Clevenger v. Mayer

3 La. App. 579, 1926 La. App. LEXIS 49
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 11, 1926
DocketNo. 2536
StatusPublished

This text of 3 La. App. 579 (Clevenger v. Mayer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clevenger v. Mayer, 3 La. App. 579, 1926 La. App. LEXIS 49 (La. Ct. App. 1926).

Opinion

ODOM, J.

This is a suit on six promissory notes each for the sum of ¡¡>50.00, bearing 8% per annum interest from their date until paid, all dated September 19, 1924, executed and signed by defendant and made payable to his own order and by him endorsed in blank.

Defendant, in answer, admitted the execution and delivery of the notes. He resists the action and defends the suit on [580]*580the ground that the consideration of the notes failed.

There was judgment in the District Court in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount sued for and defendant has appealed.

OPINION

In the month of September, 1924, the defendant purchased two mules of plaintiff at the price of $350.00. The exact date of the sale is not shown, but we gather that the trade was made on Sunday, September 18th. The defendant paid $50.00 in cash at the time of the sale and on Monday, September 19th, he executed and delivered to plaintiff the six notes sued on, for the balance of the purchase price.

The defendant resists payment of these notes on the ground that the mules proved worthless and unfit for the use for which he purchased them and that therefore the consideration of the notes failed.

In answer defendant especially alleged that plaintiff sold him the mules under an express warranty and guarantee that they were sound and entirely free from hidden defects and without redhibitory vices; that they were in good condition and capable of doing the hardest kind of logging work; that both mules died within eight weeks of the time when he purchased them; and that the mules were crippled, patched up and afflicted with certain diseases and redhibitory vices which rendered them worthless; that while the mules were on their way to his logging camp all said defects and redhibitory vices made their appearance and that defendant notified the agent of plaintiff in Alexandria, Louisiana, of the bad condition of the mules and that he was told by said agent to keep them until 'plaintiff came; that when he found the mules could not do the work for which they were intended, he ceased trying to work them, took the best of care of them, notwithstanding which fact they died; that he did not tender the mules to plaintiff because plaintiff was absent from the state of Louisiana; and in paragraph twelve of his answer he says;

“Your respondent shows that by reason of the fact that plaintiff warranted the mules sold to your respondent to be good, sound and free from hidden defects, diseases or redhibitory vices before and at the time of the sale and a reasonable time in the future, and because the mules, to the knowledge of plaintiff, and in fact, were unsound and afflicted with hidden defects and redhibitory vices, which hidden defects and redhibitory vices made themselves apparent immediately after the sale, the notes herein sued upon * * * are void and invalid for want of consideration; that the consideration for that portion of the price herein sued for has failed, and that therefore nothing is due plaintiff.”

He specifically pleads that the mules were warranted and guaranteed to him to be entirely free from any hidden defects and without any redhibitory vices, and that because said mules were unsound and afflicted with hidden defe'cts and redhibitory vices the consideration of the notes has failed.

It will be .noted that defendant does not set out what the hidden defects or redhibitory vices the animals were afflicted with nor does he allege that they died as the result of such vices.

He does allege, however, that the hidden defects and vices rendered them unfit for his use.

Article 2521 of the Civil Code, under the general heading “Of the Vices of the Thing Sold”, reads as follows:

“Apparent defects, that is, such as the buyer might have discovered by simple inspection, are not among the number of redhibitory vices.”

[581]*581So far as the testimony shows, the mules were not afflicted with any vice or defect which was not perfectly apparent to even the most casual observer; and while the plaintiff and his two witnesses, Mr. Rush and Mr. Head, all testify that the mules were sound and in good condition, we are convinced that they were crippled and in bad condition at the time the sale was made. However, we are not convinced that plaintiff or his witnesses knew that to be true.

Plaintiff testified that he told defendant that the mules were free from diseases or hidden defects and that they were sound. ■ The witnesses he called had worked the mules up to about July before the sale in September, and both testify that they were good logging mules and free from defects, except that one of them had been afflicted with “swinney” but was well. The mules, it seems, were worked up to June or J.uly and were put in a stable at Alexandria where they remained without exercise until the sale. Whether plaintiff made any careful inspection of the mules after that date or not does not appear; but from all the testimony we are convinced that he was not aware that they were in bad condition at that time.

It is clear that he practiced no intentional deception and that he concealed nothing from the purchaser. His representations were that the mules were sound and free from hidden defects and diseases and there is nothing to indicate that he was not honest in these representations.

Defendant’s place of business is some sixty miles from Alexandria where the mules were when the sale was made. They were taken from the stable on Sunday and an employee of defendant started with them, riding one and leading the other, to defendant’s camp; when the mules reached Willow Glen, which is a place about four or five miles from Alexandria, defendant was there; the mules were there inspected by him and a number of other people. The defendant himself says that when they got there one of the mules was crippled; that his foot had been split open and it looked like foot disease; that the other mule was “just loose all over and crippled in the hind legs; wobbly, loose in the back and stringy”; that the black mule was loose all over; that they could not work; that they both limped and that he discovered that “on the way down”.

The testimony shows that defendant made a critical examination of the mules at Willow Glen and that he borrowed a knife and made an examination of the mule’s foot; that there were a number of persons there and all of them saw and discussed the condition of the mules in the presence of defendant. Several witnesses testify that the crippled condition of the mules were perfectly apparent to even a casual observer.

This was on Sunday afternoon. The mules were then on their way to defendant’s camp. The defendant, seeing the condition of the mules, went back to Alexandria that night and saw plaintiff and told him of their condition. He says that plaintiff told him that it was all in his imagination and that if the mules were not all right to bring them back. Defendant had, at that time, paid $50.00 in cash on the price but had not signed the notes. He signed the notes and delivered them to plaintiff later on.

After inspection of the mules at Willow Glen on Sunday afternoon and discovery of the defects, the animals were sent on to defendant’s camp where they were put to work. All the witnesses testify that on account of this crippled condition they could not work. Some of them say that the mules could have done light work but they could not do heavy hauling, and de[582]

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Bluebook (online)
3 La. App. 579, 1926 La. App. LEXIS 49, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clevenger-v-mayer-lactapp-1926.