CLEAR CHANNEL OUTDOOR, INC. v. City of Saint Paul

642 F. Supp. 2d 902, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72121, 2009 WL 1664470
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJuly 16, 2009
DocketCivil 06-3304 (DWF/AJB)
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 642 F. Supp. 2d 902 (CLEAR CHANNEL OUTDOOR, INC. v. City of Saint Paul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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CLEAR CHANNEL OUTDOOR, INC. v. City of Saint Paul, 642 F. Supp. 2d 902, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72121, 2009 WL 1664470 (mnd 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DONOVAN W. FRANK, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. (“Clear Channel”) commenced this action against the City of Saint Paul (the “City”) after the City passed a zoning ordinance that banned all extensions on billboards in St. Paul. This matter came before the Court on May 8, 2009, pursuant to Clear Channel’s motion for partial summary judgment and the City’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Clear Channel’s motion and denies the City’s motion.

BACKGROUND

The City is a home rule charter municipality located in Ramsey County, Minnesota. Clear Channel is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona. Clear Channel owns and operates two types of billboards in St. Paul— poster panels, which are 12 x 25 feet and use paper, and bulletins, which are 14 x 48 feet and use vinyl. Since 1925, Clear Channel and its predecessors have commonly used extensions on their bulletin billboards. Extensions are graphics or words that extend above or from the sides of the rectangular face of a billboard. Extensions are limited to no more than six feet high and no more than eighteen inches on either side and below the signs. Currently, Clear Channel owns and operates 77 bulletin billboards in St. Paul containing 124 faces.

In November 2000, the City adopted a total prohibition on new advertising signs, including billboards, and it enacted other certain restrictions concerning the size and timeframe of use for billboard extensions. Prior to that time, billboards with and without extensions, although subject to regulation, were conforming uses within St. Paul. Since November 2000, existing billboards have been deemed legal nonconforming uses. See generally, St. Paul Legislative Code (hereinafter, “Code”), §§ 66.214 (2001), 66.301 (2001); § 62.102 (2007).

On March 8, 2006, the City amended Code (a) and (g) of § 64.301, entitled “Nonconforming Signs,” to ban the use of all extensions on billboards in St. Paul. Specifically, the amendment provides, “No sign shall be enlarged or altered in a way which increases its nonconformity. Bill *904 board extensions are not permitted.” Code, § 64.801(a). The City contends that this amendment brings billboards more in line with all other signs in St. Paul by requiring all signs to comply with certain size limitations. In June 2006, the City’s Office of Licensing, Inspections, and Environmental Protection demanded that Clear Channel remove all existing billboard extensions and that no new extensions be used.

Shortly thereafter, Clear Channel filed a two-count Complaint in this Court, alleging that (1) the City engaged in the unconstitutional and unreasonable use of police power in violation of Minn.Stat. § 462.357 and that (2) the City’s actions violated Clear Channel’s due process and equal protection rights under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. Clear Channel then moved for partial summary judgment to determine whether Code § 64.301(a) is valid and enforceable. The City also moved for summary judgment, asserting that Clear Channel’s two claims fail as a matter of law. The Court originally heard the parties’ motions on October 26, 2007, at which time the Court ordered the parties into settlement negotiations. After the parties informed the Court in January 2009 that they had reached a settlement impasse, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental summary judgment briefs and to appear for a second motion hearing on May 8, 2009.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank of Mo., 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir.1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated, “[sjummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ ” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. Clear Channel’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Clear Channel argues that the City’s amendment to Code § 64.301(a) is invalid because it is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. 1 Regardless of whether zoning matters are legislative (rezoning) or quasi-judicial (variances and special use permits), the standard for re *905 view is the same for all zoning matters and is essentially whether the zoning authority’s actions were reasonable or there was a rational basis for the actions. Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 416-17 (Minn.1981) (explaining that cases have expressed this standard differently, such as “is there a reasonable basis for the decision,” “is the decision unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,” or “is the decision reasonably debatable.”)

Cities are authorized to enact zoning ordinances “for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.” Minn.Stat. § 452.357, subd. 1. Thus, because a municipal body is formulating public policy in legislative zoning, the reasonableness or rational basis inquiry for zoning matters focuses on whether the proposed ordinance promotes the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 417. Specifically, a city must have articulated reasons reasonably related to public health, safety, morals, and welfare recorded or reduced to writing for a zoning ordinance to be valid. Id. at 416.

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642 F. Supp. 2d 902, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72121, 2009 WL 1664470, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clear-channel-outdoor-inc-v-city-of-saint-paul-mnd-2009.