Cline v. Duckett

Opinion

2026 WL 2068035

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Jonathan J. CLINE, Appellant,

v.

Melinda L. DUCKETT, f/k/a Melinda L. Cline, Appellee.

Supreme Court No. S-19197

July 17, 2026

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, John C. Cagle, Judge. Superior Court No. 3PA-21-01648 CI

Attorneys and Law Firms

Jonathan J. Cline, pro se, Anchorage, Appellant.

Tara Logsdon, AK Law LLC, Palmer, for Appellee.

Before: Carney, Chief Justice, and Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices.

OPINION

HENDERSON, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Star page 1*1 A husband and wife divorced, and the superior court divided the marital estate unequally in favor of the wife, including ordering the husband to pay 55% of the capital gains taxes incurred through the sale of marital property. The court further issued a child support order that included provisions for the parties’ disabled adult daughter. The husband appeals, arguing that the judge was biased and raising several challenges to the court's child support order and equitable division of the marital estate.

We reject the husband's claims of judicial bias. We affirm the child support award, the court's characterization of property, and its denial of a credit for the husband's claimed expenditures on the marital estate. We also affirm the court's equitable division of the marital estate, with one exception: We remand for further findings regarding the court's unequal division of capital gains taxes.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Bifurcated Divorce Decree

Jonathan Cline and Melinda Duckett were married in 1997. They had four children together. They separated in April 2021.

In April 2022, the parties agreed to a bifurcated divorce. They stipulated to certain terms, including that Cline would be reimbursed for “repairs completed on marital real estate” in the amount of $61,690.

The superior court issued a divorce decree at that time, reserving the issues of Cline's child support obligation¹ and division of the marital estate for later resolution.

B. Divorce Trial

The parties litigated the remaining issues during a trial that took place over four days between March and August 2023. The issues included Cline's child support obligation, the classification of certain items as separate or marital property, and equitable division of the marital estate.

1. Testimony related to Cline's child support obligation

The parties disputed Cline's child support obligation for their second-youngest daughter, who was an adult by the time trial began and graduated from high school during the trial. The parties testified that she had intellectual disabilities and had been living in assisted living facilities since she was thirteen. Cline argued that neither parent should owe either past or ongoing child support for her beyond the cost of her room and board because she had been “under the care of the [S]tate” for years, with the State covering her “necessary needs.” He told the court that he had not had much contact with her since he and Duckett had separated, did not “see her very often,” and had “probably seen her physically four or five times in the last two years.”

Duckett argued that Cline should owe child support to help cover their daughter's expenses beyond the cost of room and board. She explained that although their daughter did not live with either parent, Duckett was her legal guardian and conservator; coordinated her care, education, and therapy with little involvement from Cline; and visited her at least once a week at the facility where she lived. She said she covered their daughter's everyday expenses like clothing, toiletries, and spending money, spending about $1,280 per month in total. She testified that room and board comprised $600 of that amount, and that she expected room and board would be covered by Social Security once their daughter was approved for benefits.

2. Testimony related to the classification of separate and marital property

Star page 2*2 The parties disputed whether the court should classify a certain monetary gift as separate or marital property.

Cline told the court that during the marriage his mother loaned the parties $150,000 to develop one of their properties. He said that after he paid off $100,000 of that loan, his mother decided that she wanted to give each of her sons a $100,000 early inheritance gift. He testified that she forgave the $50,000 remaining on the loan and also sent him a check for $50,000. He said that he was away from home when the check arrived in the mail and that he told Duckett to deposit it into one of their shared accounts.

Cline's mother also testified about the inheritance, indicating that she intended the entire $100,000 early inheritance to go to her son, and that she did not intend for the gift to go to Duckett. Duckett told the court that the $150,000 loan was marital and that she was never informed that Cline's mother was forgiving only Cline's half of the loan.

3. Testimony related to the equitable division of the marital estate

The parties each sought a 60% portion of the marital estate, which included some real property and proceeds held in trust from properties they had already sold. They testified at length about their respective education, work history throughout the marriage, and earning capacities.²

Duckett told the court that she was a physical therapist, but that she had primarily been a homemaker during the marriage. She re-entered the full-time workforce outside of the home in October 2021, and at the time of trial was earning about $55/hour with a recent tentative raise. She testified that caring for her children still limited her earning capacity.

Cline testified that in addition to working as a pilot during the marriage, he had also worked in real estate and had been licensed as a contractor. He said he expected his future sole source of income to be his job as a pilot. On the last day of trial he informed the court that he had taken a new pilot job. He said it offered good long-term prospects, although it started with a wage decrease.

Cline also testified that he had lost around a quarter of a million dollars to “a scammer” between the time of separation and the trial.

C. Superior Court Order

The court issued an order regarding child support and division of the marital estate in April 2024.

The court rejected Cline's argument that neither party should owe child support for their adult daughter residing in the assisted living facility. It found that Cline owed past support through the date of that daughter's high school graduation pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 90.3.³ For purposes of calculating Cline's support obligation, it adopted the income figure stated in Cline's proposed findings of fact, finding that his adjusted annual income was $109,249.

Star page 3*3 The court also ordered Cline to provide ongoing support for the parties’ adult daughter, recognizing that courts may order post-majority support for adult children in similar contexts.⁴ The court credited Duckett's testimony that she spent about $1,280 per month on their daughter's expenses. It found this amount to be “reasonable and necessary,” and reasoned that the parties should split this monthly cost evenly to provide ongoing support for their daughter until she began receiving Social Security benefits. It urged the parties to continue supporting her beyond that point “as long as [they] [were] able.”

The court also rejected Cline's request for a $100,000 “carve out” from the value of the marital estate to reflect the inheritance gift from his mother. It found that Cline “ha[d] not proven that this portion [was] non-marital” given the parties’ testimony that $50,000 had gone toward forgiving a loan on marital property and the other $50,000 had been deposited into a shared account. It observed that Cline's mother's testimony was not “informative” and did not indicate that Cline had intended to keep the inheritance as separate property when the gift was made.

The court then turned to dividing the marital estate. It noted that in fashioning an equitable overall division of the marital estate, it would consider the factors set forth in Merrill.⁵ It made findings of fact regarding many of the factors, including the age, health, financial condition, and earning capacity of each party.⁶ The court found that the Merrill factors supported awarding 55% of the estate to Duckett. It based this division primarily on “Cline's higher earning potential and [Duckett's] role” as a homemaker throughout the marriage.

D. Denial Of Cline's Motion For Reconsideration

Cline moved for reconsideration, raising four challenges to the court's order that are relevant to this appeal.

First, he argued that the court had failed to make specific findings about whether the parties’ daughter had been in either party's primary physical custody before she graduated from high school, which he argued was required for a valid award under Civil Rule 90.3.⁷ He also argued that to the extent the court had implicitly found Duckett had primary physical custody, that was legal error because their daughter had not actually lived with either parent between separation and her graduation, but rather in an assisted living facility.

Second, he challenged the court's division of the marital estate, arguing that the court should have awarded Cline at least a 50% share.

Third, he argued that although he had requested credits for separate funds he used to preserve marital assets between separation and divorce, the court had failed to make any written findings on this point. He asked the court to award him $59,121.32 in post-separation credits for funds spent to preserve marital real property.⁸

Fourth, he asked the court to issue an order dividing the capital gains taxes the parties had incurred in selling marital real estate, which the court had not addressed in its order. He argued that the parties should “use the funds held in trust to pay off any remaining capital gains liabilities, then divide the remaining funds in trust between themselves.”

The court rejected all of these arguments. First, it noted that it had “expressly recognize[d] that [Duckett] had primary physical custody” of their adult daughter through her high school graduation for purposes of the child support award. Second, it reaffirmed that its division of the marital estate had been “fair and equitable.” Third, it stated that Cline had “failed to establish any evidence at trial that would allow” it to award him a post-separation Ramsey credit.⁹ Fourth, the court ordered that the payment of capital gains taxes would “follow the ... overall division of the marital estate, meaning [Cline] is responsible for 55% of the tax liability and [Duckett] is responsible for the remaining 45%.”

Star page 4*4 Cline appeals.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review claims of actual judicial bias for abuse of discretion, while applying de novo review to claims of an appearance of bias.¹⁰

We review a superior court's award of child support for abuse of discretion, but the question of whether the superior court used the proper method to calculate support is a legal question that we review de novo.¹¹

The superior court's equitable division of marital assets involves three steps: characterizing property as separate or marital, assigning a value to that property, and equitably dividing the marital property.¹² First, “[t]he characterization of property as separate or marital may involve both legal and factual questions.”¹³ Whether the superior court applied the correct legal rule in characterizing property is a question of law we review de novo, while underlying findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.¹⁴ “A finding is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court has made a mistake.”¹⁵ Second, the valuation of assets is a factual determination that we also review for clear error.¹⁶ Third, we review the equitable division itself for abuse of discretion.¹⁷ This includes the division of marital debt.¹⁸ We will only find an abuse of discretion “if the court considered improper factors, failed to consider statutorily mandated factors, or gave too much weight to some factors.”¹⁹

Additionally, when equitably dividing a marital estate, the court must render findings of fact that are “explicit and sufficiently detailed to give this court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision.”²⁰ Whether the court's findings are sufficiently clear is a legal question that we review de novo.²¹

We review the superior court's decision whether to award a Ramsey credit for abuse of discretion.²²

IV. DISCUSSION

Cline raises seven claims on appeal. We address these claims in three broad categories. First, Cline argues that the superior court judge was biased due to a conflict of interest. Second, he challenges two of the findings underlying the court's child support order. Third, he challenges several aspects of the court's equitable distribution of the marital estate: its characterization of the $100,000 inheritance gift from Cline's mother as marital property, its award of 55% of the estate to Duckett, its rejection of Cline's request for a Ramsey credit, and its unequal division of capital gains taxes from sale of the marital property.

Star page 5*5 We observe no evidence in the record to support Cline's claim of judicial bias, and we affirm the superior court's orders related to child support and characterization of property. We also affirm most of the court's equitable distribution of the marital assets, but we remand for more detailed findings regarding the court's assignment of capital gains taxes.

A. The Judge's And Duckett's Lawyer's Overlapping Service As Judicial Officers In Palmer Does Not Amount To A Conflict Or Support A Claim Of Bias.

Cline argues that the superior court judge who presided over the divorce trial had a conflict of interest because he and Duckett's lawyer served as judges in Palmer at the same time. Duckett's lawyer served as a magistrate judge in Palmer from 2014 until 2019.²³ The superior court judge who presided over the divorce trial was appointed to the Palmer superior court in 2019.²⁴ Cline argues that the judge should have disclosed this relationship at the start of the proceedings, and that his failure to do so “tainted” his subsequent orders.

Alaska Statute 22.20.020 requires the recusal of a judge where an identified conflict of interest exists or where “the judicial officer feels that, for any reason, a fair and impartial decision cannot be given.”²⁵ While the statute does not expressly require recusal based on the mere appearance of bias, we have held that judges must give weight to preserving the appearance of impartiality in light of their ethical duties under the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct.²⁶

We have held that “[t]he requirements for establishing judicial bias are exacting.”²⁷ Litigants may not rest on adverse rulings as evidence of bias, but must prove that “the judge formed an opinion ... from extrajudicial sources, resulting in an opinion other than on the merits.”²⁸ A claim based on an “appearance of partiality” requires an even greater showing for reversal.²⁹

We conclude that the brief overlap in the period during which the superior court judge and Duckett's lawyer served as judicial officers with the Palmer Court, three years before the parties initiated this case, does not in itself present a conflict requiring recusal or give rise to an appearance of partiality. First, this overlap in judicial service does not fit into any of the categories requiring recusal or disclosure under the statute.³⁰ And second, Cline fails to demonstrate any improper bias by the court in these proceedings. He identifies no particular aspect of the court's decision-making that “show[s] the court was not impartial.”³¹ The court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were grounded in the record, and Cline's disagreement with those conclusions cannot, on its own, sustain a claim of actual bias.³²

Star page 6*6 Nor does Cline establish an appearance of bias mandating recusal or disclosure.³³ We have held that a judge's acquaintance or even friendship with a party does not, on its own, give rise to an appearance of bias that warrants reversal.³⁴ Indeed, the overlap in the superior court judge's and Duckett's lawyer's periods of judicial service is less significant than other relationships or associations which we have held did not give rise to an appearance of bias.³⁵ It would not, without more, “cause reasonable people to doubt” his “ability and willingness to be fair.”³⁶ Cline's claim of bias thus fails.

B. Cline's Challenges To The Child Support Order Are Without Merit.

1. Cline waived the argument that his losses to a scammer should be deducted from his income.

Cline's first challenge to the child support order is that the court improperly calculated his income. The superior court found Cline's adjusted annual income for 2021 to be $109,249 for the purposes of calculating his support obligation.³⁷ The court based this figure on the “average as posited by [Cline's] counsel.” Cline argues that the court should have reduced this figure because he sustained “substantial losses” in a financial scam between 2021 and 2023.

Although Cline testified about his losses at trial, there is no evidence in the record that he ever asked the superior court to offset his income by the amount of those losses. We observe no plain error in the superior court's determination of Cline's income,³⁸ and we decline to further address this unpreserved argument.³⁹

2. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Cline to pay child support for the parties’ adult daughter.

Star page 7*7 The superior court ordered Cline to pay child support for the parties’ adult daughter through her graduation pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 90.3.⁴⁰ The court did not explicitly discuss physical custody when it made this award,⁴¹ but clarified in its order partially granting Cline's motion for reconsideration that Duckett “had primary physical custody” of their daughter “during the pendency of the case.” Cline argues that the child support order was improper under Civil Rule 90.3 because their daughter has not physically resided with either parent since she was 13.

A review of our relevant precedent, however, demonstrates that Cline's conception of physical custody for purposes of determining child support is overly rigid. While it is true that a court generally calculates whether one party has primary physical custody for purposes of a child support order based on how much time the child resides with each parent,⁴² we have held in an adjacent context that sending a child to a boarding school “is [not] the equivalent of giving custody to a third party.”⁴³ We reason along the same lines here that a parent does not forfeit physical custody by sending a child to an assisted care facility in order to meet that child's needs where there is evidence the parent still has a custodial role.⁴⁴ We observe that this interpretation of Civil Rule 90.3 is consistent with the primary purpose of the rule, which is “to ensure that child support orders are adequate to meet the needs of children, subject to the ability of parents to pay.”⁴⁵

The record here shows that although the parties’ daughter resided outside their home after the age of 13 due to her intellectual disabilities, Duckett visited her regularly; facilitated her care, counseling, and education; served as her legal guardian and conservator; and covered her expenses. Meanwhile, Cline admitted that he did not see her very often and had not participated meaningfully in her care. We see no abuse of discretion or underlying clear error in the court's determination that Duckett had primary physical custody of the parties’ daughter even though she resided in assisted living,⁴⁶ and no error in its conclusion that Cline owed past child support through her graduation based on that custody determination.⁴⁷

In addition to ordering past child support, the superior court also ordered Cline to contribute $640 per month to cover half of the daughter's monthly expenses going forward until she began receiving Social Security disability benefits. To the extent that Cline challenges that part of the support order, his argument fails under our reasoning in Streb v. Streb.⁴⁸ In that case we held that a court may order continuing support payments for an adult child where evidence shows she is “incapable of supporting ... herself by reason of a physical or mental disability.”⁴⁹ While Cline implies that their daughter is in fact capable of supporting herself, he bases this argument on factual allegations that are outside the record. The superior court credited Duckett's testimony at trial that the parties’ daughter was incapable of financially or physically caring for herself and that she would need ongoing support into adulthood. Moreover, when asked whether the parties’ daughter was severely disabled, Cline acknowledged that “in some ways she is” and that she had a guardian and conservator, which in itself requires a finding of incapacity.⁵⁰ We see no error or abuse of discretion in the court's decision that the parties’ adult daughter qualified for continued support under Streb.⁵¹

C. We Affirm The Superior Court's Characterization Of Property And Division Of Marital Assets, But Remand For Additional Findings Regarding Its Division Of Capital Gains Taxes.

1. The superior court did not clearly err in characterizing the $100,000 early inheritance from Cline's mother as marital property.

Star page 8*8 Of Cline's challenges to the superior court's division of the marital estate, we first address whether the court should have characterized his $100,000 early inheritance as separate property.

Before equitably dividing the marital estate, the trial court must characterize assets as separate or marital property.⁵² “Gifts or inheritances received by one spouse during marriage are generally not considered marital property.”⁵³ But “[s]eparate property can be transmuted into marital property ‘where that is the intent of the owner and there is an act or acts which demonstrate that intent.’ ”⁵⁴

The inheritance was gifted in two parts: Cline's mother sent him a check for $50,000 and forgave the $50,000 debt he owed her from the loan she had made to the parties to improve their marital property. We see no error in the superior court's determination that both halves of the gift transmuted to marital property.

First, as to the $50,000 check, “[t]here is a strong presumption that placing separate property into a joint account demonstrates an intent to treat the property as marital.”⁵⁵ Absent evidence to the contrary, such treatment of property is enough to justify a marital property finding.⁵⁶ Both Duckett and Cline testified that when Duckett received the check in the mail, Cline told her to deposit it into their shared account. The record is devoid of contrary evidence that Cline intended at the time to keep the money separate. While Cline points to his mother's testimony that she intended the gift to go solely to him, her testimony is not probative of Cline's intent.⁵⁷ The superior court did not clearly err in finding that Cline intended for the $50,000 check to become marital property.⁵⁸

Second, as to the $50,000 debt that Cline's mother forgave, we have held that payment of marital bills out of separate property converts the separate funds used into marital property.⁵⁹ And we presume that debt incurred during marriage is marital absent a showing that the parties intended the debt to be separate.⁶⁰ Here, there is no evidence that either party intended the original loan from Cline's mother to be separate debt,⁶¹ so the repayment of that marital debt with Cline's inheritance presumptively converted the $50,000 into marital property.⁶² Cline produced no evidence that he intended, at the time, to treat the forgiven $50,000 as separate property. The superior court did not clearly err in finding that this portion of the inheritance was marital.

2. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 55% of the marital estate to Duckett.

Star page 9*9 We next address Cline's argument that the court's unequal distribution — 55% to Duckett and 45% to Cline — was unjust.

“In dividing property, either equally or unequally, trial courts should be guided by the [Merrill] factors ....”⁶³ The factors are not exhaustive, and the trial court need not make findings as to each, “but its findings must be sufficient to indicate the factual basis for the conclusion reached.”⁶⁴ Where the court makes sufficient findings regarding the Merrill factors, “we generally will not reevaluate the merits of the property division”⁶⁵ unless the division is “based on a clearly erroneous factual finding or mistake of law” or is “clearly unjust.”⁶⁶

We observe no clear factual errors underlying the court's consideration of the Merrill factors. The record amply supports the court's findings regarding the parties’ ages, health, stations in life during the marriage, financial conditions, and future earning capacities.⁶⁷

Nor do we see any legal error or clear injustice in the court's equitable division in Duckett's favor.⁶⁸ The court based the award mainly on Cline's “higher earning potential” and Duckett's role as a homemaker during the marriage, which the court found had put Duckett's physical therapy career on pause and meant that she was “having to start fresh” in the workforce. We have upheld an unequal division of the marital estate on nearly identical reasoning,⁶⁹ and we conclude here that the court's award of 55% of the estate to Duckett on this basis “fairly allocate[d] the economic effect of divorce.”⁷⁰ While Cline argues that the distribution is unfair because his minimum annual earnings as a pilot amount to less than Duckett's annual salary, Cline's own testimony indicated that he expected to earn more than the minimum, and that he took his current job because it offered better long-term wages and benefits despite an initial pay decrease. Moreover, the financial condition of the parties is only one of the factors the court considers when dividing the estate; the court may base a property division on a “flexible range of reasons, including to compensate a spouse for the effect that her role in the marriage has had on her earning capacity.”⁷¹ The superior court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate.⁷²

3. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award Cline Ramsey credit for expenditures on the marital estate.

Star page 10*10 The third challenge we address to the superior court's equitable division of the marital estate is Cline's argument that the court failed to credit him for personal expenditures he made for the estate between separation and divorce.

We held in Ramsey v. Ramsey that when dividing the marital estate, the superior court must “consider payments made to maintain marital property from post-separation income.”⁷³ It may award a credit for such payments, but there is “no fixed rule requiring credit” in any given situation.⁷⁴ Rather, the court should consider payments from non-marital income as “one of the circumstances to be weighed ... in dividing the marital property,”⁷⁵ and must make written findings explaining the basis for awarding or denying a credit sufficient for us to discern its rationale.⁷⁶

We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cline Ramsey credit here. At the close of trial Cline asked the superior court for a credit of $34,117.51 to reflect “separate funds used solely to preserve the marital properties for sale.” The court declined the credit without expressly discussing it. While the court should have made findings explaining its decision on this point,⁷⁷ it remedied that issue in its response to Cline's motion for reconsideration when it stated that Cline “failed to establish any evidence at trial that would allow ... a Ramsey credit or other offset.” The court had observed in its original order that Cline's financial testimony was “not highly organized” and that the financial exhibit on which he based his Ramsey credit request “tend[ed] to obfuscate the actual characterization of the funds.” In combination, these findings are sufficient to give us “a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision” to decline a credit.⁷⁸ And the record supports the superior court's conclusion that Cline's request lacked an evidentiary basis.⁷⁹ In particular, the financial tables on which he relies are, as the superior court put it, “not helpful.” The superior court did not abuse its “broad discretion” in denying Cline a Ramsey credit.⁸⁰

4. The superior court's findings were not adequate to support the division of the capital gains taxes.

Finally, we address Cline's argument that the court abused its discretion in assigning him 55% of the capital gains taxes incurred through sale of marital property while only awarding him 45% of the estate.

Unpaid capital gains taxes incurred upon sale of marital property before the court divides that property are treated and allocated as marital debt.⁸¹ Like property, marital debt is allocated upon consideration of the Merrill factors.⁸² When the court allocates marital debt, its findings “must be sufficient to indicate the factual basis for the conclusion reached.”⁸³

Star page 11*11 Here we conclude that a remand is necessary because we are “unable to review the merits of the superior court's division” of the capital gains taxes.⁸⁴ The superior court did not address the division of capital gains taxes at all in its original order. In its order partially granting Cline's motion for reconsideration, it simply stated that the payment of capital gains taxes would “follow the ... overall division of the marital estate, meaning [Cline] is responsible for 55% of the tax liability and [Duckett] is responsible for the remaining 45%.” But this division of the taxes does not automatically follow from the property division itself, as it effectively widens the difference between the parties’ awards.⁸⁵

The court should have made findings that would allow an understanding of how the Merrill factors supported what amounts to an alteration of the overall division of the estate.⁸⁶ We therefore remand for the court to explain how the Merrill factors support its allocation of the capital gains taxes.

V. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the superior court's orders regarding child support, as well as its characterization of property, award of 55% of the marital estate to Duckett, and denial of a Ramsey credit, but REMAND for additional findings regarding its division of the capital gains taxes.

Footnotes

1

There were no disputed custody or support issues regarding the two oldest children, both of whom were over 18 when the case was initiated. Litigation of custody and support addressed the two youngest children, the older of whom turned 18 during the pendency of the case.

2

As discussed below, the court considered this testimony in its evaluation of what would constitute an overall equitable division of the marital estate utilizing the factors set forth in Merrill v. Merrill — ages of the parties, earning ability, conduct during the marriage, station in life, circumstances and necessities, health and physical condition, and financial circumstances. 368 P.2d 546, 547-48 n.4 (Alaska 1962).

3

Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 (Child Support Awards). The court also ordered Cline to pay ongoing child support for their youngest daughter until she turned 18 and graduated from high school.

4

Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 800-01 (Alaska 1989).

5

368 P.2d at 547-48 n.4; see also AS 25.24.160(a)(4) (codifying equitable factors).

6

See AS 25.24.160(a)(4).

7

Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 (calculating child support awards differently based on primary or shared physical custody).

8

This amount differed from his initial request, which was $34,117.51.

9

See Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992) (holding that trial court must consider party's personal, post-separation expenditures on marital property when it divides marital estate and may award credit for such expenditures).

10

Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1062-63 & n.7 (Alaska 2013); Phillips v. State, 271 P.3d 457, 459 (Alaska App. 2012).

11

Swaney v. Granger, 297 P.3d 132, 136 (Alaska 2013); Faulkner v. Goldfuss, 46 P.3d 993, 996 (Alaska 2002).

12

Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 458-59 (Alaska 2013).

13

Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 330 (Alaska 2006).

14

Beals, 303 P.3d at 459.

15

Fredrickson v. Button, 426 P.3d 1047, 1052 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess, 259 P.3d 462, 468 (Alaska 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

16

Beals, 303 P.3d at 459.

17

Hudson v. Hudson, 532 P.3d 272, 279 (Alaska 2023).

18

Gallant v. Gallant, 945 P.2d 795, 803 (Alaska 1997); see Beals, 303 P.3d at 459, 461-63.

19

Hudson, 532 P.3d at 279.

20

Beals, 303 P.3d at 459.

21

Id.

22

Hall v. Hall, 446 P.3d 781, 783 (Alaska 2019).

23

Alaska Court System Annual Report FY 2020: July 1, 2019 – June 30, 2020, https://courts.alaska.gov/admin/docs/fy20-narratives.pdf.

24

Current Judges as of May 2025, Alaska Judicial Council, https://www.ajc.state.ak.us/judges/judgemain.html.

25

AS 22.20.020 (enumerating nine reasons for disqualification, including where judge is related to party's attorney by blood or has direct financial interest in the matter); see also Amidon v. State, 604 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Alaska 1979) (holding that AS 22.20.020(a) requires recusal if there is bias).

26

See Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Alaska 2013) (citing Amidon, 604 P.2d at 577-78); see also Alaska Code of Jud. Conduct Canon 3(E)(1), 3(F)(1) (requiring judge to “disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” unless grounds for disqualification are waived by parties).

27

Hooks v. Alaska USA Fed. Credit Union, 413 P.3d 1192, 1197 (Alaska 2018).

28

Id. (omission in original) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 252 P.3d 998, 1010 (Alaska 2011)).

29

Carr v. Carr, 152 P.3d 450, 459 (Alaska 2007).

30

See AS 22.20.020.

31

Hooks, 413 P.3d at 1197.

32

See id. (holding that litigants alleging bias “must point to specific actions, words, or aspects of the proceeding that show the court was not impartial”); Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Alaska 2013) (“[E]ven incorrect rulings against a party do not show bias in and of themselves.”).

33

See Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 38 P.3d 1162, 1170 (Alaska 2002) (“We have interpreted AS 22.20.020(a)(9) to require a judge to consider ... the appearance of partiality.”).

34

Jerry B. v. Sally B., 377 P.3d 916, 929 (Alaska 2016) (holding there was no appearance of bias where there was “no evidence in the record to support the accusation that the judge's relationship with the victim's sister ‘exceeded mere social acquaintance or social friendship’ ” (quoting Phillips v. State, 271 P.3d 457, 470 (Alaska App. 2012))); see also Long v. Long, 816 P.2d 145, 156 (Alaska 1991) (reasoning that appellant's “ability to connect this case tangentially to” a party in a way that implies a conflict “simply is not a ‘great showing’ of apparent partiality”).

35

See, e.g., Jerry B., 377 P.3d at 929.

36

Id. at 929-30 (rejecting bias claim based on “speculative assumptions” that “attenuated connection” between party and judge could have affected judge's decision-making); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 19-488 (2019) (“[A] judge's acquaintance with a lawyer or party, standing alone, is not a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality. A judge therefore has no obligation to disclose his or her acquaintance with a lawyer ....” (footnote omitted)).

37

See Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3.

38

See Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V., 319 P.3d 219, 225-26 & n.27 (Alaska 2014) (noting this court will only review waived arguments for plain error where an “obvious mistake has been made which creates a high likelihood that injustice has resulted” (quoting Paula E. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 276 P.3d 422, 436 (Alaska 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Without engaging in a full merits analysis, we observe that the superior court's finding as to Cline's annual income appears to be supported by the record. The superior court in fact adopted the precise number Cline proposed as his adjusted annual income.

39

Ivy v. Calais Co., 397 P.3d 267, 275 (Alaska 2017) (“An argument is ordinarily not preserved for appeal if it was not raised below ....”).

40

See Ruppe v. Ruppe, 358 P.3d 1284, 1292-93 (Alaska 2015) (holding that child support should “continue beyond the time a child turns 18 if that child is still in high school” absent exceptional circumstances).

41

See Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(a), (b) (calculating child support award amount based on physical custody arrangement).

42

Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(f)(2) (providing that parent has primary physical custody if child “reside[s] with the other parent ... less than 30 percent of the year”).

43

Cusack v. Cusack, 202 P.3d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 2009).

44

See id.; see also Gallant v. Gallant, 945 P.2d 795, 799 n.5 (Alaska 1997) (affirming superior court's flexibility to come up with “reasonable solution to the problem of awarding support” where child spends significant time outside home for medical treatment).

45

Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. I.B (emphasis added).

46

Faulkner v. Goldfuss, 46 P.3d 993, 996 (Alaska 2002) (“We will reverse the superior court's resolution of custody issues only if we are convinced that the record shows an abuse of discretion, or if controlling factual findings are clearly erroneous.”).

47

Id. (applying de novo review to proper method of calculating child support as question of law).

48

774 P.2d 798 (Alaska 1989).

49

Id. at 800-01. We note that Cline's implication that such an award must be based on physical custody is unsupported by the caselaw. See id. (holding that Civil Rule 90.3 does not govern awards for continuing support payments for adult children with disabilities, such awards should be “reasonably calculated to reimburse the moving party for a fair percentage of funds actually spent on reasonable child care expenditures,” and not discussing physical custody).

50

See AS 13.26.266.

51

See Streb, 774 P.2d at 800-01. To the extent that Cline appears to dispute the amount of support ordered, we also note that the $1,280 figure was supported by the record as a reasonable calculation of actual funds spent.

52

Schmitz v. Schmitz, 88 P.3d 1116, 1124 (Alaska 2004).

53

Johns v. Johns, 945 P.2d 1222, 1225 n.4 (Alaska 1997).

54

Bellanich v. Bellanich, 936 P.2d 141, 144 (Alaska 1997) (quoting Chotiner v. Chotiner, 829 P.2d 829, 832 (Alaska 1992)).

55

Miller v. Miller, 105 P.3d 1136, 1142 (Alaska 2005) (holding funds given to party as early inheritance were transmuted to marital property when he transferred them to joint account).

56

See Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 556 (Alaska 1990) (holding that in absence of evidence to contrary, jointly held shares presumed to be marital).

57

See Miller, 105 P.3d at 1142 (reasoning that decision to move funds into joint account is “viewed as a demonstration of ... intent to treat the property as marital” absent contrary evidence of party's intent).

58

Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 459 (Alaska 2013) (explaining that “[u]nderlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate are factual questions” that we review for clear error).

59

Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 332-33 (Alaska 2006).

60

Veselsky v. Veselsky, 113 P.3d 629, 636 (Alaska 2005) (holding that student loan obtained during marriage properly considered marital debt absent evidence showing parties intended it to be separate).

61

In fact, the record shows that the first half of the loan was repaid out of a joint account.

62

See Odom, 141 P.3d at 332-33 (reasoning that payment of marital bills out of separate account converted money actually used into marital property).

63

Jones v. Jones, 942 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Alaska 1997); see AS 25.24.160(a)(4) (codifying Merrill factors).

64

Downs v. Downs, 440 P.3d 294, 298 (Alaska 2019) (quoting Nicholson v. Wolfe, 974 P.2d 417, 422 (Alaska 1999)).

65

Id. at 298 (quoting Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707, 713 (Alaska 2010)).

66

Id. at 297 (quoting Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148, 1152 (Alaska 2018)).

67

See AS 25.24.160(a)(4).

68

Downs, 440 P.3d at 297 (holding that division of property will be reversed only if clearly unjust).

69

See Cartee, 239 P.3d at 714 (upholding 60/40 division based on fact that wife “bore the entire burden of daily child rearing” during marriage which necessarily impeded her career development).

70

AS 25.24.160(a)(4).

71

Cartee, 239 P.3d at 714.

72

See id.

73

834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992).

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Hall v. Hall, 446 P.3d 781, 784-85 (Alaska 2019).

77

See id. (explaining that court must explain decision on Ramsey credit “with sufficient written findings”).

78

Doyle v. Doyle, 815 P.2d 366, 368 (Alaska 1991); cf. Hall, 446 P.3d at 784 (“[W]e must be able to discern that the superior court considered a Ramsey credit and what its rationale was for awarding or denying it.”).

79

We observe that Cline requested different credit amounts after trial, in his motion for reconsideration, and in his briefing to us. Moreover it is unclear whether any of the credits he was requesting had already been captured in the $61,690 reimbursement that the parties had stipulated to and that he had received earlier in the case.

80

Hall, 446 P.3d at 784.

81

Dundas v. Dundas, 362 P.3d 468, 478 (Alaska 2015) (citing 2 Brett Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property § 8.28, at 913-14 (3d ed. 2005)).

82

See id.

83

Lang v. Lang, 741 P.2d 1193, 1195-96 (Alaska 1987).

84

See Brooks v. Brooks, 677 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Alaska 1984).

85

Let's assume the property to be divided is $100 and the capital gains tax to be divided is $10. Under the court's clarification about the tax liability, Cline would end up with $39.50 ($45 property minus $5.50 tax) and Duckett would end up with $50.50 ($55 property minus $4.50 tax). The overall estate would be reduced to $90. This changes Cline's share of the estate to about 44% ($39.50/$90) and Duckett's share to about 56% ($50.50/$90).

86

See Money v. Money, 852 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Alaska 1993) (“It is well settled that the superior court must state the facts upon which it bases its property division.”); Lang, 741 P.2d at 1196 (remanding where “the court gave no indication of which, if any, of the Merrill factors it weighed” in dividing estate).

End of Document