Claylon J. Cooper, Jr. v. State
This text of Claylon J. Cooper, Jr. v. State (Claylon J. Cooper, Jr. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NO. 07-07-0334-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
FEBRUARY 2, 2009
______________________________
CLAYLON J. COOPER, JR., APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. ONE OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2006-499,733; HONORABLE LARRY B. “RUSTY” LADD, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Claylon J. Cooper, Jr., was convicted by a jury of driving while intoxicated. The court sentenced Appellant to a term of confinement of ninety days in the Lubbock County Jail and a fine of $500, with the period of confinement being suspended in favor of eighteen months of community supervision. By one issue, Appellant maintains the trial court erred by charging the jury on the synergistic effect (footnote: 1) of combining drugs and alcohol because there was no evidence of a synergistic relationship between the medication being taken by Appellant and alcohol. We affirm.
Background
On May 11, 2006, Appellant was arrested for the offense of driving while intoxicated after he was discovered “slumped” over in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, while his vehicle sat at a controlled intersection in Lubbock, Texas. In June 2007, his case was tried to a jury and in his opening statement, Appellant’s counsel asserted Appellant was asleep at the wheel of his vehicle due to a let down following a dose of Adderall, a prescription drug used to treat Appellant’s condition of Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).
John Barber, an officer for the Lubbock Police Department, testified that, on May 23, 2006, he observed Appellant’s pickup truck sitting in an intersection at 3:00 a.m. After the truck remained stationary through a green traffic light, Barber drove by the truck and observed Appellant slumped behind the steering wheel. The engine was running, headlights were on, and the brake lights were flashing intermittently. Barber walked up to the truck, opened the door on the driver’s side, and turned the ignition off. As he did, Appellant stirred and started to waken. The music coming from within the cab was very loud. After Appellant took his foot off the brake, the truck started to roll into the intersection. Barber reached in the truck and put the transmission in “park.” Barber asked Appellant why he was passed out behind the wheel and Appellant responded that he could not explain it. He asked Appellant if he had been drinking, and Appellant responded affirmatively.
As Barber asked Appellant for his license and proof of insurance, Sergeant Hyatt arrived to assist. Barber told Appellant that he could smell an odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his breath and the cab interior. He asked Appellant for an explanation and received none. Barber performed several field sobriety tests. After administering the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, Barber concluded there was a strong probability that Appellant was intoxicated because he exhibited six indicators. Barber next administered the walk and turn and leg stand tests. Both tests resulted in strong indicators to Barber that Appellant was intoxicated. Barber arrested Appellant and asked whether Appellant would submit to a breath test. Appellant declined. When Appellant’s vehicle was inventoried, Sergeant Hyatt found an unopened twelve ounce can of beer underneath the front seat. He also found a driver’s license belonging to someone else in Appellant’s wallet.
Daretia Cooper, Appellant’s mother, testified that, in the tenth grade in high school, Appellant was diagnosed with ADHD and was prescribed a daily dosage of Adderall XL. She also testified that his medication could cause him to be “either bouncing off the walls or he’s asleep.” She testified that, on at least two prior occasions, when her son’s Adderall dosage was wearing off he would suddenly fall asleep without warning. In her opinion, after watching the police video of his arrest, she believed he appeared to be asleep rather than intoxicated.
Based upon the testimony of Appellant’s mother, the State requested that the trial court issue a synergism charge. Appellant’s counsel objected asserting that the State had failed to offer any evidence that alcohol would interact with Adderall to produce intoxication. The State responded that his mother had testified that coming off the drug caused her son to suddenly fall asleep and that the consumption of alcohol could compound this effect. The court overruled Appellant’s objection and issued a synergism charge. (footnote: 2) Thereafter, the jury issued a guilty verdict, the court assessed punishment, and this appeal followed.
Discussion
I. Standard of Review
We review charge error using a two-step process. Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). First, we determine whether error occurred; and if so, we evaluate that error to determine whether sufficient harm resulted therefrom to require reversal. Id. at 731-32. The degree of harm required for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved that error by objection. Id. A properly preserved error will call for reversal as long as the error is not harmless. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)(op. on reh'g), reaffirmed, Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In other words, error in the charge that is properly preserved by a timely objection requires reversal if the error is “calculated to injure the rights of [the] defendant,” meaning that there must be some harm to the accused from the error. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.19 (Vernon 2006); see Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 732; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174.
II. Charge Error
In presenting its charge to the jury, it is incumbent upon a trial court to distinctly instruct the jury on the law applicable to every issue raised by the evidence, Cantu v. State , 170 Tex.Crim. 375, 341 S.W.2d 451, 452-53 (1960); Mullins v. State , 173 S.W.3d 167, 178 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2005, no pet.), regardless of whether the evidence favors the State or the accused. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 (Vernon 2007); Givens v. State , 749 S.W.2d 954, 959 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref’d).
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