Cleveland Trust Co. v. Realty Corp.

118 F.2d 773, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 4096
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedApril 7, 1941
DocketNo. 8723
StatusPublished

This text of 118 F.2d 773 (Cleveland Trust Co. v. Realty Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Realty Corp., 118 F.2d 773, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 4096 (6th Cir. 1941).

Opinion

MARTIN, Circuit Judge.

In corporate reorganization proceedings, under Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq., the Cleveland Trust Company, as successor trustee under a trust indenture for the debtor, The Allied Properties Company (hereinafter called “Allied”), and as the holder in trust of $424,000 of first mortgage leasehold bonds of The Buckeye Sheriff Street Realty Company, subsidiary debtor (hereinafter called “Buckeye”), has appealed from an order of the District Court overruling its objections to the interim report of the special master, approved, confirmed and adopted by the District Judge. The challenged order sustained the claim of priority for $11,000 face amount of the subsidiary debtor’s bonds, which were not exchanged for bonds of the debtor company, and decreed that these $11,000 of unexchanged bonds are entitled to separate classification for the purpose of any plan of reorganization or liquidation of the subsidiary debtor company.

Realty Corporation is the owner of $5,000 face amount, and Florence A. McDonald of $1,000 face amount of such unexchanged Buckeye bonds. The owners of the remaining $5,000 face amount of the unexchanged bonds held entitled to preferential classification personally have filed no claims, and are unknown. In his interim report, the master states that “the parties agree that the presently unlocated bonds are entitled to the same classification as that to be given the bonds of Realty Corporation and McDonald subject to suitable provisions in the event such unlocated bonds are not presented within a certain time.”

The District Court decreed, further, that the Cleveland Trust Company, as successor trustee for the Buckeye bonds, has a valid secured claim for the benefit of Buckeye bondholders under the Buckeye first mortgage deed of trust in the amount of. $435,000, with interest less liquidating payments.

Inasmuch as analysis of the transactions involved impels the conclusion that our decision of the issue presented must respond to the plain meaning of Section 4 of Article III of the trust indenture, executed April 1, 1924, to secure the Buckeye bonds, we shall not complicate a simple question with unnecessary ramification's.

Briefly, then, The Cuyahoga Land and Securities Company, an Ohio holding company, owned substantially all of the capital stock of Buckeye, Superior Third Realty and Fourth Commercial Realty Companies, all three of which held ninety-nine-year leases on improved Cleveland real estate and had outstanding issues of leasehold bonds.

On March 21, 1927, Cuyahoga addressed a letter to all known bondholders of its [775]*775subsidiary companies, painting a gloomy picture concerning their tenant losses, operating deficits, and unfavorable income positions, and asserting that “with the object in mind of preventing any default either now or in the future,” the directors desired to submit a proposal “as a means to protect and save the interests of all parties concerned.” The letter stated that “either this company or a new company to be formed will take title to all of the properties affected, or control them through stock ownership.”

It was proposed that the bondholders of the respective companies exchange their presently held bonds at par for collateral trust bonds at par, and “that the present bonds be deposited with the trustee as the collateral for the new bonds.” It was asserted that “by this operation, the underlying security remains the same, all of the present bonds so exchanged being pledged as collateral, but the company is relieved of the burden of the high interest rate and the principal payments now due.”

Pursuant to the plan outlined in the letter, a new corporation,' The Allied Properties Company (the debtor in this cause), with officers and directors interlocking with the old companies, was incorporated under the laws of Ohio on May 23, 1927, and acquired all of the common stock of Buckeye (the subsidiary debtor), and stock control of the other two subsidiary companies. Practically all of the bonds of the three subsidiary companies were exchanged for the bonds of Allied, as planned, and were pledged with the trustee under the Allied trust indenture.

All the Buckeye bonds have matured for payment in accordance with the covering trust indenture recorded April 14, 1924, but no part of the principal of the $435,000 face amount of bonds issued has been paid and no interest thereon has been paid since October 1, 1929. There have been two liquidating payments aggregating seven per cent, however, on account of the principal of the Buckeye bonds.

Although Allied defaulted in the payment of interest on its outstanding bonds on April I, 1930, no action to foreclose the Buckeye bond mortgage has been taken.

The special master found, and the District Judge approved his findings, that “(1) an extension, within the meaning of Section 4 of Article III of the first mortgage deed of trust dated April 1, 1924, between The Buckeye Sheriff Street Realty Company and the * * * Trustee, of the payment of the principal and interest upon bonds issued thereunder, was effected in 1927; (2) that the subsidiary debtor [Buckeye] approved such extension; and (3) that the $11,000.00 principal amount of bonds including the bonds owned by Realty Corporation and McDonald, not exchanged pursuant to the 1927 plan, did not assent to or participate in the extension aforesaid.”

The District Judge found, further, that the main purpose of the 1927 plan, as executed, was to -extend the maturity of the exchanged Buckeye Bonds by indirection and to reduce the interest rate thereon.

Section 4 of Article III of the trust indenture securing the Buckeye bonds is explicit in its provisions against extension of time for payment of principal or interest, and in its requirement of prior payment of unextended bonds and coupons should the time of payment of any of the bonds be nevertheless extended. The clear-cut covenant of Buckeye with the trustee reads: “Section 4. In order to prevent any accumulation of coupons after maturity, the Company will not, directly or indirectly, extend or assent to the extension of the time for payment of any bond or coupon appertaining to any bond; and the Company will not, directly or indirectly, be a party to or approve any such extension by purchasing or funding said bonds or coupons, or in any other manner. In case the time for the payment of any such bonds or coupons shall be so extended, whether or not such extension be by or with the consent of the Company, such bonds or coupons shall not be entitled, in any case of default hereunder, to the benefit of the security of this Mortgage, except subject to the prior payment in full of the principal of all the bonds then outstanding, and of all coupons appertaining to such bonds, the payment of which shall not have been so extended, with interest.”

This language is plain and unambiguous, and leaves no room for construction. See Calderon v. Atlas Steamship Company, 170 U.S. 272, 280, 18 S.Ct. 588, 42 L.Ed. 1033. A direct inhibition is placed upon an indirect, as well as a direct, extension by Buckeye of the time for payment of any bond or coupon secured by the Buckeye trust indenture.

The record contains substantial evidence other than that already summarized to support the finding and conclusion of the District Court that the time for pay[776]

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Bluebook (online)
118 F.2d 773, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 4096, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cleveland-trust-co-v-realty-corp-ca6-1941.