Clayton v. Keeler

18 Misc. 488, 42 N.Y.S. 1051
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 18 Misc. 488 (Clayton v. Keeler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clayton v. Keeler, 18 Misc. 488, 42 N.Y.S. 1051 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1896).

Opinion

Giegerich, J. (charging the jury).

Gentlemen of the Jury.— This action is brought to recover damages claimed in consequence of an alleged assault and. battery by the defendant upon the plaintiff.

The allegations of the complaint in substance are: That on.or about the 26th day of September, 1894, at the city of New York, the defendant violently assaulted the plaintiff, and struck, beat, pushed and thrust her violently against, upon and into a chair, thereby injuring and bruising her about her arms, limbs and body; that he shook his fist in her face, and cursed and swore at and threatened to kill her if she did not sign her name to a paper writing which he then and there produced and which it is alleged contained false and untrue statements; that the defendant then and there did, by threats, violence, force and duress, and by putting the plaintiff in fear of her life, compel her to sign her name to and upon said paper; and plaintiff further alleges that, by reason of the matters referred to, she was incapacitated in a great degree for the performance of her duties and business and suffered and still suffers great bodily and mental pain as well as a severe shock to her nervous system, and that she has been put to expense for medicine and medical attendance.

The answer of the defendant is a general denial of each and every allegation of the complaint, the substance of which you have heard.

[490]*490The solution of the questions of fact presented by the pleadings and proofs is for you and you alone. It is my duty to instruct you as to the law which you will apply to the facts in the case as you may find them; for of the facts you are the solé judges. Your guide to the law is the charge of the court and not the statements of counsel.

At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case a motion was made for a. dismissal of the complaint, and it was denied by the court.

I charge you that the denial of that motion should not be taken by you as any indication that the plaintiff is entitled to recover; it was simply a ruling of the court that the plaintiff had presented such a state of facts as required consideration by a jury.

While- the law makes the parties litigant competent witnesses in this case, yet you have a right to take into consideration their relation to and interest in the result of your verdict, and the circumstances surrounding them, and give to their testimony such weight as in your judgment it is fairly entitled to.

You are the judges of the credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of each and every Witness, and you are not bound to take the testimony of any witness as absolutely true if you are satisfied'from all the facts and circumstances proved on the trial that such witness is mistaken in'the matter testified to or that for any other reason her or his testimony is untrue or unreliable.

In determining the issues, you should take into' consideration the whole of the evidence and all the facts and circumstances proved on the trial, giving the several parts of the evidence such weight as you think they are entitled to.

You must decide this case upon the evidence adduced before you as you recollect it, and where statements of counsel ór the court are not in accord with your recollection, you must entirely disregard them.

It is, perhaps, not amiss, in view of the character of the testimony adduced and the summing up of counsel, to remind you that this is an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery and not one for divorce. ■

While it is your duty to' consider the evidence as to the alleged commission of adultery by the defendant’s wife,- as well as all other facts and circumstances proved on the trial, and to determine the Weight you believe should be given to the testimony of each witness who has been examined in that regard, you- should, however, not lose sight of the main question in this case, which is, whethei [491]*491or not the defendant assaulted and beat the plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint.

In determining this question one way or the other, it does not, to my mind, necessarily follow from your verdict that you believe or disbelieve the charge made by the plaintiff against the defendant’s wife; for you may, in my opinion, consistently find from the evidence that such charge is entirely without foundation, and yet, that the defendant, in his zeal to protect his wife’s honor, did assault the plaintiff; or that there is some foundation for the story which it is claimed plaintiff circulated concerning the defendant’s wife, but that the defendant did not assault or beat the plaintiff.

As before remarked, this is an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery.

Every laying on of hands upon the person of another, and every blow or push, constitutes an assault and trespass, in respect of which an action for damages is maintainable, unless the act can be justified or excused. Every attempt, also, to offer with force and violence to do hurt to another, constitutes an assault, such as striking at a person with or without a weapon; holding up a fist in a threatening attitude sufficiently near to be able to strike; advancing with a hand uplifted in a threatening manner with intent to strike, although the person is stopped before he gets near enough to carry the intention into effect. But as regards threatening gestures, if the parties at the time the gestures are used áre SO' far distant from each other that immediate contact is impossible, there is no assault. A mere threat, unaccompanied by an offer or threat to strike, is not an assault. The mere touching of a person without force or violence, for the purpose of drawing his attention to some matter or another, is not an assault unless it is done in a hostile or insulting manner.

A battery as distinguished from an assault is where the person of a man or woman is actually struck or touched in a violent, angry, rude or insolent manner. But every laying on of hands is not a buttery. The parties’ intention must be considered; for people will sometimes, by way of joke or friendship, clap a person on the back, and it would be ridiculous to say that every such case constitutes a battery.

To constitute a battery, the intent to injure must concur with the use of unlawful violence upon the person of the assaulted party, but the'slightest degree of force suffices to constitute violence, and the intended injury may be to the feelings of mind' of the latter; as well' as to the corporeal person.

[492]*492Now, gentlemen, it will be your duty to carefully consider the evidence adduced, and to determine in the light of the law, as laid down by the court, whether or not the defendant did commit the alleged assault and battery upon the plaintiff.

The plaintiff testified that on the 26th of September,-. 1894, while she was stopping with one Mrs. Millie Getman, at No. 317 West One Hundred and Twenty-fourth street in this city, the defendant, together with his wife, and Mr.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Misc. 488, 42 N.Y.S. 1051, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clayton-v-keeler-nysupct-1896.