Cletis Wells v. Blue Diamond Coal Company and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor

884 F.2d 581, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 12968, 1989 WL 99461
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedAugust 29, 1989
Docket88-3747
StatusUnpublished

This text of 884 F.2d 581 (Cletis Wells v. Blue Diamond Coal Company and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cletis Wells v. Blue Diamond Coal Company and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, 884 F.2d 581, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 12968, 1989 WL 99461 (6th Cir. 1989).

Opinion

884 F.2d 581

Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.
Cletis WELLS, Petitioner,
v.
BLUE DIAMOND COAL COMPANY; and Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, United States Department of
Labor, Respondents.

No. 88-3747.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Aug. 29, 1989.

Before RALPH B. GUY, Jr. and RYAN, Circuit Judges and DAVID D. DOWD, Jr., District Judge*.

PER CURIAM.

Cletis Wells (Wells) appeals from the denial of black lung benefits by the Benefits Review Board (Board), United States Department of Labor. Wells filed his claim for benefits pursuant to Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 30 U.S.C. Sec. 901 et seq. Wells' claim for benefits was ultimately denied based upon a determination by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that the medical evidence of record failed to satisfy any of the four medical criteria of 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a), and thus did not invoke the interim presumption of that section that Wells was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment. On appeal, Wells asserts the ALJ's determination that he failed to invoke the presumption of 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a) is not supported by substantial evidence. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ's finding that the medical evidence before him was insufficient to invoke the presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed.

I.

Wells began working in the mines in 1954 when he was 17 years old. He was a miner during his entire working life until he quit the mines at 42 years of age. His last job in the mines was with Blue Diamond Coal Company (Blue Diamond) as a shuttle car operator. A shuttle car runs on rubber tires, has a hydraulic starter and is operated by hydraulic levers. Wells testified at the hearing before the ALJ that he quit working due to breathing and back problems.

Wells applied for black lung benefits on September 10, 1979, one month after ceasing work in the coal mine industry. The Department of Labor initially found Wells to be entitled to federal black lung benefits, however, this finding was challenged by Blue Diamond. Upon this challenge, Wells' claim was referred to an ALJ, who reversed the initial grant of benefits. Wells' motion for reconsideration was overruled, and he appealed to the Benefits Review Board, who affirmed the ALJ's decision.

The ALJ found that Wells had established 24 years of coal mine employment history. Based upon the finding that Wells had over 10 years of coal mine employment, the ALJ went on to consider whether Wells satisfied any of the four medical requirements of 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a).1 If Wells satisfied any of these criteria, he would be presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment.

An X-ray which "establishes" the existence of pneumoconiosis is necessary in order to trigger the presumption of total disability pursuant to 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a)(1). There were nine X-ray readings in the record for nine separate X-rays in the record before the ALJ. Those X-rays were interpreted by physicians who were "B" readers2 as well as those who were not "B" readers, as well as the reading of one "B" reader, Dr. Brandon, were positive for pneumoconiosis. A number of readings by "B" readers, including the most recent readings, were negative for pneumoconiosis. The clear majority of readings by "B" readers were negative for pneumoconiosis.

The second means of invoking the interim presumption of 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a) is by way of pulmonary studies which "establish" chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease, as demonstrated by values which are equal to or less than certain specified values. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a)(2). In this case, only a single pulmonary function study, performed by Dr. Clarke in 1979, produced qualifying results. Several pulmonary function studies performed in 1980, however, produced non-qualifying results.

The interim presumption of 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a) may also be invoked through blood gas studies which demonstrate an impairment in the transfer of oxygen from the lungs to the blood, as indicated by values which are equal to or less than certain specified values. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a)(3). Of three blood gas studies before the ALJ, only the earliest produced qualifying values.

The last method of invoking the interim presumption of 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a) that is applicable to this case is through "other medical evidence" which establishes the presence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a)(4). Of the six medical reports in evidence before the ALJ, Dr. Clarke found Wells to be totally disabled for "all work in a dusty environment," Dr. Carey found Wells to be disabled in part due to chronic pulmonary disability and in part due to osteoarthritis, and Dr. Matheny found Wells to be totally disabled due to his "illnesses."3 Dr. Powell and Cornish found no disabling pulmonary or respiratory impairment, and Dr. Anderson diagnosed Wells with category 1 pneumoconiosis but made no finding of disability.

II.

The standard of review of the ALJ's decision is whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision and whether the correct legal criteria was employed in reaching that decision. Ramey v. Kentland Elkhorn Coal Corp., 755 F.2d 485, 486 (6th Cir.1985). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence sufficient to support a conclusion which a reasonable mind might arrive at. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

Wells' primary argument on appeal is that a single positive X-ray reading by a "B" reader is sufficient to trigger a presumtion of total disability due to pneumoconiosis pursuant to 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a)(1). He therefore concludes that since the positive reading of Dr. Brandon, a "B" reader, was in the record before the ALJ, the ALJ erred by not concluding that Wells was entitled to the interim presumption of 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a) based on this single positive reading alone.

Wells further argues on appeal that the ALJ "chose to ignore" qualifying pulmonary function and blood gas studies in the face of more recent studies demonstrating no pulmonary or respiratory impairment, as well as ignoring medical reports rendered on behalf of plaintiff that plaintiff was totally disabled due to a respiratory or pulmonary impairment.

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884 F.2d 581, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 12968, 1989 WL 99461, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cletis-wells-v-blue-diamond-coal-company-and-director-office-of-workers-ca6-1989.