Claude and Tammie Aucoin Versus Diaz LLC and Admiral Insurance Company

Opinion

CLAUDE AND TAMMIE AUCOIN NO. 23-C-294

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

DIAZ LLC AND ADMIRAL INSURANCE COURT OF APPEAL COMPANY ET AL STATE OF LOUISIANA

June 27, 2023

Linda Wiseman First Deputy Clerk

IN RE DIAZ LLC, DIAZ II LLC, DIAZ REALTY INVESTMENTS AND ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR., DIVISION "N", NUMBER 809-603

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker, Jude G. Gravois, and Robert A. Chaisson

WRIT GRANTED IN PART; DENIED IN PART

Defendants/Relators seek review of the trial court’s May 15, 2023 judgment

granting Plaintiffs’ motion for an adverse presumption based on spoliation of

evidence in this personal injury suit arising from an accident at a convenience store

and gas station. For the following reasons, the writ is granted in part and denied in

part.

On August 25, 2020, Plaintiffs Claude and Tammie Aucoin, filed suit against

Diaz, LLC and Admiral Insurance Company; and thereafter, in November 2022, filed a

supplemental and amending petition to add Diaz Realty Investments, LLC and Diaz II,

LLC as defendants (collectively “Diaz”), claiming Diaz is liable for damages as a result

of injuries Plaintiff Claude Aucoin allegedly sustained at a convenience store and gas

station owned and operated by Diaz.

On August 31, 2019, Mr. Aucoin stopped at Diaz Market, a convenience store

and gas station located in Kenner, Louisiana, and parked his vehicle near the carwash

23-C-294 and the automobile vacuum cleaner, located on the Diaz Market premises, in order

to clean out his car. According to the petition for damages, Mr. Aucoin approached

the vacuum cleaner and bent down to reach for the vacuum hose when he struck his

head on a piece of metal protruding from a post located behind the vacuum cleaner.

Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Aucoin sustained concussive injuries, as well as emotional

and/or psychological injuries, bruising, tingling, and neck pain, for which Diaz is

liable.

On March 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion for adverse presumption based

on the theory of spoliation of evidence. Diaz and codefendant StarStone National

Insurance Company filed oppositions to Plaintiffs’ motion, and a hearing was held

on the matter on April 18, 2023. The trial court took the matter under advisement

and subsequently rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, granting their motion for

adverse presumption, and issued written reasons. Diaz now seeks this Court’s

supervisory review of the trial court’s May 15, 2023 ruling.

In Temes v. Manitowoc Corp., 14-93 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/14), 181 So.3d

733, 740, this Court explained:

The theory of “spoliation of evidence” refers to an intentional destruction of evidence for the purpose of depriving opposing parties of its use. The tort of spoliation of evidence has its roots in the evidentiary doctrine of “adverse presumption,” which allows a jury instruction for the presumption that the destroyed evidence contained information detrimental to the party who destroyed the evidence unless such destruction is adequately explained. Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 04-455 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/12/04), 887 So.2d 524, 534. However, the presumption of spoliation is not applicable when the failure to produce the evidence has a reasonable explanation. Allen v. Blanchard, 99-0277 (La. App. 1 Cir. 03/31/00), 763 So.2d 704, 710.

Plaintiffs’ motion complains of Diaz’s failure to preserve: (1) the store’s video

surveillance footage from the date of the accident; (2) the physical piece of metal;

(3) the configuration of the metal piece as it appeared at the time Mr. Aucoin was

injured; and (4) the carwash premises. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs

presented the September 4, 2019 preservation notice they sent to Diaz, instructing

2 Diaz “to retain, preserve and protect any and all video of [August 31, 2019,] as well

as all records and physical evidence in anticipation of litigation.” The preservation

letter also attached the incident report and the photographs Tammie Aucoin, Mr.

Aucoin’s wife, took on the day of the accident. Plaintiffs assert that despite Diaz’s

receipt of the preservation notice, Diaz failed to view and preserve the video footage

from the date of the incident, and one week before Dorian M. Diaz’s (“Mr. Diaz”)

scheduled deposition, Mr. Diaz had the carwash portion of the premises demolished,

and with it, the offending metal piece and the post into which it had been embedded

were also discarded.

The motion points out that Kevin Glidewell, the insurance adjuster who

investigated the claim within two weeks of the incident, including a site inspection,

testified during his deposition that he was not aware of the preservation letter and

had he known about it, he would have made efforts to ensure preservation of the

metal piece. Additionally, the motion states that “but for the pictures from [Mrs.

Aucoin’s] cell phone, there would be no evidence of the actual placement of this

dangerous condition” because Mr. Diaz “[tore] down the entire scene and [threw]

away the evidence, 1 week before this [sic] deposition.” Plaintiffs further assert that

their purpose for seeking an adverse presumption is “to ensure any defense [Diaz]

may claim blaming Aucoin, or others are cut off by the presumption.”

Opposing the motion, Diaz and StarStone argued that Plaintiffs are not

entitled to an adverse presumption because by the time Diaz received the notice of

preservation, the video footage had already been overwritten as part of the standard

operating practices of the business. Likewise, Diaz and StarStone averred that the

discarding of the offending metal piece does not prejudice Plaintiffs’ case in that the

photographs taken by Mrs. Aucoin and Mr. Glidewell sufficiently demonstrate what

the piece of metal looked like and where it was located. They also contend that the

demolition of the carwash occurred over three years after the accident, and therefore,

3 Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to inspect the premises. Furthermore, Diaz and

StarStone maintain that the demolition of the carwash was a business decision based

upon storm related damages to the premises.

After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court issued a blanket

ruling granting an adverse presumption on the basis of spoliation of the evidence.

The trial court judgment states, “[Plaintiffs] are entitled to an instruction to the jury

on the adverse presumption of spoliation due to Defendants’ conduct.” In its written

reasons, the trial court concluded that “Defendants were on notice as of Sept[sic] 9,

2019 to preserve the physical evidence. It is undisputed that Mr. Diaz later went on

to destroy the evidence without first notifying Plaintiffs’ counsel to determine if

there was any further need to preserve said evidence.”

In that the trial court’s judgment makes no distinction as to the individual

items and categories of evidence raised in the motion, it appears the trial court

granted an adverse presumption as to all the evidence. Because we find Plaintiffs

are not entitled to an adverse presumption based on spoliation of the evidence in

every instance raised in Plaintiffs’ motion, we address each one separately.

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs conceded at the hearing on the motion that it

was possible that the failure to preserve the video footage was unintentional because

Diaz received the preservation notice on September 9, 2019, and based on testimony

presented, the time for recovering the video footage would have already lapsed. The

hearing transcript suggests that upon this concession, Plaintiffs abandoned their

spoliation argument as to the video footage. To the extent, however, that the trial

court granted an adverse presumption pertaining to the video footage, the trial

court’s ruling was in error.

Plaintiffs, however, maintain their argument with regard to the metal object

embedded on the post on which Mr. Aucoin struck his head, arguing that Diaz’s

failure to preserve the physical evidence was intentional. Plaintiffs argue that Diaz

4 destroyed the physical evidence for the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs of its use at

trial. In opposition to the instant writ application, Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he issue

is the loss and destruction of the evidence that hurt Mr. Aucoin within two (2) weeks

after the event, while [Diaz] was on notice of the request, and decided to alter and

eventually lose the evidence.” In this regard, Plaintiffs’ argument, regarding the

spoliation of the piece of metal, is two-fold.

First, Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to an adverse presumption because Diaz

removed the metal piece from its original location and, as a result, altered the

configuration and placement of the protruding piece of metal as it appeared when

Mr. Aucoin was injured. While the parties do not dispute that the metal piece itself

was still available when Mr. Glidewell conducted his investigation on September

13, 20191, Plaintiffs failed to present evidence to establish when the protruding piece

of metal was dislodged and removed from its original location as it appeared on

August 31, 2019. Unlike the video footage, it is unclear if the piece of metal was

removed from its original location before or after Diaz received notice to preserve

the physical evidence. Assuming Diaz removed the metal piece before receiving

Plaintiffs’ preservation notice on September 9, 2019, it is arguable that Plaintiffs are

not entitled to an adverse presumption for Diaz’s failure to preserve the offending

piece of metal in the same state it appeared on August 31, 2019. Because at this

point there is no evidence to establish when the metal piece was removed, and thus

altering the configuration of the injury site, we find the granting of an adverse

presumption based on Diaz’s removal of the metal piece is premature.

Second, Plaintiffs also seek an adverse presumption based on Diaz’s

discarding of the actual physical piece of metal. Diaz received the preservation

1 The instant writ application states that Mr. Glidewell performed his investigation within days of Diaz’s receipt of the September 2019 preservation notice and within two weeks of the accident. Photographs taken by Mr. Glidewell as part of his report indicate his investigation took place on or about September 13, 2019; however, in StarStone’s writ application, in affiliated case no. 23-C-300, StarStone states that Mr. Glidewell performed his investigation in September 2021, two years after the accident. 5 notice via certified mail on September 9, 2019, which Giselle Diaz Eastlick, the

general manager of Diaz, LLC, testified was “turned …over to the insurance

company.” Mr. Glidewell testified in his deposition that he was not aware of the

preservation letter, nor was he ever informed that a request to preserve physical

evidence was made. Mr. Glidewell stated that if he had known of the preservation

letter or the need to preserve the evidence, he would have instructed Diaz to keep it.2

The preservation notice specifically instructed Diaz to retain and preserve any

and all physical evidence and informed Diaz of the potential for litigation. The letter,

sent less than two weeks after the accident, included the photographs taken by Mrs.

Aucoin on August 31, 2019, and the incident report, which indicated Mr. Aucoin

struck his head on a protruding piece of metal. The specific request to preserve any

physical evidence; Diaz’s knowledge that the alleged dangerous condition was the

protruding piece of metal, as evidenced by the photographs attached to the notice;

and Plaintiffs’ notice that they were considering filing suit, reasonably put

Defendants on notice that the offending piece of metal would be relevant evidence

to the instant litigation. Therefore, despite Diaz having previously removed the

metal piece, Diaz had a duty to preserve the physical piece of metal and failed to do

so. Inasmuch as the trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for an adverse presumption

for the discarding of the actual metal piece, we find no abuse of the trial court’s

discretion.

However, while Plaintiffs argue, in part, that they are seeking an adverse

presumption instruction in order to bar Diaz from asserting a contributory negligence

defense, as to Mr. Aucoin or others, it is imperative to acknowledge, as highlighted

by the concurrence, that the spoliation instruction has no bearing on whether the trial

court allows or disallows any specific defense at trial.

2 Mr. Glidewell’s deposition testimony is not attached to the instant writ application; however, we take judicial notice of the fact that in affiliated case no. 23-C-300, StarStone’s writ application includes as an attachment Mr. Glidewell’s deposition testimony. 6 Lastly, Plaintiffs’ claim that they are entitled to an adverse presumption based

on Diaz’s demolition of the carwash. The accident occurred on August 31, 2019,

and that same day Mrs. Aucoin took photographs of the scene including the

offending piece of metal and the vacuum cleaner, which was a stand-alone unit

adjacent to, rather than attached to the carwash. Less than two weeks after the

accident, Mr. Glidewell also inspected and photographed the site. Moreover,

Plaintiffs’ counsel visited the accident scene in May 2022 to take photographs and

videos of the site. Although Diaz did not inform Plaintiffs of its decision to tear

down the carwash, the demolition of the carwash did not take place until January

2023. The only fact tending to suggest that the demolition of the carwash was for

the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs from inspecting the premises or discovering

evidence detrimental to Diaz’s case is that the demolition occurred one week before

Mr. Diaz’s scheduled deposition. However, this fact alone is insufficient to prove

Diaz intended to deprive Plaintiffs’ access to the evidence considering, Plaintiffs had

nearly four years to photograph, video, and inspect the subject property and were

permitted to so on multiple occasions. Furthermore, it is unclear what relevancy, if

any, the carwash has in this case. The parties do not dispute that the injury-causing

condition was the piece of metal protruding from behind the standalone vacuum

cleaner unit, which was an entirely separate entity from the carwash building.

Given these circumstances, particularly the nearly four-year delay in

demolishing the carwash and the fact that the scene was photographed and

documented on multiple occasions prior to its demolition, Plaintiffs have not shown

that an adverse presumption, based on the theory of spoliation evidence, from Diaz’s

demolition of the carwash, is warranted. See Critton v. State, Dep’t of Transp. &

Dev., 43,328 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08), 989 So.2d 207, 210 (finding no adverse

presumption was warranted where the subject roadway was resurfaced almost two

years after suit was filed and a year after notice of the resurfacing was posted);

7 Constans v. Choctaw Transp., Inc., 97-0863, 97-0864 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/97),

712 So.2d 885, 902 (adverse presumption did not apply where truck bumper was

photographed and investigated in the weeks following the accident, but thereafter

not examined for at least one year and a half before it was eventually replaced in the

normal course of business); and also Everhardt v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 07-

0981 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/20/08), 978 So.2d 1036 (finding adverse presumption did

not apply in wrongful death action brought by wife of dump truck operator who died

when his truck flipped over on the highway, where wife sold the truck for scrap

materials a year after the accident and after defendant served, no attempt was made

to examine the truck before it was sold, and no evidence suggested that wife disposed

of the truck in order to deprive defendant of discovering evidence detrimental to her

case).

In light of the foregoing, we find the trial court abused its discretion when it

rendered a broad-brush judgment, granting Plaintiffs’ motion for an adverse

presumption based on spoliation of the evidence. Inasmuch as the trial court granted

the motion for Diaz’s failure to preserve the video footage, removing the metal piece

and altering the configuration of accident scene as it appeared on August 31, 2019,

and demolishing the carwash premises, the trial court’s ruling is reversed; however,

to the extent the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion based on Diaz’s discarding of

the physical piece of metal, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed. Accordingly, the writ

is granted in part and denied in part.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 27th day of June, 2023.

FHW JGG

8 CLAUDE AND TAMMIE AUCOIN NO. 23-C-294

DIAZ LLC AND ADMIRAL INSURANCE COURT OF APPEAL COMPANY ET AL STATE OF LOUISIANA

CHAISSON, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS

The sole issue before the trial court on Respondents’ Motion for Adverse

Presumption on Spoilation (sic) is whether Respondents are entitled to a jury

instruction on the law regarding application of an adverse presumption for

Realtors’ intentional spoliation of evidence. Because Mr. Diaz intentionally

discarded the piece of metal on which Mr. Aucoin was injured, in violation of its

known obligation not to do so and without advance notice to Respondents, there is

sufficient evidence upon which the jury could determine that the adverse

presumption is applicable in this case to the extent that the detached piece of metal

could assist the jury in its liability determination. I therefore agree with the

majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

Respondents are entitled to the requested jury charge. Whether the jury chooses to

apply that adverse presumption in this case is a determination for the jury based

upon the facts as the jury finds them at trial.

To the extent that Respondents contend that their entitlement to this jury

charge will “ensure any defense [Diaz] may claim blaming Aucoin, or others are

(sic) cut off by the presumption,” and Respondents’ concern that the trial court will

“use the presumption to exclude any evidence/defense that Aucoin was negligent

or failed to observe what he should have observed, i.e., an open and obvious

condition,” there is nothing in the trial court’s judgment that indicates that its

decision to allow the requested jury charge is a determination that the trial court 9 will exclude any defenses raised by Relators and/or not allow testimony and

evidence in support of those defenses. I find that these arguments are not pertinent

to the sole issue that was before the trial court on Respondents’ motion. I therefore

respectfully concur with the majority disposition.

RAC

10 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN STEPHEN J. WINDHORST FIRST DEPUTY CLERK JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. CORNELIUS E. REGAN, PRO TEM FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org

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23-C-294 E-NOTIFIED 24th Judicial District Court (Clerk) Honorable Stephen D. Enright, Jr. (DISTRICT JUDGE) Melvin A. Eiden (Relator) James M. White, III (Relator) Andrew D. Weinstock (Respondent) J. Patrick Connick (Respondent)

MAILED Lewis O. Unglesby (Respondent) Yul D. Lorio (Respondent) Christian B. Bogart (Respondent) Attorney at Law Attorney at Law Attorney at Law 112 Founders Drive 1228 Camellia Boulevard 433 Metairie Road Baton Rouge, LA 70810 Suite A Suite 600 Lafayette, LA 70508 Metairie, LA 70005 Lance C. Unglesby (Respondent) Attorney at Law 607 St. Charles Avenue Suite 300 New Orleans, LA 70130 • Complete Items 1, 2, and 3. • Print your name and address on the reverse so that we can return the card to you. • Attach this card to the back of the mallplece, or on the front if space permits. 1icle Addl'essed to: D. Is delivery addr98S dllrerent from Item 1? 0 Yes If YES, enter dellvery adchss below: 0 No -;by Attu1 ... J - l Law 11 2 Founders Drive Baton Rouge, LA 70810 2 3-C-294 06-27-23 3. Servioe Type Cl Ptlorlly Mall Expreeall ~ ~ Slgnatunl 0 ReglsUnd Mall"" 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 w~Rtltl'lcllld Dellvery a~ Mall ReetJtcted 9590 9402 2434 6249 3634 75 0 Cerlllled Miii Aellltc:ted DelWiy 'd'R;b;;~ for Cl Collec:t on Ol8llverf ~tn:hllndlee -2.-Artic--le-Number ____ (Tiiansfet"--from--St!IM-ce-laMl)-----to Collect on Delivery Reetrtcted Oellll8ly Cl Signatunl Conftmatlon"' - I Cl SignaWte Confirmation 7016 2070 0000 0954 7691 IReetrlcledOellwfy ~Deliv8ly PS Form 3811, July 2015 PSN 753().-02-000-9053 SENDER COMPlf:. TE THIS SECTION

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