Cleveland Athletic Club v. United States

588 F. Supp. 1305, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5994, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14832
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedJuly 19, 1984
DocketCiv. A. C82-2034
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 588 F. Supp. 1305 (Cleveland Athletic Club v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cleveland Athletic Club v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 1305, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5994, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14832 (N.D. Ohio 1984).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ANN ALDRICH, District Judge.

In this civil tax refund action, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Upon consideration of the pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits, this Court denies the plaintiffs Motion, grants' the defendant’s Motion, and dismisses the complaint.

Jurisdiction rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).

I.

The relevant facts are not disputed. The Cleveland Athletic Club (“the Club”) is an organization described in § 501(c)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (“the Code”), 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7), as a social club “organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes.” Under § 501(a), the Club is ordinarily exempt from federal income tax. But, under § 501(b), it is subject to income tax on its unrelated business income 1 .

The Club was organized to provide entertainment, amusement, and athletic recreation to its members. To supplement the income received from membership dues, it also conducts certain unrelated business activities. During the years in question, the Club’s unrelated business income was derived from two sources — investments, and sales of food and beverage to nonmembers.

In conducting the food and beverage operation, the Club incurred certain expenses, including salaries, rent, insurance, and depreciation. Income from the business was sufficient to produce a gross profit; however, upon deduction of the expenses listed above (overhead and fixed expenses), a net loss resulted.

Specifically, during the fiscal years ending June 20, 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978, the Club realized net investment income in the total amount of $149,508, which was taxable as unrelated net losses on sales to non-members in the total amount of $164,-886. In its income tax returns for the years involved, the Club offset its net losses on food and beverage sales to non-members against its investment income. Since the losses exceeded the taxable net investment income, the Club thereby eliminated all of its taxable income.

The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) determined that the Code did not permit the Club to offset its losses on sales to nonmembers against its net investment income. On August 3,1981, the IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency in income taxes paid for the total amount of $31,357. The Club paid the deficiency, with interest, and filed a Claim for Refund, which was disallowed on May 13, 1982. The Club then commenced this action for a refund of the amount paid, plus statutory interest.

II.

The Club’s primary contention is that *1307 Revenue Ruling 81-69 2 , the technical advice memorandum disallowing the claimed deductions, is unlawful. The Club also argues that the citations of authority contained in the Ruling do not support the legal theory for which they are cited. Specifically, it claims that a profit motive is not a proper basis upon which to determine the deductibility of unrelated business losses incurred by a § 501(c)(7) organization, and, alternatively, that the Club does not have a profit motive in the operation of its nonmember beverage business. The IRS responds by contending that, on their face, the applicable code sections require that a deduction of this type must first be allowable under § 162(a) of the Code 3 , which governs “ordinary and necessary expenses in carrying on a trade or business,” and that since the Club has failed to meet this standard, their claimed deductions should not be permitted.

A.

As noted, the Club is a § 501(c)(7) organization which is exempt from federal income tax except on unrelated business income. The term “unrelated business taxable income”, as it applies to § 501(c)(7) organizations, is defined in § 512(a)(3)(A) as follows:

... the term “unrelated business taxable income” means the gross income (excluding any exempt function income), less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of gross income (excluding exempt function income) ...

The general definition of “unrelated business taxable income” (not applicable to the Club), as provided in § 512(a)(1), is as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the term “unrelated business taxable income” means the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business (as defined in Section 513) regularly carried on by it, less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business, both computed with the modifications provided in subsection (b).

The Club contends that the distinction between §§ 512(a)(3)(A) and 512(a)(1) of the Code — the absence of the phrase “trade or business” in the latter section — establishes that gross income and deductions need not be derived from the conduct of a “trade or business” to be included in computing “unrelated taxable income” under § 512(a)(3)(A). Because of this, the Club claims that the results reached in Revenue Ruling 81-69 are wrong, and that their deduction should be allowed.

Case law makes clear that all deductions, whether with respect to individuals or corporations, are matters of legislative grace, and unless the claimed deductions come clearly within the scope of the statute, they are not allowed. When construing the statutory provision under which the deduction is sought, the general rule that public laws should be interpreted in light of the popular or received import of words is applicable. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 60 S.Ct. 363, 84 L.Ed. 416 (1940); International Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.1960).

Section 512(a)(3)(A) requires that for an expense to be deductible it must meet two requirements. First, the deduction must be directly connected with the production of gross income; and second, it must be a deduction “allowed by this chapter.” The parties agree that the deductions claimed were directly connected with the production of gross income; their dispute is over the meaning of the phrase *1308 “allowed by this chapter.” Using the standard of statutory interpretation as set forth in Deputy v. du Pont, the Code must be read and interpreted by its plain meaning. As the IRS points out, the phrase “allowed by this chapter” can only be read to refer to Chapter One of the Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-1379. Section 162(a) is Chapter One’s general rule for allowance of trade or business deductions.

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Bluebook (online)
588 F. Supp. 1305, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5994, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14832, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cleveland-athletic-club-v-united-states-ohnd-1984.