Cleveland & Pittsburgh Railroad v. Ball

5 Ohio St. 568
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 15, 1856
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 5 Ohio St. 568 (Cleveland & Pittsburgh Railroad v. Ball) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cleveland & Pittsburgh Railroad v. Ball, 5 Ohio St. 568 (Ohio 1856).

Opinion

Bartley, C. J.

The first Inquiry presented in this case, is, whether the court below erred in admitting the opinions of witnesses as evidence to show the damages which the appropriation would occasion to the defendant. This is fully answered by the determination of this court at the last term, in the case of The Atlantic and Great Western Railroad Company v. Campbell, 4 Ohio St. Rep. 583. The general rule that the testimony of witnessees is confined to a statement of facts coming from observation, knowledge and recollection, as distinguished from the mere opinion or inference of a witness, is a safe rule, although subject to numerous exceptions. Opinions are often formed upon slight or inaccurate information, and sometimes the mere dictate of feeling, rather than the exercise of judgment, and therefore to be received with great caution even when competent as evidence.

There are some facts of such a nature as to be incapable of the ordinary means of proof by direct evidence, and consequently resort is had to the best means of proof which the nature of the subject affords. On questions of science, skill, trade, and others of a like nature, experts are allowed to give their opinions as evidence. On questions of pedigree or relationship, character, boundary, and the like; also on inquiries touching the extent of a man’s property, his solvency, health, sanity, affection, antipathy, and others of a similar nature, the knowledge of witnesses is chiefly a matter of opinion, and it is often impossible to enumerate each particular fact from which the knowledge of a witness is derived. And of this nature are inquiries touching the value and quality of property. And in the case of The Atlantic and Great Western Railroad Company v. Campbell, above cited, while the opinions of witnesses as to the amount of damages sustained, are excluded as incompetent evidence, the court did not exclude the opinions of witnesses as to the value of the land, before and after the location of the railroad. It is proper for a witness to describe the particulars of the injury, the manner in Avhich the property is affected, and give his opinion as to the value of the land. And it is for the jury to find from all the facts, from the value of the land, and the extent and manner [574]*574in which injured, and other circumstances, what amount of damage has been sustained by tho land owner, And to allow witnesses to give their opinions as to the amount of the damages suffered, would permit witnesses to swear to the conclusion which \it is the peculiar province of the jury to deduce from the evidence. Upon this ground, therefore, there was error in the proceedings of the court below.

2d. It appears, that in the further progress of the case before the probate court, evidence was given by the land owner that there were valuable coal mines on his land through which the railroad passes; that the road was located between the coal banks and the river ; and that in the opinion of the witnesses, the railroad would prevent the coal from being carried across the road to the river. On cross examination, the counsel for the company inquired of the witnesses: Will the facilities for transportation of coal to a market, be diminished by reason of the construction of this railroad ?” This inquiry was objected to by the land owner, and the objection sustained, to which ruling an exception was taken.

In this, the probate court manifestly erred. The inquiry was legitimate and proper as coming within the scope of cross-examination ; and it was especially important to show the value, if there would be any value, in the river transportation in connection with the coal banks. This would not be deducting benefits, but simply showing what value there would be in the river transportation to the owner of the coal banks, after the construction of the road ; for that value, so far as affected, would be one of the direct incidental consequences occasioned by the appropriation. If by means of the railroad facilities, the river transportation would be superseded by a cheaper and better mode of transportation, and thus be rendered of but little or no value to the owner, he ought not to be paid a compensation on account of an incidental disadvantage or loss of value which he did not suffer.

3d. The questions arising on the charge of the court to the jury, and the refusal of the court to charge as requested, are comprehended in the following inquiries :

[575]*5751. In estimating the damages to property outside of the limits of the land appropriated, what compensation for the incidental injury to the value of the residue of the land, is to be taken into the account?

2. Can the damages to the residue of the land through which the appropriation is made, be reduced by deducting therefrom, or setting off against them, the resulting benefits of the railroad to such residue of the land ?

The provisions of the constitution of this State on this subject, are somewhat different from the provisions in the constitutions of some of the other states. “ Full compensation ” is required to be made to the owner in money for the appropriation of his property, as a condition precedent. To be a full compensation, it must be a remuneration or recompense for that detriment or loss to the owner in the value of his propei ty arising from the taking of his property in connection with the use for which it is taken. Where a piece or strip of land is taken and severed by the appropriation from its connection with other land of the owner, some elements of compensation necessarily enter into the computation besides the abstract value of the number of feet or acres of ground actually taken. These elements of compensation may be comprehended in the following: first, the abstract value of the quantity of ground taken; second, the value arising from the relative situation of the land, taken in its connection with the residue of the owner’s land from which it is severed ; and third, the effect upon the value of the residue of the owner’s land arising from the uses for which the appropriation is made. These grounds of compensation will give the land owner á recompense for the loss in the value of his property, caused by the appropriation for the special purposes or use for which it is authorized. Thus far, and thus far only, is the loss in the value of the residue of the land of the owner to be taken into account in making up the amount of the compensation to be paid.

It is said in the work of Redfield on Railways, page 152, It is requisite that the tribunal appraising land damages, for lands condemned for railways, should take into consideration all such incidental loss, inconvenience and damage, as may reasonably be [576]*576expected to result from the construction and use of the road, in a legal and proper manner. And as all tribunals having jurisdiction of any particular subject matter are presumed to take into consideration all the elements legally constituting their judgments, such incidental loss and damage will be barred by the appraisal, whether, in fact, included in the estimate or not.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coalton v. Atkins
7 Ohio App. Unrep. 105 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1990)
State Auto Mutual Ins. v. Chrysler Corp.
304 N.E.2d 891 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1973)
Masheter v. Kebe
295 N.E.2d 429 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1973)
In Re Appropriation for Hwy. Purposes of Lands of Arnold
261 N.E.2d 142 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1970)
In Re Appropriation
262 N.E.2d 561 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1970)
Director of Highways v. Kramer
23 Ohio App. 2d 219 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1970)
Director of Highways v. Lordstown Realty Co.
23 Ohio App. 2d 233 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1970)
In Re Appropriation of Easement
160 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1959)
American Louisiana Pipe Line Co. v. Kennerk
144 N.E.2d 660 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1957)
Rockwell v. Ohio Turnpike Commission
128 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1954)
In Re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes
112 N.E.2d 411 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1952)
Sargent v. City of Cincinnati
25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 89 (Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Hamilton County, 1923)
Martin v. City of Columbus
101 Ohio St. (N.S.) 1 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1920)
Lewisburg & N. R. v. Hinds
134 Tenn. 293 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1915)
Springfield & Northeastern Traction Co. v. Warrick
94 N.E. 933 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1911)
Taber v. New York, Providence & Boston Railroad
67 A. 9 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1907)
Carlisle v. Cincinnati (City)
19 Ohio C.C. Dec. 81 (Hamilton Circuit Court, 1906)
De Wald v. Ingle
72 P. 469 (Washington Supreme Court, 1903)
In re Guardian for Shelleig
8 Ohio N.P. 399 (Scioto County Probate Court, 1901)
Feuerstein v. Jackson
8 Ohio C.C. 396 (Ohio Circuit Courts, 1894)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
5 Ohio St. 568, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cleveland-pittsburgh-railroad-v-ball-ohio-1856.