Cleveland v. Rivers

2025 Ohio 2868

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 14, 2025
• Docket: 114673
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Cleveland v. Rivers, 2025-Ohio-2868.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF CLEVELAND, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114673 v. :

TRAMEIKA RIVERS, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 14, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court Case No. 2023-TRC-008396

Appearances:

Mark Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, Aqueelah A. Jordan, Chief Prosecutor, and Elizabeth Graham, Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee.

Law Office of Victor O. Chukwudelunzu, LLC, and Victor Chukwudelunzu, for appellant.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

This matter arises from a single-car traffic accident that occurred in

May 2023. As a result of this accident, defendant-appellant Trameika Rivers

(“Rivers”) was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Cleveland Cod.Ord. 433.01(a)(1)(A) and failure to control in violation of Cleveland

Cod.Ord. 431.34(a). Rivers pleaded not guilty to both charges. After a bench trial,

Rivers was convicted on both counts. Rivers appeals her convictions and asserts the

following two assignments of error:

1. Appellant’s conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, and Failure to Control was not supported by sufficient evidence. 2. Appellant’s conviction for Diving Under the Influence of Alcohol, and Failure to Control was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Rivers’s

convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm her convictions.

I. Factual Background — Evidence at Trial

At the June 2024 bench trial, the City of Cleveland (“Cleveland”)

presented as evidence the testimony of Cleveland Detective Daniel McCandless

(“McCandless”) and Cleveland police officer Matthew Woznicki (“Woznicki”) who

had responded to the accident. Rivers did not introduce any evidence at trial.

Testimony of McCandless

McCandless testified that he has been a police officer (and now

detective) for 26 years. During that time, he has been involved in frequent traffic

stops involving drivers suspected of operating a vehicle under the influence otherwise known as “OVI stops.” He is also certified in “OVI” and is a blood-alcohol

concentration operator.

McCandless testified that on May 31, 2023, he was on duty and

responded to a call for a possible intoxicated driver that had driven their vehicle off

the road and into a fence in Cleveland. Personnel from the Cleveland Fire

Department were first on the scene and told him that Rivers had driven into the

fence. The Cleveland Fire Department personnel further informed him that when

they tried to help Rivers, she drove through the fence a little bit more but eventually

they were able to get Rivers to maneuver the vehicle to the side of the road.

McCandless testified that he observed Rivers in the front seat of the

vehicle. He asked her to step out of the vehicle, but Rivers refused several times.

McCandless noted that she was not listening to verbal commands.

At this time, McCandless further observed a red-striped beer bottle

on the floor in front of the passenger seat. He could smell the odor of alcohol in the

vehicle. When she finally exited the vehicle, he also smelled the odor of alcohol on

her.

Testimony of Woznicki

Woznicki testified that he has been a police officer for eight years and

has made OVI stops during this time. Woznicki also responded to the accident

involving Rivers.

Woznicki testified that when he arrived at the scene, he observed

McCandless asking Rivers to exit her vehicle and Rivers was in the driver’s seat of the vehicle. He further testified that she did not seem to comprehend what

McCandless was saying and she just kept saying “no.” Rivers repeatedly refused to

get out of the car.

Woznicki also observed the red-striped bottle of beer that was in the

vehicle. Woznicki testified that Rivers smelled of alcohol, was sweating profusely,

and had slurred speech. Woznicki also noted that field-sobriety tests were possibly

not conducted because Rivers was already on a gurney for transport to the hospital

by ambulance.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found Rivers guilty

on both driving under the influence and failure to control her vehicle.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Assignment of Error No. 1 — Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her first assignment of error, Rivers challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting her convictions for driving under the influence and failure

to control. In support of her argument, Rivers asserts that the testimony of the two

law enforcement officers did not establish the elements necessary to satisfy these

offenses because neither of them witnessed the accident, they did not conduct any

field-sobriety or BAC tests, and they did not introduce at trial the beer bottle the

officers observed in her vehicle. However, viewing the evidence below in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crimes proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Rivers’s convictions were based upon sufficient evidence, and therefore, her first assignment of error is

overruled.

1. Standard of Review — Sufficiency Challenge

A sufficiency challenge is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997); R.C. 2505.01(A)(2). “‘A

sufficiency challenge requires a determination as to whether the State has met its

burden of production at trial.’” Cleveland v. Clark, 2024-Ohio-4491, ¶ 37 (8th

Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 2006-Ohio-20, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins at

390. Specifically, “[a]n appellate court reviewing sufficiency of the evidence must

determine ‘“whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”’” Id., quoting State v. Leonard, 2004-

Ohio-6235, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of

the syllabus. Additionally, “[w]ith a sufficiency inquiry, an appellate court does not

review whether the State’s evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the

evidence admitted at trial supported the conviction.” Id., citing State v. Starks,

2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.).

Further, “[t]he elements of the offense may be proven by direct

evidence, circumstantial evidence, or both.” Clark at ¶ 39. “Direct evidence and

circumstantial evidence have ‘equal evidentiary value.’” Id., quoting State v. Wells,

2021-Ohio-2585, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Santiago, 2011-Ohio-1691, ¶ 12 (8th

Dist.). Moreover, direct or circumstantial evidence may be “gathered through first or secondhand observation.” Cleveland v. English, 2009-Ohio-5011, ¶ 17 (8th

Dist.).

2. Driving Under the Influence

Cleveland Cod.Ord. 433.01(a) states:

(1) No person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this City, if, at the time of the operation, any of the following apply:

A. The person is under the influence of alcohol . . . .

Accordingly, Cleveland must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Rivers

“operated” a vehicle “under the influence of alcohol” to sufficiently support her

conviction. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Criss, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5900, *31 (8th

Dist. Dec. 10, 1988).

The language of Cleveland Cod.Ord. 433.01 above tracks the language

of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(h). Cleveland v. Crawford, 2015-Ohio-2402, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.).

The term “operate” as used in R.C. Ch. 4511 means “to cause or have caused

movement of a vehicle.” Id.; see also Cleveland v. Sheppard, 2016-Ohio-7393, ¶ 20

(8th Dist.). “[T]he definition employs both the present tense, to cause movement,

and, alternatively, the past tense, to have caused movement, an action already

completed.” Sheppard at ¶ 20, citing Crawford at ¶ 18, applying State v. Schultz,

2008-Ohio-4448 (8th Dist.), and State v. Barnard, 2010-Ohio-5345, ¶ 29 (5th

Dist.). “‘“[T]o ‘have caused’ movement of a vehicle is a fact that may be proved by

circumstantial evidence, which inherently possesses the same probative value as

direct evidence. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991)”’” Crawford at ¶ 18, quoting Barnard at ¶ 29, quoting State v. Haplin, 2008-Ohio-4136, ¶ 24. The

“operation” of the vehicle does not have to be witnessed but rather may be inferred

from the circumstances surrounding the vehicle at the time of observation by the

witnesses. See, e.g., Sheppard at ¶ 23; Crawford at ¶ 12-13; Cleveland v. Fields,

2016-Ohio-7398, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.).

“Generally, any lay witness, including a police officer, may testify

whether an individual appeared intoxicated.” Clark, 2024-Ohio-4491, at ¶ 41 (8th

Dist.), citing State v. Clark, 2007-Ohio-3777, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Schmitt,

2004-Ohio-37, ¶ 12. To establish one’s impaired driving ability, the prosecution may

rely on physiological factors including slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and the odor

of alcohol as well as whether the individual exhibited a belligerent or combative

demeanor. Id., citing Solon v. Hrivnak, 2014-Ohio-3135, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), and State

v. Assefa, 2023-Ohio-385, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.). Moreover, “[f]ield sobriety tests are not

required to prove an OVI conviction.” Id., citing Hrivnak at ¶ 17.

The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that Rivers operated the

vehicle. McCandless and Woznicki both testified that they observed Rivers in the

front seat of the vehicle. McCandless testified without objection that he was told by

Cleveland Fire Department personnel that Rivers had driven the vehicle into a fence

and that when they tried to assist her, she drove a little further into the fence before

they were able to direct her to drive to the side of the road. No one else was in the

vehicle. Moreover, Rivers does not deny that she operated her vehicle, only that the testifying officers did not see her operate her vehicle. Accordingly, we find that

Cleveland sufficiently established this element of the offense.

The testimony of McCandless and Woznicki also sufficiently

demonstrate that Rivers was under the influence of alcohol. They both testified that

they observed Rivers’s inability to follow basic directions and her refusal to exit the

vehicle. They both testified that she smelled of alcohol and that they smelled the

odor of alcohol in her vehicle. Woznicki further testified that Rivers had slurred

speech and was sweating profusely. These observations coupled with the fact that a

beer bottle was present in her vehicle and that she had driven her car off the road

and into a fence support the conclusion that she was under the influence of alcohol

while operating her vehicle. Further, Ohio law does not require field-sobriety test

results to support a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and

believing that this evidence is true, we conclude that Cleveland has met its burden

of production and has sufficiently established the necessary elements of the charge

of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.

3. Failure to Control

Cleveland Cod.Ord. 431.34(a) states:

No person shall operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon any street or highway without exercising reasonable and ordinary control over such vehicle.

In general, “[t]he offense of failure to control does not require, as an element of the

offense, that the offender actually be involved in an accident that damages the vehicle.” Sheppard, 2016-Ohio-7393, at ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Roberson,

1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 6080, *3 (5th Dist. Oct. 28, 1996). “Rather, it is the reckless

manner in which the driver operates his vehicle that established a violation of this

offense.” Id., citing id. “In other words, the offense incorporates the ordinary

standard of negligence as the requisite proof of culpability.” Id., citing State v.

Lett, 2023-Ohio-3366, ¶ 12 (5th Dist.). “The statute merely requires the

prosecution to show that the driver failed to reasonably control the vehicle . . . .”

State v. Houston, 2018-Ohio-2788, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.). The offense may be established

by direct or circumstantial evidence. Cleveland v. Pate, 2013-Ohio-5571, ¶ 20-21

(8th Dist.).

As set forth above, McCandless’s and Woznicki’s testimony

established that Rivers was in the driver’s seat of the vehicle and that the vehicle had

been driven off the road and into a nearby fence. They did not have to actually

observe Rivers drive into the fence. Rather, the officers could infer this from their

observation of the location of her vehicle — off the road and near a fence — as well

as from information relayed to them by Cleveland Fire Department personnel

regarding her continued attempt to operate the vehicle (again testimony not

objected to by the defense at trial). Accordingly, we find that Cleveland presented

sufficient evidence demonstrating that Rivers failed to exercise reasonable and

ordinary control over her vehicle and is guilty of violating Cleveland

Cod.Ord. 431.34(a) for failing to control her vehicle. B. Assignment of Error No. 2 — Manifest Weight

In her second assignment of error, Rivers argues that her convictions

for driving under the influence and failure to control are against the manifest weight

of the evidence. In support of her argument, Rivers again asserts that neither of the

testifying police officers witnessed the accident nor conducted any field-sobriety or

BAC tests and that Cleveland did not introduce at trial the beer bottle the officers

observed in her vehicle. Based on our review of the record, we also conclude that

this assignment of error lacks merit.

1. Standard of Review — Manifest-Weight Challenge

“Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment of a trial

court is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may nevertheless conclude that

the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at

387. “A manifest weight challenge questions whether the prosecution met its

burden of persuasion at trial.” Clark, 2024-Ohio-4491, at ¶ 45 (8th Dist.). When a

defendant asserts that a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence,

an appellate court must “‘review[] the entire record, weigh[] the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of witnesses, and determine[]

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed

and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reversal on manifest-evidence grounds should

“be granted ‘only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Clark at ¶ 45, quoting Martin at paragraph three of the

syllabus.

2. Driving Under the Influence and Failure to Control

Rivers raises essentially the same argument under her manifest-

weight claim as she does in her sufficiency claim adding that the “trier of fact lost its

way and created a [sic] such a manifest miscarriage of justice.” However, based on

the facts contained in the record and detailed above, we are unpersuaded. The

testifying police officers provided competent, credible direct and circumstantial

evidence supporting both of Rivers’s convictions. Specifically, both officers testified

regarding Rivers’s condition immediately following the accident including slurred

speech, profuse sweating, and the odor of alcohol both on her person and in her

vehicle. They both testified that Rivers was unable to follow basic commands.

Additionally, both officers observed a beer bottle in the front seat area of her vehicle.

Further, as set forth above, neither field-sobriety tests nor blood-alcohol tests are

required to support a conviction. The evidence at trial also clearly demonstrated

that Rivers was in the front driver’s seat of her vehicle and that the vehicle had been

driven off the road and into a fence. On this record, we cannot conclude that her

convictions for driving under the influence and failure to control are against the

manifest weight of the evidence. This assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Cleveland Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________ MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR