Cleveland v. Kushlak
This text of 2025 Ohio 1656 (Cleveland v. Kushlak) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[Cite as Cleveland v. Kushlak, 2025-Ohio-1656.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF CLEVELAND, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 113956 v. :
ANTHONY KUSHLAK, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: DISMISSED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 8, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court Housing Court Division Case No. 2020-CRB-007383
Appearances:
Mark Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, and William H. Armstrong, Jr., Assistant Law Director, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Thomas T. Lampman, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J.:
The issue presented to this court is, in fact, a nonissue. The sole assignment of error in this case is:
The housing court imposed an improper community control sanction when it restricted him from entering the subject property without a housing inspector.
Although the trial court judge made that oral pronouncement at a
“status hearing” that was converted, without proper notice or due process, into a
probation-violation hearing, which is, in and of itself, a concerning matter that we
will not address in this appeal, the condition at issue was not referenced in the
journal entry attendant to the proceeding.
A trial court needs to administer justice in a legal sense but also in a
practical sense. If we were to accept the court’s oral proclamation that appellant is
prohibited from entering the subject premises outside the presence of housing
inspector Michael Shockley, what are the parameters of that order?
Is Mr. Shockley required to remain on site during the entire time that
the homeowner is present ad infinitum?
If Inspector Shockley has other properties which are in his bailiwick,
or he is required to be in court or he is otherwise unavailable and he must leave the
property, must the homeowner leave the property, as well?
From a practical perspective, who is paying for Mr. Shockley’s
apparent continued presence as a professional babysitter/property sitter? In view
of the fact that since January 2023 a total of 14 “status hearings” have been
conducted by the court and each of those “status hearings” generates court costs, there could be minimal financial remuneration for Inspector Shockley’s presence in
this case.
As we all know, the court speaks through its journal entry. State v.
Beaver, 2018-Ohio-2840, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.) (“It is axiomatic that the trial court speaks
through its journal entry.”), citing State v. Brooke, 2007-Ohio-1533, ¶ 47, citing
Kaine v. Marion Prison Warden, 88 Ohio St.3d 454 (2000).
As the trial court in this case did not so speak, we have no issue to
address in this appeal.
Case dismissed.
It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________ EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, J., and ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR
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