Clemons v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Clemons v. State

508 So. 2d 430, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1259, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 17362

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMay 15, 1987

DocketNo. 86-1368

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 508 So. 2d 430 (Clemons v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Clemons v. State, 508 So. 2d 430, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1259, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 17362 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for speedy trial discharge. We affirm the denial because there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could conclude that appellant was not “in custody” for purposes of the speedy trial rule until his arrest for the underlying charges on July 23, 1985. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(4); State v. Christian, 442 So.2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Accordingly, appellant’s November 19, 1985, motion for discharge was premature.

Appellant, a juvenile at the time he committed the offenses, also contends the trial court erred in sentencing him as an adult without complying with section 39.-111(6), Florida Statutes (1985). That section requires a trial court to set forth written reasons for the imposition of adult sanctions. The state concedes this error and we agree. See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984). We reverse appellant’s sentences, and remand to the trial court for resentencing in compliance with section 39.111(6).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

FRANK, A.C.J., and SANDERLIN, J., and BOARDMAN, EDWARD F., (Ret.) J., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for speedy trial discharge. We affirm the denial because there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could conclude that appellant was not “in custody” for purposes of the speedy trial rule until his arrest for the underlying charges on July 23, 1985. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(4); State v. Christian, 442 So.2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Accordingly, appellant’s November 19, 1985, motion for discharge was premature.

Appellant, a juvenile at the time he committed the offenses, also contends the trial court erred in sentencing him as an adult without complying with section 39.-111(6), Florida Statutes (1985). That section requires a trial court to set forth written reasons for the imposition of adult sanctions. The state concedes this error and we agree. See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984). We reverse appellant’s sentences, and remand to the trial court for resentencing in compliance with section 39.111(6).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

FRANK, A.C.J., and SANDERLIN, J., and BOARDMAN, EDWARD F., (Ret.) J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

508 So. 2d 430, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1259, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 17362, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clemons-v-state-fladistctapp-1987.

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