Clarkson v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided August 26, 2022·No. 3:21-cv-00099·Unknown

Opinion

FOR TUHNEI TSOEDU TSHTAERTENS D DIISSTTRRIICCTT O CFO IULLRITN OIS

OTIS C.1 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Civil No. 3:21-cv-00099-GCS ) COMMISSIONER of SOCIAL ) SECURITY, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff, through counsel, seeks judicial review of the final agency decision denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits.2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January 11, 2019, and March 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI alleging a disability onset date of November 17, 2008. After holding an evidentiary hearing on July 9, 2020, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied the application on August 18, 2020. On December 7, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for

1 Plaintiff’s full name will not be used in this Memorandum & Order due to privacy concerns. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 5.2(c) and the Advisory Committee Notes thereto.

2 This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See (Doc. 10).

Page 1 of 19 60). Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies and filed a timely complaint with this Court. ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF Plaintiff raises the following issues: 1. The ALJ exceeded her authority by inferring limitations from objective medical findings.

2. Opinion evidence was not properly considered.

3. The ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s pain.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

“The [SSA] provides benefits to individuals who cannot obtain work because of a physical or mental disability.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1151 (2019). Disability is the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his former occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? See 20

Page 2 of 19 An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a finding of disability. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1–4. Once the claimant shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant’s ability to engage in other work existing in significant numbers in the

national economy. See Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). It is important to recognize that the scope of judicial review is limited. “The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, this Court is not tasked with determining whether or not Plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but

whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether any errors of law were made. See Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court defines substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (internal citations omitted). In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken

into consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). However, while judicial review is deferential, it is not abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010).

Page 3 of 19 The ALJ followed the five-step analytical framework described above. She determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2013, and that Plaintiff had not worked at the level of substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of November 17, 2008. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: transverse myelitis of the thoracic spine; mild degenerative disc

disease/degenerative joint disease of the thoracic spine; mild degenerative disc disease and facet arthropathy of the lumbar spine; bilateral plantar calcaneal bone spurs; and moderate arterial disease of the posterior tibial artery. She also found that Plaintiff had the following non-severe impairments of right paranasal sinus disease, obesity, diabetes, and depression. (Tr. 60-63). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to

perform sedentary work except the claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He can engage in no more than occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling and cannot work at unprotected heights, around moving mechanical parts or other such hazards. The claimant can have no concentrated exposure to heat.” (Tr. 66). Thus, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not

disabled. THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in preparing this Memorandum & Order. The following summary of the record is directed to the points raised by Plaintiff.

Page 4 of 19 Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the telephone hearing on July 9, 2020. During the hearing, Plaintiff and the vocational expert (“VE”), Darrell W. Taylor, Ph.D, testified. (Tr. 60). Plaintiff testified that he lives with his wife and his two teenage children. (Tr. 92). From 2005 to 2008, Plaintiff worked as an auto technician/motor mechanic. (Tr. 90-91).

Plaintiff testified that he had a work injury wherein his lower back popped. The area was the T5 vertebra of his spinal cord. (Tr. 93-94). In 2006, Plaintiff was diagnosed with transverse myelitis after having an MRI. (Tr. 91, 93). Plaintiff has tried medications, steroid treatment, and a couple rounds of physical therapy. (Tr. 94). Plaintiff experiences dull achy pain from his mid to lower back that wraps halfway around his rib cage, and he develops radiating pain down through his leg, into his joints,

knees, ankles, and feet. He also has nerve damage in his back because of the transverse myelitis. (Tr. 93).

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