Cleveland v. Sun Life Assurance Co.

125 P.2d 251, 13 Wash. 2d 318
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedApril 24, 1942
DocketNo. 28595.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 125 P.2d 251 (Cleveland v. Sun Life Assurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cleveland v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 125 P.2d 251, 13 Wash. 2d 318 (Wash. 1942).

Opinion

Jeffers, J.

Plaintiff, Ira Cleveland, on February 19, 1941, instituted this action in the superior court for Yakima county, against the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, to recover judgment on a total disability clause in a life insurance policy issued to plaintiff on March 12, 1931. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he had been totally disabled since October, 1937, and sought to recover the amount of payments due under the policy from June 25, 1940, to the time of trial, and the further sum of two hundred dollars per month which would accrue until the final determination of this action.

Defendant by its answer admitted the issuance of the policy; that all premiums have been duly and timely paid, and that the policy has been at all times and is now in full force and effect; that plaintiff furnished to defendant proof in writing that plaintiff was totally disabled; that defendant approved plaintiff’s claim for disability payments from February 25, 1938, and paid to plaintiff the sum of two hundred dollars per month from February, 1938, up to and including May 25, 1940, at which time defendant ceased making payments to plaintiff; that defendant recognized that, in accordance with the terms of the policy, all subsequent premiums falling due on the policy during the continuance of such disability would be waived. Defendant denied that plaintiff has been or is totally disabled, under the terms of the policy.

The case went to trial before the court without a jury, upon one issue, which all parties agree was whether or not plaintiff was totally disabled from May 25, 1940, to the date of trial, within the meaning of the *320 total disability clause of the policy. The trial court, after hearing the evidence, entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, finding that plaintiff was totally disabled, and entering judgment in his favor.

The policy here in question contains the following disability endorsement:

“Supplementary Provisions for Waiver of Premiums ' and Monthly Income during Total Disability
“Attached to and made part of Policy No. 1278901 on the life of Ira Emerson Cleveland
“In consideration of the payment of an additional yearly premium of One Hundred and Six 60/100 Dollars, which additional premium is included in the premium stated on the first page of the said policy, the Company hereby agrees that, if due proof shall be received by it at his Head Office in Montreal that the assured, whilst the said policy and these supplementary provisions are in full force and effect and before the maturity date, has become totally disabled by bodily injury or disease occurring after the payment of the first premium, so as to be prevented thereby from performing any work for compensation or profit or from following any gainful occupation and that such disability has existed continuously for not less than four months and is then existing, it will grant the following benefits:-
“1. Waiver of Premiums. — The Company will waive the subsequent premiums, if any, as they shall become due during the continuance of such disability beginning with the premium the due date of which next succeeds the date of commencement of such disability; provided, however, that no premium shall be so waived the due date of which is more than one year prior to the date of receipt at the Head Office of the Company of written notice of claim under these supplementary provisions.
“2. Monthly Income. — The Company in addition will pay, during the continuance of such total disability, to the assured or, if such disability is due to or accompanied by mental incapacity, to the beneficiary *321 under the policy, a monthly income of one per cent of the assurance set forth on the first page of the said policy for each completed month of such disability beginning with the fourth such month and ceasing with the last payment preceding the death of the assured or with the first payment becoming due after the maturity date; provided, however, that in no case shall any such monthly income be paid for the first three months of such disability nor for any fractional part of a month of such disability nor for any period of such disability more than one year prior to the date of receipt at the Head Office of the Company of written notice of claim under these provisions.” (Italics ours.)

The above are the material terms of the policy involved in this action.

No question is raised as to the amount or form of the judgment entered June 14, 1941, if plaintiff is entitled to recover herein.

Defendant has appealed from the judgment entered, and assigns error upon the finding by the trial court that respondent was continuously and totally disabled by reason of arthritis, from May 25, 1940, to the date of trial, and prevented thereby from performing any work for compensation or profit, or from following any gainful occupation. Error is also assigned upon the entry of judgment in favor of respondent.

While the trial court did not make a specific finding as to the type of arthritis with which respondent is afflicted, we are of the opinion it conclusively appears from all the evidence, including the testimony of Drs. Lewis and Cornett, called by respondent, and Dr. England, called by appellant, that Mr. Cleveland has what is known as “hypertrophic arthritis.” It is important to keep in mind the type of arthritis with which respondent is afflicted, as all the doctors testified that at least seventy-five per cent of men over fifty years of age are afflicted to some extent with this *322 disease. Especially is the disease evidenced by conditions of the spine. We think the testimony of the doctors is also conclusive that evidence of this disease in itself is of no particular clinical value unless accompanied by pain; that pain is a subjective symptom, and a doctor must depend, to a great extent, upon what his patient tells him as to the amount of pain suffered, especially in this type of arthritis, as there may be evidence of the disease without accompanying pain; that the pain is the disabling factor.

The medical testimony is to the effect that there are two recognized types of arthritis — hypertrophic arthritis and atrophic arthritis. The former is evidenced by an overgrowth of bone in the form of little spurs or proliferations, called “lipping.” It not only is evident on the margins of the bone, but is also prevalent in the attachment of the muscles to the bone where the muscles originate. The type of arthritis is not changed by the number of spurs or the amount of lipping that may be present.

Atrophic arthritis is sometimes called arthritis deformous, or rheumatoid arthritis, and is evidenced by a destruction or wasting away of the bone. It is regarded as more serious, and usually involves many of the joints, especially the smaller joints of the hands and feet. The joints are puffy, swollen, and inflamed, and, when the patient is afflicted with this type of arthritis affecting his spine, he is stooped over, with a stiff back.

It seems to be admitted that there is no recognized treatment of hypertrophic arthritis, other than rest, regular living, heat applications, light exercise, diet, and warm climates.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
125 P.2d 251, 13 Wash. 2d 318, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cleveland-v-sun-life-assurance-co-wash-1942.