Clay v. Discover Bank

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: April 7, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00179
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6

7 AANIYA CLAY, Case No. 2:25-cv-00179-APG-NJK 8 Plaintiff(s), Order 9 v. [Docket Nos. 32, 33] 10 DISCOVER BANK, et al., 11 Defendant(s). 12 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default. Docket No. 32.1 13 Defendant Discover Bank filed a response in opposition. Docket No. 34. Plaintiff filed a reply. 14 Docket No. 37. Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to strike. Docket No. 33. 15 Discover filed a response in opposition. Docket No. 35. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 38. 16 The motions are properly resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons 17 discussed below, the motions are both DENIED. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 This is a Fair Credit Reporting Act case against several defendants. On February 19, 2025, 20 Plaintiff and Discover filed a second joint motion to extend Discover’s answer deadline. Docket 21 No. 22. The Court granted that second request and extended the deadline to February 26, 2025, 22 with the caveat that no further extensions of this deadline would be allowed. Docket No. 24 at 2. 23 Despite that warning, Plaintiff and Discover jointly moved to extend the answer deadline again, 24 filing their request after hours on the deadline, February 26, 2025. Docket No. 25. On February 25 28, 2025, consistent with its prior warning, the Court denied that joint motion. Docket No. 26. On 26 March 3, 2025, Discover filed its answer. On March 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motions 27 1 The Court liberally construes the filings of pro se litigants. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 28 89, 94 (2007). 1} for default and to strike the answer. Docket Nos. 32, 33. Those are the motions currently before the Court. 3} II. MOTION FOR DEFAULT 4 The Court may enter default against a party that has “failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). This rule “applies only to parties who have never appeared in the action.” 6|| Randazza v. Cox, 2014 WL 12789624, at *1 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2014) (quoting Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988)). In this 8]| case, Discover has filed an answer, Docket No. 27, and that answer was filed before the motion 9| for default was filed. As such, Discover has not “failed to plead or otherwise defend” and entry 10]| of default is not warranted. See, e.g., Jennings v. Cnty. of Riverside, 2022 WL 19829433, at *1 11] (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2022). 12) 11. MOTION TO STRIKE 13 The Court may strike from pleadings material that is “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, 14] or scandalous.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “Untimeliness” is not an enumerated ground in Rule 12(f) on which to strike material from a pleading, so it is not clear that Rule 12(f) provides a foundation 16] on which Plaintiff may seek this relief. Cf Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comm’s Enters., 17] Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 540 (1991). At any rate, courts routinely find “that the untimeliness of an answer is not, by itself, a sufficient basis to grant a motion to strike.” Banks v. TransUnion, 2024 19] WL 402661, at *10 (D. Nev. Feb. 1, 2024) (collecting cases). Particularly in light of the strong preference for deciding cases on their merits and the fact that the answer was filed only a few days 21] late, the Court declines to strike Discover’s answer. CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff's motion for entry of default and motion to strike are both DENIED. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: April 7, 2025 Ze \ ae Nancy JKoppe 28 United States Magistrate Judge