Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Wintner.

2018 Ohio 4731, 121 N.E.3d 348, 155 Ohio St. 3d 355
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 28, 2018
Docket2018-0810
StatusPublished

This text of 2018 Ohio 4731 (Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Wintner.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Wintner., 2018 Ohio 4731, 121 N.E.3d 348, 155 Ohio St. 3d 355 (Ohio 2018).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*355 {¶ 1} Respondent, Jennifer Ellen Wintner, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0014507, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1984. On November 1, 2013, we suspended her from the practice of law based on her failure to register as an attorney for the 2013/2015 biennium. In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Wintner , 136 Ohio St.3d 1544 , 2013-Ohio-4827 , 996 N.E.2d 973 . We reinstated her license to practice law on September 9, 2014. In re Reinstatement of Wintner , 140 Ohio St.3d 1457 , 2014-Ohio-4466 , 17 N.E.3d 602 .

{¶ 2} On February 1, 2018, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, charged Wintner with professional misconduct arising from her neglect and failure to reasonably communicate with a single client. A panel of the Board of *356 Professional Conduct considered the cause on the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement. See Gov.Bar R. V(16).

{¶ 3} The parties stipulated that in March 2016, Michelle Troutman hired Wintner to investigate the possibility of Troutman obtaining a historic-preservation tax credit for a building that Troutman had purchased. Wintner did not enter into an engagement agreement regarding the nature and scope of Wintner's representation *350 or establish the basis or rate of Wintner's fee and expenses beyond exploring the possibility of obtaining the tax credit. Wintner also failed to inform Troutman that Wintner did not carry professional-liability insurance. Although Wintner met with Troutman and completed some of the work that Troutman had hired Wintner to do-and for which Troutman paid Wintner $500-Wintner did not complete the work and stopped responding to Troutman's communications. Eventually, Troutman contacted another attorney for assistance with filing the application for a historic-preservation tax credit.

{¶ 4} Wintner admits that her conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client), 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client if the lawyer does not maintain professional-liability insurance), and 1.5(b) (requiring an attorney to communicate, within a reasonable amount of time after commencing the representation, the nature and scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be charged).

{¶ 5} In addition to three mitigating factors-the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, Wintner's acknowledgment of the wrongful nature of her conduct, and her willingness to work with a mentoring attorney during the period of a stayed suspension-the parties also stipulated that Wintner is willing to refund $250 of the $500 that she received from Troutman. See generally Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C). The only aggravating factor in this case is Wintner's previous attorney-registration suspension. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1).

{¶ 6} The parties recommended that Wintner be suspended for one year, with the entire suspension stayed on conditions, including a one-year period of monitored probation, paying Troutman $250 in restitution, and completing six additional hours of continuing legal education ("CLE") in law-practice management. In support of that recommendation, the parties cite two cases in which we imposed conditionally stayed six-month suspensions on attorneys who violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 in relation to a single client matter when no aggravating factors existed and multiple mitigating factors were present. See Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Malvasi , 143 Ohio St.3d 140 , 2015-Ohio-2361 , 34 N.E.3d 916 ; Dayton Bar Assn. v. Strahorn , 152 Ohio St.3d 288 , 2017-Ohio-9204 , 95 N.E.3d 369 .

*357 {¶ 7} In addition to the cases cited by the parties, the panel considered Columbus Bar Assn. v. McNeal , 152 Ohio St.3d 37 , 2017-Ohio-8775 , 92 N.E.3d 840 , and Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Freeman , 128 Ohio St.3d 416 , 2011-Ohio-1447 , 945 N.E.2d 515 . McNeal was retained by a husband and wife to assist them with potentially filing a complaint in a home-warranty matter. McNeal took some action on behalf of his clients and then failed to respond to their requests for information regarding the status of their matter. In the presence of just one aggravating factor and several mitigating factors, we suspended McNeal for one year, with the entire suspension stayed on conditions.

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Related

Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Ass'n v. Freeman
2011 Ohio 1447 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2011)
Columbus Bar Association v. McNeal.
2017 Ohio 8775 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2017)
Dayton Bar Association v. Strahorn.
2017 Ohio 9204 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2017)
Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Malvasi
34 N.E.3d 916 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2018 Ohio 4731, 121 N.E.3d 348, 155 Ohio St. 3d 355, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cleveland-metropolitan-bar-association-v-wintner-ohio-2018.