Claymont Development, LLC, Appellant, vs. City of Wildwood, Respondent.

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 24, 2025
• Docket: ED112720
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FIVE

CLAYMONT DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) No. ED112720 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of St. Louis County vs. ) ) Honorable Kristine A. Kerr CITY OF WILDWOOD, ) ) Respondent. ) FILED: June 24, 2025

Claymont Development, LLC (“Claymont”) appeals the judgment dismissing its petition

challenging the constitutionality of certain ordinances enacted by the City of Wildwood relating

to real estate development. We agree with Claymont that the trial court erred in concluding these

claims were not ripe for adjudication. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

Factual and Procedural Background

We take the allegations in the petition as true for purposes of our review. See Graves v.

Missouri Dep’t of Corr., Div. of Prob. & Parole, 630 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Mo. banc 2021). In 1999,

Claymont began “working with” the City of Wildwood to develop homes on a property known as

Strecker Forest. In 2007, the City approved a residential development plan. Since that time,

Claymont has invested over a million dollars in reliance on the expectation that it could develop

Strecker Forest as a residential subdivision. It is prepared to move forward with the development. In late 2020, the City enacted the Special Circumstances Overlay District (“SCOD”)

ordinance, creating the SCOD and subjecting land use within it to additional regulations beyond

the City’s other zoning rules. The SCOD ordinance states that the purpose of the SCOD is to

“protect public health and the environment, while allowing appropriate development activities and

practices within the SCOD.” It also “establishes a protective zoning process that places more focus

on the assessment of physical characteristics and public and environmental hazards that may exist

on a property through a multiple-step [] review process.” The SCOD ordinance provides that “[n]o

person shall develop or cause the development of any property, or part thereof, located within the

SCOD unless a completed application for such development has been submitted and approved

pursuant to the requirements” set forth therein. In 2022, the City enacted another ordinance (“the

Strecker Forest ordinance”), which placed Strecker Forest within the SCOD.1

Claymont sought a declaratory judgment that the SCOD ordinance is unconstitutional on

its face and as applied to Strecker Forest. Claymont also requested damages, alleging that the

Strecker Forest ordinance constituted a taking of private property without just compensation in

violation of the United States Constitution and an inverse condemnation in violation of the

Missouri Constitution. Claymont alleged that the procedures and requirements set out in the

SCOD ordinance are “onerous, cost prohibitive, [] subjective and vague” and thereby prevent “any

effective use of Strecker Forest as a residential development.” According to Claymont, the SCOD

ordinance (1) “allows for no uses permitted as of right” with respect to property within the SCOD,

(2) conditions all uses on the City’s discretionary approval, and (3) “lacks sufficiently definite and

specific standards” for what conditional uses might be permitted. It claimed that the SCOD is

1 The ordinances are attached to Claymont’s petition, and we consider them part of the allegations therein. See Smith v. Stewart, 644 S.W.3d 5, 10 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022); Missouri Supreme Court Rule 55.12 (2024) (“An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes”).

2 unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious on its face. As applied to Strecker Forest, Claymont

alleged that the SCOD ordinance “makes residential development infeasible, interferes with

Claymont’s reasonable investment-backed expectations based on the City’s prior approvals for a

residential subdivision, and destroys all economically beneficial use of Strecker Forest.” While

asserting that the ordinances have no public benefit, the petition also asserted that any benefit to

the public the ordinances do have is outweighed by the private detriment to Claymont.

The City filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that Claymont’s claims were not

ripe for adjudication because it had not applied for approval of its Strecker Forest development

plans under the ordinances. The trial court agreed and entered judgment dismissing the petition.

Claymont appeals.

Standard of Review

We review the granting of a motion to dismiss de novo. Graves, 630 S.W.3d at 772. In

doing so, we accept all properly pleaded facts as true, giving the pleadings their broadest

intendment and construing all allegations in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.

Discussion

The sole issue on appeal is whether Claymont’s constitutional challenges to these

ordinances are ripe for adjudication even though it has not yet applied for approval of its Strecker

Forest development plan pursuant to the ordinances. We conclude that Claymont’s claims are

indeed ripe.

It is well-settled that a plaintiff may challenge the constitutionality of a law before it has

been enforced against the plaintiff. See Alpert v. State, 543 S.W.3d 589, 592-93 (Mo. banc 2018).

“Parties need not subject themselves to a multiplicity of suits or litigation or await the imposition

of penalties under an unconstitutional enactment in order to assert their constitutional claim[.]” Id.

3 at 595 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such pre-enforcement constitutional

challenges are ripe when “(1) the facts necessary to adjudicate the underlying claims are fully

developed and (2) the law at issue affects the plaintiff in a manner that gives rise to an immediate,

concrete dispute.” Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). A case

that presents predominantly legal questions with little need for the development of additional facts

is particularly amenable to a pre-enforcement determination, as are challenges to laws that have

“interrupt[ed] or prevent[ed]” the plaintiff’s “previous lawful conduct.” Id. at 593-94 (collecting

cases).

Our jurisprudence is replete with examples of ripe pre-enforcement constitutional

challenges to statutes and ordinances. For instance, in Alpert, a convicted felon filed a petition

challenging a statute criminalizing his possession of firearms. Id. at 591. The plaintiff had legally

possessed firearms prior to the enactment of the statute and desired to do so again. Id. at 593. At

the time of his lawsuit, the plaintiff had not violated the statute or been charged or threatened with

prosecution. Id. at 592. The Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that the plaintiff’s

constitutional challenge to the statute was ripe even though the statute had not yet been enforced

against him. Id. at 595. Noting that the plaintiff’s previously lawful possession of firearms was

interrupted as a result of the statute, the Court found that the issue of whether the statute violated

his right to bear arms was a legal question that could be determined based on facts that required

no further development—specifically, the plaintiff’s status as a convicted felon and his stated

desire to possess guns. Id. at 593-94.

The Western District has also recognized that a case is ripe when the issue can be resolved

on the “historical facts” and “no future factual developments or events will affect the analysis.”

Iseman v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 660 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). In that case, the

4 plaintiff, while still incarcerated, sought a declaration about his future obligation under the sex

offender registration statute. Id. at 689. The court found his pre-enforcement claim to be ripe

because the facts necessary to determine whether he would be required to register—namely, the

nature of his previous offenses—were “historical,” meaning they had already occurred and needed

no further development. Id. at 690.

Likewise, a plaintiff can bring a pre-enforcement challenge to an ordinance when it directly

impacts how the plaintiff does business and the facts needed to resolve the challenge are fully

developed. For example, in Building Owners & Managers Ass’n of Metropolitan St. Louis, Inc. v.

City of St. Louis, 341 S.W.3d 143, 146 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011), the plaintiff challenged an ordinance

that the city had not yet enforced against the plaintiff’s members. The claims were nevertheless

ripe because (1) they presented legal questions that needed little factual development, and (2) the

ordinance “impose[d] affirmative duties” on the plaintiff’s members giving rise to an immediate

and concrete dispute. Id. at 149. The ordinance, this Court noted, affected the way the plaintiff’s

members did business in the city and they could “assume the [c]ity will enforce its laws.” Id. This

Court also held a claim was ripe in Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis, Inc. v. City of

Wildwood, 32 S.W.3d 612, 613-15 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000), where the plaintiff challenged an

ordinance that imposed certain financial requirements on the development of subdivisions before

the city enforced it against the plaintiff or its members. The ordinance, the Court explained, was

clearly directed at the plaintiff’s members and was designed to regulate the way they engaged in

developing subdivisions. Id. And there was “no speculation that [the members] are or will be

immediately adversely affected by [the city]’s collection of the allegedly improper amounts for

subdivision developments.” Id.; see also Clifford Hindman Real Est., Inc. v. City of Jennings, 283

S.W.3d 804, 807 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (finding that plaintiff did not have to risk injury to its

5 business by knowingly violating a rental permit ordinance before seeking a declaration that the

ordinance was unconstitutional and constituted a taking without just compensation).

Claymont’s challenges to the constitutionality of the SCOD and Strecker Forest ordinances

are ripe for adjudication for all the same reasons. First, the Forest Strecker ordinance is clearly

directed at how Claymont can use Strecker Forest, and its enactment interrupted Claymont’s

previously approved plan to develop that property. On their face, the challenged ordinances ban

“development of any property, or part thereof, located within the SCOD” without approval under

the SCOD ordinance. Thus, in order for Claymont to continue with its development plans in

Strecker Forest, it must undergo the additional approval process in the SCOD ordinance.

Claymont’s petition specifically alleged that the ordinances are already having an adverse effect

by making development infeasible, interfering with its “investment-backed expectations,” and

destroying any economically beneficial use of its property.

Second, the allegations in Claymont’s petition present predominantly legal claims: whether

the approval process in the SCOD ordinance is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to

Strecker Forest and whether the Strecker Forest ordinance constituted a taking without just

compensation. Most, if not all, of the facts needed to make these determinations—the text of the

ordinances, the history of development plans in Strecker Forest, details about the impact on

Claymont’s property since the Strecker Forest ordinance was enacted, and Claymont’s stated

intention to move forward with its development plan—are “historical” and need no further

development. See Iseman, 660 S.W.3d at 690.

The City insists that the claims are not ripe because additional facts, which have not yet

occurred, are needed in order to determine whether Claymont will be prevented from developing

Strecker Forest. According to the City, the impact of the challenged ordinances on Claymont is

6 purely speculative unless and until Claymont submits an application to develop Strecker Forest in

accordance with the SCOD ordinance. But the City misconstrues the nature of the claims in the

petition. Claymont did not assert that it would be unconstitutional to deny an application for the

development of Strecker Forest; it claimed that subjecting its property to that approval process in

the first place was unconstitutional and constituted a taking without just compensation. In other

words, Claymont did not allege that it will be unable to develop Strecker Forest in the future; it

alleged that it is currently being adversely impacted by ordinances that subject development of

that property to an additional approval process. These claims are not dependent in any way on

what an application to develop Strecker Forest would contain or whether such an application would

be approved or denied.

And contrary to the City’s contention, this case is not analogous to St. Louis County v. City

of Sunset Hills, 727 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987), where the plaintiff claimed that zoning

certain property for a particular use was unconstitutional but did not challenge the process by

which the property was zoned. Because the plaintiff in that case had not first attempted to have

the property rezoned, this Court found that it “ha[d] not shown a legally protectable interest that

has been injured . . . and is appropriate or ripe for judicial resolution.” Id. at 413. Here, on the

other hand, Claymont challenged the application process itself—not the potential outcome of that

process—and alleged an immediate adverse impact resulting from the fact of being subject to that

process. Claymont is not required to engage in the approval process under the SCOD ordinance

and await a negative result before challenging its constitutionality in court. See Alpert, 543 S.W.3d

at 594-95; Iseman, 660 S.W.3d at 689; Home Builders, 32 S.W.3d at 615.

In sum, the petition contained the requisite factual allegations—not merely conclusions as

the City argues—demonstrating that the factual background necessary to adjudicate Claymont’s

7 claims is fully developed and that the ordinances affect Claymont in a manner that gives rise to an

immediate, concrete dispute. See Alpert, 543 S.W.3d at 593. Therefore, the claims in Claymont’s

petition are ripe, and the trial court erred in dismissing the petition.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

_______________________________ MICHAEL E. GARDNER, Judge

Thomas C. Clark, II, C.J., concurs. Elizabeth B. Hogan, Sp.J., concurs.