Clement Ayer v. Charles Ryan

Ninth Circuit

Clement Ayer v. Charles Ryan

682 F. App'x 594

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 16, 2017

Docket16-15976

StatusUnpublished

This text of 682 F. App'x 594 (Clement Ayer v. Charles Ryan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Clement Ayer v. Charles Ryan, 682 F. App'x 594 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Arizona state prisoner Clement Makung Ayer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights by not providing elbow surgery or a diabetic diet. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Ryan because Ayer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Ayer’s health. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (under § 1983, there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ayer’s motion to amend judgment and motion for relief from judgment because Ayer failed to establish any grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief from judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)).

Ayer’s appeal of the denial of his motion for preliminary injunction is moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary relief would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We do not consider issues which are not supported by argument. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Arizona state prisoner Clement Makung Ayer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights by not providing elbow surgery or a diabetic diet. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Ryan because Ayer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Ayer’s health. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (under § 1983, there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ayer’s motion to amend judgment and motion for relief from judgment because Ayer failed to establish any grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief from judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)).

Ayer’s appeal of the denial of his motion for preliminary injunction is moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary relief would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We do not consider issues which are not supported by argument. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

5 F.3d 1255 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)

Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung

391 F.3d 1051 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)

Padgett v. Wright

587 F.3d 983 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

Jones v. Williams

297 F.3d 930 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

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