Cleveland Electric Railway Co v. Cleveland & the Forest City Railway Co.

204 U.S. 116, 27 S. Ct. 202, 51 L. Ed. 399, 1907 U.S. LEXIS 1534
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 7, 1907
Docket197, 321
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 204 U.S. 116 (Cleveland Electric Railway Co v. Cleveland & the Forest City Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cleveland Electric Railway Co v. Cleveland & the Forest City Railway Co., 204 U.S. 116, 27 S. Ct. 202, 51 L. Ed. 399, 1907 U.S. LEXIS 1534 (1907).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Peckham,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

Out of these various ordinances and resolutions arise the difficulties suggested in this case. The facts are somewhat complicated by reason of their number, and the. inferences to be drawn from them are not always perfectly plain and certain. The complainant contends that, by reason of the action of the city council and the acceptance by the complainant of the various ordinances and resolutions adopted by that council, a valid contract has been entered into between the city and the' complainant, by which the right to use the streets named in .the ordinances by the Garden street branch has. been granted to complainant up to July 1, 1914, or, if it is mistaken as to that time, that then, the contract terminates on the thirteenth of July, 1913. The city contends that neither date is right, but that the contract, so far as it related to the Garden street branch, terminated on the twenty-second of March, 1905.

The rules of construction which have been adopted by courts in cases of public grants of this nature by the authorities of cities are of long standing. It has been held that such grants should be in plain language, that they should be certain and *130 definite m their nature, and should contain no ambiguity in their terms. The legislative mind must be .distinctly impressed with the unequivocal form of expression contained in the grant, “in- order that the privileges may be intelligently granted or purposely withheld. It is matter of common knowledge that grants of this character are usually prepared by those interested in them, and submitted to the legislatures with a view to obtain from such bodies the most liberal grant of privileges which they are Avilling to give. This is one among many reasons why they are to be strictly construed.” Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 471. In the case cited this court has had occasion to state the principle of construction and to cite some of the authorities upon which it is based. This has been so lately done that it is unnecessary to more than refer to that case as authority for the doctrine above stated.

Before proceeding with an examination of the various ordinances and resolutions referred to in the foregoing statement, it is well to say that we do so upon the assumption that the legislature has heretofore granted to the city council of Cleveland most comprehensive power to contract with street railroads within its limits, with regard to the use of its streets, and the length of time for which such use may.be granted, not longer than twenty-five years. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland City Railway Company, 194 U. S. 517, 533; Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Railway Company, 201 U. S. 529, 541. Therefore, in deciding this case, we assume the validity of the contract, whatever it is, that was made. The only question involved herein is one of construction and intent.

The most important of the many ordinances and resolutions relating to the Euclid avenue line, commencing in 1859, have been referred to in the foregoing statement of facts because of the contention of complainant that the Garden street branch is nothing but an extension and, in reality, as in law, a component part of the Euclid avenue line, and that the Garden street grant is limited and governed by the time of the expiration of the Euclid avenue grant. In other words, that the grant *131 of 1888 to the Euclid avenue line of the right to change its motive power, and extending the termination of the grant until twenty-five years from that date, thereby extended the termination of the grant to the Garden street branch to the same time, although the whole branch road had been separately and otherwise provided for, and had never before had the same termination as the Euclid avenue line. The grant is to be implied which is to work such a change in a grant then existing in specific' and direct language. The same argument is also set forth in regard to the ordinance of July 17, 1893, which will be again referred to.

Under these circumstances it is important to direct special attention to the Garden street branch.

The East Cleveland Railroad Company, having built and operated its road through the various streets mentioned in the ordinance of 1859, granting it leave so to do, became desirous of building another road in connection with the one it was'then operating, büt there was no statute at that time in Ohio permitting the extension of a road then built, and the company therefore in 1867, and the early part of 1868, took the same proceedings to acquire the right to build the new road that it had taken to build the former, although it did not seek a new incorporation. As a railroad company already existing, it applied to the council of the city of Cleveland for leave to construct a street railroad from the intersection of Prospect and Brownell streets, to connect with the main line of its road, and thence through various streets and along the center of Garden street, to and across Willson avenue, to the easterly boundary of the city. It procured the consents of the property owners along the line; notice for the reception of bids was published by the city as provided for in the statute, and the railroad company made a formal bid for the privilege of laying down its trkeks- through the various streets, and named the rates of fare which would be charged. That bid was the lowest, if not the only one, made, and it was duly accepted, and the privilege was granted tó build a railroad in Garden street, and to operate *132 it for twenty years from the date of the adoption of the ordinance, January 14, 1868, and the company was to continue to use the western end of the Euclid aveiiue road as stated in the ordinance. The ordinance was accepted and the road built. At this time the grant to the Euclid avenue line expired September 20, 1879.

Referring to the procedure under which the Garden street branch was created and the permission of the city council to build the road obtained, it is plain that the branch thus built was not a mere extension or part of the Euclid avenue line, so that a grant to the latter necessarily covered the other as an inseparable part of it, but was a distinct line, with a separate route, with the exception of a short distance at the west end, where it was permitted to use the tracks of the Euclid avenue line. The termination of the right was at a different time from that provided for the Euclid avenue line. This use of the Euclid avenue tracks for a short distance did not make the Garden street branch a mere extension of the former road. Whether authorized by its charter to build the Garden street road is not important. It did so, and its right to do it was given by an ordinance of the council, which has been recognized as valid ever since. Because on some occasions it has been called a branch does not alter the weight to be given -the facts stated, or turn the branch into a mere extension where it has been otherwise uniformly treated.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
204 U.S. 116, 27 S. Ct. 202, 51 L. Ed. 399, 1907 U.S. LEXIS 1534, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cleveland-electric-railway-co-v-cleveland-the-forest-city-railway-co-scotus-1907.