Clifford Chaun Loyer v. Patrick Covello

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: November 1, 2019
• Docket: 8:19-cv-02035
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 CLIFFORD CHAUN LOYER, ) Case No. 8:19-cv-02035-PSG-JC ) 11 Petitioner, ) 12 v. ) ) ) 13 ) ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING PATRICK COVELLO, ) PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 14 ) CORPUS ) 15 Respondent. ) ____________________________ ) 16 17 I. SUMMARY 18 On October 12, 2019, petitioner Clifford Chaun Loyer, a state prisoner who 19 is proceeding pro se, signed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in 20 State Custody (“Petition”) which was formally filed on October 24, 2019. 21 Petitioner challenges his conviction in Orange County Superior Court Case No. 22 16WF1726 on four somewhat overlapping grounds: (1) his warrantless arrest on 23 August 2, 2016 violated the Fourth Amendment; (2) his arrest and detention in jail 24 for many hours without booking, fingerprinting, photographing or a phone call, 25 and the use of force against him violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process; 26 (3) his warrantless arrest on August 5, 2016 violated the Fourth Amendment; and 27 (4) his arrests on August 2, 2016 and August 5, 2016 were made without a warrant 28 or probable cause and violated the Fourth Amendment. (Petition at 5-6). It 1 plainly appears from the face of the Petition that it is wholly unexhausted as it 2 reflects that petitioner has not presented any of his claims to the California 3 Supreme Court. (Petition at 5-6). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal 4 habeas relief on his claims at this time. As explained below, the Court dismisses 5 this action without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 6 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which requires a judge promptly to 7 examine a federal habeas petition, and to dismiss it if “it plainly appears from the 8 petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the 9 district court. . . .” 10 II. DISCUSSION 11 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), habeas relief may not be granted unless a 12 petitioner has exhausted the remedies available in state court.1 Exhaustion requires 13 that the petitioner’s contentions were fairly presented to the state courts, Ybarra v. 14 McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 959 (2012), 15 and disposed of on the merits by the highest court of the state, Greene v. Lambert, 16 288 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). As a matter of comity, a federal court will 17 not entertain a habeas petition unless the petitioner has exhausted the available 18 state judicial remedies on every ground presented in it. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 19 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). A federal court may raise the failure-to-exhaust issue sua 20 sponte and summarily dismiss on that ground. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 21 129, 134-35 (1987); Stone v. City & County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 856 22 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993). 23 /// 24 /// 25 26 1A habeas petition “shall not be granted unless it appears that – [¶] (A) the applicant has 27 exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or [¶] (B)(i) there is an absence of available state corrective process; or [¶] (ii) circumstances exist that render such process 28 ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 1 Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating he has exhausted available state 2 remedies. See, e.g., Williams v. Craven, 460 F.2d 1253, 1254 (9th Cir. 1972) (per 3 curiam); Rollins v. Superior Court, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 4 In the present proceeding, the Petition affirmatively reflects that petitioner 5 has not presented his claims to the California Supreme Court. (Petition at 5-6). 6 Accordingly, it plainly appears from the face of the Petition that petitioner cannot 7 meet his burden to demonstrate that he has exhausted his claims because they have 8 not been disposed of by the California Supreme Court. 9 Although it is clear that the California Supreme Court has not resolved 10 petitioner’s claims, the exhaustion requirement may nonetheless be satisfied if 11 petitioner’s claims are clearly procedurally barred under state law. See Castille v. 12 Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1989); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 831 (9th 13 Cir. 1996). In this case, it is not at all “clear” that the California Supreme Court 14 would deem petitioner’s claims procedurally barred under state law. See In re 15 Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 825 (1993) (“[H]abeas corpus has become a proper remedy 16 in this state to collaterally attack a judgment of conviction which has been obtained 17 in violation of fundamental constitutional rights.”) (citations omitted); People v. 18 Sorenson, 111 Cal. App. 2d 404, 405 (1952) (claims that fundamental 19 constitutional rights have been violated may be raised by state habeas petition). 20 However, this Court expresses no opinion regarding whether consideration of 21 petitioner’s claims might be foreclosed by the principles discussed in In Re Clark, 22 5 Cal. 4th 750, 763-87 (1993). The California Supreme Court should evaluate the 23 matter in the first instance. Even if an applicable state procedural bar exists, the 24 California Supreme Court nevertheless might choose to reach the merits of 25 petitioner’s claims. See, e.g., Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151-52 (9th 26 Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 918 (2000). 27 Once, as in this case, a Court determines that a habeas petition contains only 28 unexhausted claims, it may dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust. Rasberry v. 1 Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, because the Petition in 2 this case is wholly unexhausted, dismissal thereof on this ground is appropriate. 3 III. ORDER 4 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition is dismissed without 5 prejudice and that Judgment be entered accordingly.2 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 DATED: November 1, 2019 8 9 ________________________________________ HONORABLE PHILIP S. GUTIERREZ 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 2The Court further notes, as an alternative basis for dismissal, that none of petitioner’s 17 claims appear to be cognizable on federal habeas review. Petitioner’s first, third and fourth claims are predicated on the Fourth Amendment as to which federal habeas review is precluded. 18 See e.g., Ahlswede v. Wolff, 720 F.2d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1983) (where petitioner had full and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment challenge that no probable cause existed to arrest 19 him, federal habeas review precluded) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976); Myers v. Rhay, 577 F.2d 504, 508-09 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978)); see also 20 Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990) (California affords criminal defendants 21 opportunity for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims); Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity 22 to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly decided.”) (citations omitted). Petitioner’s second claim appears to challenge his conditions of 23 detention and the use of force against him, claims which may be appropriate to assert in a civil 24 rights action, but which do not appear to be cognizable in a federal habeas action. See e.g., Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (habeas corpus proceedings are proper 25 mechanism for prisoner to challenge legality or duration of confinement, whereas a civil rights action is the proper method to challenge conditions of confinement). Indeed, petitioner currently 26 has pending in the Central District of California a federal civil rights case in which he asserts 27 many of the same claims asserted herein, including a challenge to the failure to book him and to the use of force against him. See Clifford C. Loyer v. City of Cypress, et al., Case No. 8:19-cv- 28 01504-PSG-JC.