Clifford L. Alexander, Secretary of the Army v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Global Van Lines, Inc., A. Arnold and Son Transfer & Storage Co., Movers Round Table, Intervenors. O.K. Transfer and Storage Co. (Shawnee, Oklahoma) v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Global Van Lines, Inc., Intervenors. Sherwood Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Global Van Lines, Inc., Intervenors

567 F.2d 91
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJune 29, 1977
Docket75-1722
StatusPublished

This text of 567 F.2d 91 (Clifford L. Alexander, Secretary of the Army v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Global Van Lines, Inc., A. Arnold and Son Transfer & Storage Co., Movers Round Table, Intervenors. O.K. Transfer and Storage Co. (Shawnee, Oklahoma) v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Global Van Lines, Inc., Intervenors. Sherwood Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Global Van Lines, Inc., Intervenors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clifford L. Alexander, Secretary of the Army v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Global Van Lines, Inc., A. Arnold and Son Transfer & Storage Co., Movers Round Table, Intervenors. O.K. Transfer and Storage Co. (Shawnee, Oklahoma) v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Global Van Lines, Inc., Intervenors. Sherwood Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Global Van Lines, Inc., Intervenors, 567 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

Opinion

567 F.2d 91

185 U.S.App.D.C. 224

Clifford L. ALEXANDER, Secretary of the Army, Petitioner,
v.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States of America,
Respondents,
Global Van Lines, Inc., A. Arnold and Son Transfer & Storage
Co., Movers Round Table, Intervenors.
O.K. TRANSFER AND STORAGE CO. (SHAWNEE, OKLAHOMA), Petitioner,
v.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States of America,
Respondents,
Global Van Lines, Inc., et al., Intervenors.
SHERWOOD VAN LINES, INC., Petitioner,
v.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States of America,
Respondents,
Global Van Lines, Inc., et al., Intervenors.

Nos. 75-1722, 75-1726 and 75-2164.

United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Feb. 23, 1977.
Decided June 29, 1977.

Judith S. Feigin, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Rex E. Lee, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ronald R. Glancz, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for petitioner in No. 75-1722.

Thomas R. Kingsley, Washington, D. C., for petitioner in No. 75-1726 and intervenor Movers Round Table in No. 75-1722.

Robert J. Gallagher, Washington, D. C., for petitioner in No. 75-2164 and intervenor A. Arnold & Son Transfer and Storage Co., Inc. in No. 75-1722. Paul F. Sullivan, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for intervenor A. Arnold & Son Transfer and Storage Co., Inc. in No. 75-1722.

Raymond Michael Ripple, Atty., I. C. C., Washington, D. C., with whom Arthur J. Cerra, Gen. Counsel, I. C. C., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for respondent I. C. C.

John H. D. Wigger, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for respondent United States in No. 75-1726. Edward E. Lawson and Robert B. Nicholson, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., also entered appearances for respondents in No. 75-2164.

Stanley I. Goldman, Washington, D. C., with whom Alan F. Wohlstetter, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for intervenors Global Van Lines, Inc., et al.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and McGOWAN and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge BAZELON.

BAZELON, Chief Judge:

The Interstate Commerce Commission denied gateway elimination applications by three irregular route motor common carriers of household goods. The applicants and the Secretary of the Army have filed petitions for review. The sole issue we must reach is whether the Commission should have considered evidence of military traffic in passing on these applications.1 We hold that the Commission's refusal to do so was arbitrary, and direct the Commission to reconsider petitioners' applications giving full weight to military traffic.

Background

For years, the Commission has acquiesced in a practice known as "tacking." A carrier with authority from "A" to "B" and from "B" to "C" was permitted to transport goods from "A" to "C" so long as the traffic was transported through "B", the gateway. The need to honor the gateway could be eliminated either by obtaining fresh authority from "A" to "C"2 or by, as explained below, satisfying the Childress gateway elimination criteria.3 A carrier unable to remove its gateway under Childress was permitted to continue to tack its authority by transporting goods through the gateway.

In the early 1970's, the Commission determined that the circuity inherent in tacking was inefficient and wasteful of gasoline. Consequently, the Commission by regulation prospectively prohibited tacking on movements of longer than 300 miles. Ex Parte MC-55, 119 M.C.C. 530 (1974). As relevant here, when the circuity of such a tacked route is over 20%, the carrier must cease transporting goods through the gateway if unable to obtain fresh authority or to satisfy Childress. In other words, a carrier no longer may tack its authorities "A" to "B" and from "B" to "C" in order to provide service from "A" to "C" through "B". Service from "A" to "C" must be direct, and can under Childress be provided if the carrier:

1) actually is transporting a substantial amount of traffic through the gateway, and in so operating, is effectively and efficiently competing with existing direct service carriers; and

2) elimination of the gateway would not enable the applicant to institute a new service or service so different from that presently provided as to materially improve the applicant's competitive position to the detriment of existing carriers.

In determining the "substantiality" of traffic moved through the gateway, only the two-year period prior to November 23, 1973 is considered. 49 C.F.R. § 1065.1.

O.K. Transfer, A. Arnold and Sons, and Sherwood Van Lines, Inc., are irregular route carriers that sought elimination of gateways as required by Ex Parte MC-55. They sought to do so by satisfying Childress. In a consolidated order dated February 25, 1975, the Commission denied the applications of O.K. and Arnold. It found that neither applicant had transported enough non-military traffic through their gateways to satisfy the substantiality requirement of Childress ; military traffic was given only "the most minimal weight" because the Commission concluded that such traffic was dispensed on a rotational basis and hence was not "competitive." Thus, the Commission reasoned, O.K. and Arnold were not "effectively competing with existing competitors." The Department of Defense (DOD), which had not previously participated in this proceeding,4 sought leave to intervene and sought, along with O.K. and Arnold, rehearing and reconsideration of the February 25 order. In support of its claim that it dispenses its traffic through a competitive process, DOD filed an affidavit by Herbert Paige, Senior Traffic Management Specialist, Military Traffic Management Command. By order of May 27, 1975, the Commission granted DOD's motion to intervene, but denied the motions for reconsideration. The Commission reaffirmed its holding that military traffic is non-competitive, spelling out its reasoning with greater specificity. The Secretary of the Army, on behalf of DOD, O.K. and Arnold all seek review of this order.5 The application for gateway elimination filed by Sherwood Van Lines was denied on June 30, 1975. Again, the Commission refused to consider Sherwood's military traffic. Reconsideration was denied October 8, 1975 and Sherwood petitioned for review. The petitions of the three carriers and the Secretary have been consolidated on appeal.

The Competitive Nature of DOD's System of Traffic Distribution

When transporting the household goods of private shippers, the Interstate Commerce Act provides that no common carrier shall charge a different rate than that provided for by the applicable tariff. 49 U.S.C. § 317(b). However, the Act also provides that the United States may obtain reduced rates. 49 U.S.C. § 22. Cf. 49 U.S.C. § 5b(6).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Thompson Van Lines, Inc. v. United States
399 F. Supp. 1131 (District of Columbia, 1975)
Alexander v. Interstate Commerce Commission
567 F.2d 91 (D.C. Circuit, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
567 F.2d 91, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clifford-l-alexander-secretary-of-the-army-v-interstate-commerce-cadc-1977.