v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 624 F. App'x 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2015). For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that amendment would be futile.
Even should Mr. Hickman be able to allege facts to cure pleading deficiencies, amendment would not overcome immunity. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court's denial of leave to amend
because the proposed amendment would be futile where the proposed amended complaint failed to state a Monell claim against claim against the City of Covina). ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 22, is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, ECF No. 21, is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 3. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal of this Order would not be taken in good faith and would lack any arguable basis in law or fact. IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter this Order, enter judgment, provide copies to Plaintiff and counsel, and CLOSE the file. DATED June 29, 2026. ~ REBECCA L.PENNELL | UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ORDER OL NICNMICCAT _ @