[Cite as Cleveland v. Tome, 2026-Ohio-2085.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF CLEVELAND, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115644 v. :
RODD TOME, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 4, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court Case No. 2025-CRB-004405
Appearances:
Mark D. Griffin, City of Cleveland Law Director, and Margaret Scott, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
John H. Lawson, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Rodd Tome appeals his conviction for assault in violation of
R.C. 2903.13, a first-degree misdemeanor, for knowingly causing or attempting to
cause physical harm to another and the resulting 18-month term of community-
control sanctions. For the following reasons, we affirm. Tome was convicted of assault arising from a not-so-neighborly
dispute. He and the victim began arguing over trash in his yard one morning as
the victim was leaving her house with her eight-year-old son for work and school.
Tome tossed trash into the victim’s yard that he believed to be left by the victim.
The verbal dispute quickly became physical, with the victim claiming Tome
attacked her and Tome claiming the opposite. Both parties exhibited injuries,
although the victim appeared worse for it, having lost a braid that was pulled from
her scalp and incurring visible abrasions and bruising on her elbows, knees, and
face. According to the officers, Tome suffered a bruise to one of his knees, but no
medical records were introduced to substantiate any further injuries. 1 The victim
claims the attack occurred on the sidewalk while Tome claims the victim
approached him on his porch where he was hit with a short section of two-by-four
lumber. The victim confirmed holding the two-by-four but claims it was in self-
defense because Tome had a knife, which in reality appears to have been a small
hand-held drywall saw he was using for renovations being done on the property.
Tome claims the victim grabbed the knife off his porch after hitting him in the knee
with the two-by-four and he swung a pipe or piece of wood to disarm her. Both
1 The extent of Tome’s injury to his knee is unclear. Although the officers testified
to bruising on one of his knees, Tome stated that when he was taken to the hospital, “they took ex-rays, and they had big ass – I broke both my kneecaps, and I had a big two-by- four smashed on my [knee] caps. And I had puncture wounds from the knife which she was sticking me with that she picked up off the stairs.” Tr. 66:1-9. Tome later clarified that the victim did not break his kneecaps; he was referring to past injuries. Id. at 67:5- 7. parties called authorities to report the incident, although the responding officer
concluded that Tome was the instigator.
In the two assignments of error, Tome claims his conviction entered
following a bench trial is in error because he “submitted legally sufficient evidence
that his use of force was in self-defense” of himself or his residence. Before a trier
of fact considers the claim of self-defense, “the defendant has the burden of
producing legally sufficient evidence of self-defense to trigger the state’s [burden of
persuasion] to overcome that evidence” at trial. State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-
4562, ¶ 19; see also State v. Barker, 2023-Ohio-453, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.) (“[The
defendant] has the burden of producing sufficient evidence he acted in self-defense”
in order to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense at trial.). However, the State’s
“burden of disproving the defendant’s self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt
is subject to a manifest-weight review on appeal,” not a sufficiency review. See
Messenger at ¶ 27. Insofar as Tome argues that there was sufficient evidence to
justify his use of force, that argument is only relevant to whether the affirmative
defense is considered by the trier of fact triggering the burden-shifting framework
under R.C. 2901.05. It does not address the merits of the self-defense claim
following a verdict.
The trial court considered Tome’s claim of self-defense at trial, as
evident, for example, from Tome’s counsel first broaching the possibility of asserting
self-defense at the initial pretrial. Tr. 3:7-17 (June 17, 2025 proceeding). Tome’s
argument throughout trial continued to present the argument beginning with the opening statement in which it was argued that “Mr. Tome was not at fault for
creating the situation. He was not the initial aggressor . . . . [O]n this day in question,
Mr. Tome was in his right to use self-defense.” Tr. 5:11-7:17 (August 19, 2025 trial
proceeding). That self-defense theme carried into Tome’s oral motion for acquittal
under Crim.R. 29 following Tome’s testimony. Id. at 55:3-56:12. Importantly, the
city addressed the self-defense argument raised; it did not claim the municipal court
could disregard it. Id. at 80. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court
precluded Tome from pursuing the claim or that the defense was not considered at
the bench trial. As a result, it can only be concluded that the trial court tacitly agreed
there was sufficient evidence warranting consideration of the defense, rendering
Tome’s claims in this appeal moot.
Inasmuch as Tome’s arguments lend themselves to being construed
as challenging the weight of the evidence, that claim is also without merit.
When evaluating a claim that a jury verdict is against the weight of
the evidence, appellate courts “review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether
in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order
a new trial.” State v. Wilks, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168, citing State v. Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997); State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17. Reversing a
conviction based upon the weight of the evidence occurs “‘only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at
387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
In order to disprove the claim of self-defense, the State must present
evidence “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) was at fault in creating
the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) did not have reasonable grounds to believe
or an honest belief that he or she was in imminent danger of bodily harm; or
(3) violated a duty to retreat or avoid danger.’” State v. French, 2024-Ohio-1256,
¶ 25 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Gibson, 2023-Ohio-1640, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). The first
and third elements are straightforward and are applied as written. As to the second
element, “‘the test for a bona fide belief of imminent bodily harm is both objective
and subjective: whether the defendant’s belief is objectively reasonable and whether
the defendant subjectively had an honest belief of imminent bodily harm.’” Id. at
¶ 26, quoting State v. Warth, 2023-Ohio-3641, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.).
Tome’s argument, even if construed as a claim that the trier of fact
lost its way in rejecting his assertion of self-defense, is solely focused on his
subjective beliefs to the exclusion of the victim’s testimony. Both parties presented
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[Cite as Cleveland v. Tome, 2026-Ohio-2085.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF CLEVELAND, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115644 v. :
RODD TOME, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 4, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court Case No. 2025-CRB-004405
Appearances:
Mark D. Griffin, City of Cleveland Law Director, and Margaret Scott, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
John H. Lawson, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Rodd Tome appeals his conviction for assault in violation of
R.C. 2903.13, a first-degree misdemeanor, for knowingly causing or attempting to
cause physical harm to another and the resulting 18-month term of community-
control sanctions. For the following reasons, we affirm. Tome was convicted of assault arising from a not-so-neighborly
dispute. He and the victim began arguing over trash in his yard one morning as
the victim was leaving her house with her eight-year-old son for work and school.
Tome tossed trash into the victim’s yard that he believed to be left by the victim.
The verbal dispute quickly became physical, with the victim claiming Tome
attacked her and Tome claiming the opposite. Both parties exhibited injuries,
although the victim appeared worse for it, having lost a braid that was pulled from
her scalp and incurring visible abrasions and bruising on her elbows, knees, and
face. According to the officers, Tome suffered a bruise to one of his knees, but no
medical records were introduced to substantiate any further injuries. 1 The victim
claims the attack occurred on the sidewalk while Tome claims the victim
approached him on his porch where he was hit with a short section of two-by-four
lumber. The victim confirmed holding the two-by-four but claims it was in self-
defense because Tome had a knife, which in reality appears to have been a small
hand-held drywall saw he was using for renovations being done on the property.
Tome claims the victim grabbed the knife off his porch after hitting him in the knee
with the two-by-four and he swung a pipe or piece of wood to disarm her. Both
1 The extent of Tome’s injury to his knee is unclear. Although the officers testified
to bruising on one of his knees, Tome stated that when he was taken to the hospital, “they took ex-rays, and they had big ass – I broke both my kneecaps, and I had a big two-by- four smashed on my [knee] caps. And I had puncture wounds from the knife which she was sticking me with that she picked up off the stairs.” Tr. 66:1-9. Tome later clarified that the victim did not break his kneecaps; he was referring to past injuries. Id. at 67:5- 7. parties called authorities to report the incident, although the responding officer
concluded that Tome was the instigator.
In the two assignments of error, Tome claims his conviction entered
following a bench trial is in error because he “submitted legally sufficient evidence
that his use of force was in self-defense” of himself or his residence. Before a trier
of fact considers the claim of self-defense, “the defendant has the burden of
producing legally sufficient evidence of self-defense to trigger the state’s [burden of
persuasion] to overcome that evidence” at trial. State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-
4562, ¶ 19; see also State v. Barker, 2023-Ohio-453, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.) (“[The
defendant] has the burden of producing sufficient evidence he acted in self-defense”
in order to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense at trial.). However, the State’s
“burden of disproving the defendant’s self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt
is subject to a manifest-weight review on appeal,” not a sufficiency review. See
Messenger at ¶ 27. Insofar as Tome argues that there was sufficient evidence to
justify his use of force, that argument is only relevant to whether the affirmative
defense is considered by the trier of fact triggering the burden-shifting framework
under R.C. 2901.05. It does not address the merits of the self-defense claim
following a verdict.
The trial court considered Tome’s claim of self-defense at trial, as
evident, for example, from Tome’s counsel first broaching the possibility of asserting
self-defense at the initial pretrial. Tr. 3:7-17 (June 17, 2025 proceeding). Tome’s
argument throughout trial continued to present the argument beginning with the opening statement in which it was argued that “Mr. Tome was not at fault for
creating the situation. He was not the initial aggressor . . . . [O]n this day in question,
Mr. Tome was in his right to use self-defense.” Tr. 5:11-7:17 (August 19, 2025 trial
proceeding). That self-defense theme carried into Tome’s oral motion for acquittal
under Crim.R. 29 following Tome’s testimony. Id. at 55:3-56:12. Importantly, the
city addressed the self-defense argument raised; it did not claim the municipal court
could disregard it. Id. at 80. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court
precluded Tome from pursuing the claim or that the defense was not considered at
the bench trial. As a result, it can only be concluded that the trial court tacitly agreed
there was sufficient evidence warranting consideration of the defense, rendering
Tome’s claims in this appeal moot.
Inasmuch as Tome’s arguments lend themselves to being construed
as challenging the weight of the evidence, that claim is also without merit.
When evaluating a claim that a jury verdict is against the weight of
the evidence, appellate courts “review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether
in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order
a new trial.” State v. Wilks, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168, citing State v. Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997); State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17. Reversing a
conviction based upon the weight of the evidence occurs “‘only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at
387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
In order to disprove the claim of self-defense, the State must present
evidence “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) was at fault in creating
the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) did not have reasonable grounds to believe
or an honest belief that he or she was in imminent danger of bodily harm; or
(3) violated a duty to retreat or avoid danger.’” State v. French, 2024-Ohio-1256,
¶ 25 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Gibson, 2023-Ohio-1640, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). The first
and third elements are straightforward and are applied as written. As to the second
element, “‘the test for a bona fide belief of imminent bodily harm is both objective
and subjective: whether the defendant’s belief is objectively reasonable and whether
the defendant subjectively had an honest belief of imminent bodily harm.’” Id. at
¶ 26, quoting State v. Warth, 2023-Ohio-3641, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.).
Tome’s argument, even if construed as a claim that the trier of fact
lost its way in rejecting his assertion of self-defense, is solely focused on his
subjective beliefs to the exclusion of the victim’s testimony. Both parties presented
their versions of the events at trial, and the municipal court believed the victim’s
version to be more credible. It is well settled that “‘a conviction is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence simply because the [trier of fact] rejected the
defendant’s version of the facts and believed the testimony presented by the state.’”
State v. Jallah, 2015-Ohio-1950, ¶ 71 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hall, 2014-Ohio-
2959, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.); see also State v. Kouame, 2020-Ohio-3118, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.); State v. Agnew, 2024-Ohio-874, ¶ 25 (12th Dist.). This is because the trier of fact is
free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence presented by the State or defense at
trial. State v. Smith, 2010-Ohio-4006, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
The victim’s testimony establishes that Tome caused physical harm
to the victim during what began as a verbal altercation. The responding police
officer confirmed that the victim had visible injuries from the scuffle. More
important for the purposes of our review, the victim’s testimony has not been
demonstrated to be inherently incredible despite the minor discrepancies in her
retelling of the incident, such as whether Tome was holding what was described as
a knife or not. Without more, we cannot conclude that the trial court, sitting as the
trier of fact, lost its way in this particular case.
This is not the exceptional case warranting appellate intervention,
and as a result, the conviction is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
municipal court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR