Clifford W. Carrier v. Terrell D. Hutto, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections

Fourth Circuit

Clifford W. Carrier v. Terrell D. Hutto, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections

754 F.2d 520, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28959

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 7, 1985

Docket83-6039

StatusPublished

Cited by12 cases

This text of 754 F.2d 520 (Clifford W. Carrier v. Terrell D. Hutto, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Clifford W. Carrier v. Terrell D. Hutto, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, 754 F.2d 520, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28959 (4th Cir. 1985).

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PER CURIAM:

Being of the opinion that under some circumstances, an error by an attorney which does not constitute a violation of the sixth amendment might be “cause” within the meaning of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), we reverse the decision of the district court and remand this proceeding to that court for a determination of whether Carrier can successfully meet the “cause” requirement of Wainwright, and if so, whether he can then satisfy the “prejudice” prong of the Wainwright exception to procedural bar. The basis for our ruling is adequately set forth in the panel majority opinion and need not be repeated here. Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1983).

Judge Russell, Judge Widener, Judge Hall, and Judge Chapman dissent, believing that the district court should be affirmed because of Carrier’s failure to exhaust his state remedies and his failure to satisfy the cause and prejudice requirements of Wainwright as articulated by Judge Hall in his dissenting opinion, 724 F.2d at 403.

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PER CURIAM:

Being of the opinion that under some circumstances, an error by an attorney which does not constitute a violation of the sixth amendment might be “cause” within the meaning of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), we reverse the decision of the district court and remand this proceeding to that court for a determination of whether Carrier can successfully meet the “cause” requirement of Wainwright, and if so, whether he can then satisfy the “prejudice” prong of the Wainwright exception to procedural bar. The basis for our ruling is adequately set forth in the panel majority opinion and need not be repeated here. Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1983).

Judge Russell, Judge Widener, Judge Hall, and Judge Chapman dissent, believing that the district court should be affirmed because of Carrier’s failure to exhaust his state remedies and his failure to satisfy the cause and prejudice requirements of Wainwright as articulated by Judge Hall in his dissenting opinion, 724 F.2d at 403.

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754 F.2d 520, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28959, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clifford-w-carrier-v-terrell-d-hutto-director-of-the-virginia-ca4-1985.

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