Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Gay.

2018 Ohio 2170, 104 N.E.3d 745, 153 Ohio St. 3d 251
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedJune 7, 2018
Docket2017-1413
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2018 Ohio 2170 (Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Gay.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Gay., 2018 Ohio 2170, 104 N.E.3d 745, 153 Ohio St. 3d 251 (Ohio 2018).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*251 {¶ 1} Respondent, James Arthur Gay, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0025646, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1979. We indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law in 1994 for misappropriating *252 funds from and failing to file an inventory of his father's probate estate, accepting fees from clients without performing the contracted work, and failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation. Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Gay , 68 Ohio St.3d 190 , 625 N.E.2d 593 (1994). We reinstated his license to practice law on February 27, 2002. Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Gay , 94 Ohio St.3d 404 , 763 N.E.2d 585 (2002).

{¶ 2} In a four-count complaint filed in February 2017, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, alleged that Gay violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by mismanaging his Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account ("IOLTA") on several occasions and by making a personal loan to a client.

{¶ 3} Based on the parties' stipulations, a panel of the Board of Professional Conduct found by clear and convincing evidence that Gay committed the charged rule violations and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with the suspension fully stayed on conditions. The board adopted the panel's report and further recommends that the costs of the proceedings be assessed to Gay. We adopt the board's report in its entirety and suspend Gay from the practice of law for one year, with the suspension fully stayed on conditions.

Misconduct

Count I-IOLTA Overdraft

{¶ 4} On July 21, 2015, Gay disbursed settlement proceeds to two of his clients, Carmen Graham and Breonna Crawford, from his IOLTA. He also disbursed *747 $5,747.56 in settlement proceeds to pay his fees and to reimburse himself for expenses he had advanced to his clients. On July 28, 2015, Gay directly withdrew $5,747.56 from his IOLTA for the same fees and expenses, causing a negative balance in the account. The next day, he became aware of the overdraft and returned the funds that he had mistakenly withdrawn. In response to a letter of inquiry from relator, Gay acknowledged that he had mistakenly paid himself twice. The parties agreed, and the board found by clear and convincing evidence that Gay's conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring client funds to be properly safeguarded in a client trust account).

Count II-Failure to Properly Manage IOLTA

{¶ 5} Gay admits that he did not maintain separate ledger sheets for his clients. He also admits that he did not consistently maintain and have his clients sign disbursement sheets and closing statements. The parties agreed and the board found that Gay's conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(2) (requiring a lawyer to furnish closing statements that are signed by both the client and the lawyer in contingent-fee cases), 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for each *253 client setting forth the date, amount, payee, and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of each client), and 1.15(a)(5) (requiring a lawyer to perform and retain a monthly reconciliation of the funds held in the lawyer's client trust account).

Count III-Making a Personal Loan to a Client

{¶ 6} Gay admits that he made a personal loan of $300 to a client, Carmen Graham, and repaid himself from the settlement proceeds of Graham's personal-injury claim. The parties agreed and the board found that Gay's conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(e) (prohibiting a lawyer from providing financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation).

Count IV-Failure to Properly Manage IOLTA

{¶ 7} Gay admits that prior to depositing the settlement proceeds of clients Vanessa Cannon and Layvonne Washington in two separate cases, he withdrew funds from his IOLTA to pay himself for the work he did in those cases. The parties agreed and the board found that Gay's conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a).

{¶ 8} We agree with the board's findings of misconduct.

Sanction

{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.

{¶ 10} The only aggravating factor found by the board is that Gay has a prior disciplinary record. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1).

{¶ 11} The panel found the following mitigating factors: although alcohol and depression were involved in Gay's first disciplinary case, Gay has maintained his sobriety such that alcohol was not a factor in this case; Gay had been practicing law for 38 years; Gay did not have a dishonest or selfish motive; Gay's misconduct was not intentional but instead was the result of sloppiness and bad recordkeeping; Gay made a full and free disclosure to relator and has had a cooperative attitude toward these proceedings; no clients were harmed as a result of Gay's failure to deposit settlement *748 checks prior to withdrawing funds or his failure to keep appropriate IOLTA records; Gay has taken appropriate action, with the assistance of relator, to educate himself in order to prevent further errors with his IOLTA; Gay now maintains a general ledger and client ledgers; he understands that he must deposit settlement funds prior to withdrawing his fees or disbursing funds to clients; he understands that he must perform monthly reconciliations of his IOLTA; he now has clients sign disbursement statements; *254 and he understands that he is not permitted to make loans to clients and has averred that he will not make loans to clients in the future. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A) and (C)(2) through (4).

{¶ 12}

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2018 Ohio 2170, 104 N.E.3d 745, 153 Ohio St. 3d 251, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cleveland-metropolitan-bar-association-v-gay-ohio-2018.