Claude Franklin Moore v. United States

Ninth Circuit

Claude Franklin Moore v. United States

401 F.2d 533, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5178

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 22, 1968

Docket22501_1

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 401 F.2d 533 (Claude Franklin Moore v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Claude Franklin Moore v. United States, 401 F.2d 533, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5178 (9th Cir. 1968).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 *534 (1966), requires the government to show not only that the accused was effectively informed of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to the assistance of counsel, but also that the accused knowingly and intelligently waived these rights. Moreover, “A valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.

The record is devoid of any evidence that appellant waived his rights before making the admissions to which Officer Pelz testified.

Since we cannot say that the error “does not affect substantial rights” (Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a)), or “that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the judgment must be reversed.

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PER CURIAM:

Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 *534 (1966), requires the government to show not only that the accused was effectively informed of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to the assistance of counsel, but also that the accused knowingly and intelligently waived these rights. Moreover, “A valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.

The record is devoid of any evidence that appellant waived his rights before making the admissions to which Officer Pelz testified.

Since we cannot say that the error “does not affect substantial rights” (Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a)), or “that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the judgment must be reversed.

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401 F.2d 533, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/claude-franklin-moore-v-united-states-ca9-1968.

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