Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines Inc

Opinion

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

NO. 2:19-CV-0005-TOR Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND v. DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL HORIZON AIR INDUSTRIES, INC. and ALASKA AIRLINES PENSION/BENEFITS

Defendants.

BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. ECF No. 83. This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the record and files herein, and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 83) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. This case arises out of Plaintiff’s class action filed against Defendants on January 7, 2019. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on July 1, 2019, which is now the operative Complaint. ECF No. 31. The allegations raised in Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint concern two of Defendants’ employment policies regarding military leave and their compliance with the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). Id. at ¶¶ 61-94. Defendants filed their

Answer on July 15, 2019. ECF No. 32. Plaintiff now seeks partial summary judgment on Defendants’ First, Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Affirmative Defenses, as well as Count V. ECF No. 83 at 7. Defendants indicated in their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment they have

withdrawn the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations (Third Affirmative Defense), personal jurisdiction (Seventh Affirmative Defense), and claims barred by settlement or release (Eighth Affirmative Defense). ECF. No. 101 at 6.

Defendants also indicated the parties have reached a settlement as to Count V. Id. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment as to Defendants’ Third, Seventh, and Eighth Affirmative Defenses, as well as Count V, are now GRANTED. The Court will address the remaining affirmative defenses at issue

(First, Second, and Ninth). Plaintiff Casey Clarkson worked as a pilot for Defendant Horizon Air

Industries, Inc. (“Horizon”) from November 2013 until November 2017 when he was hired as a pilot for Defendant Alaska Airlines, Inc. (“Alaska”). ECF No. 30 at 3. Plaintiff is still employed by Alaska. Id. While working as pilot for Horizon

and Alaska, Plaintiff also served in the Air National Guard. Id. Plaintiff’s Guard duty required him to take periods of short-term military leave throughout his employment with Horizon and Alaska. Id. Horizon and Alaska have certain

policies regarding employees who take short-term military leave. Id. Plaintiff contends these policies caused him and other similarly situated pilots to lose their seniority status, which affected their pay and benefits. ECF No. 30 at 4-6. Plaintiff also alleges these policies caused him and other similarly

situated employees who took short-term military leave to be denied their regular wages, even though Horizon and Alaska paid full wages to other employees who took comparable leave. ECF No. 30 at 7.

I. Summary Judgment Standard The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must only consider admissible evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002). The

party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To carry this burden, “the moving party must either produce

evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The moving party must persuade the court there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. For purposes of summary judgment, a fact is “material” if it might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248. Further, a dispute is “genuine” only where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party. Id. The Court views the facts, and all rational

inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). If the moving party successfully carries its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to identify specific facts showing there is a genuine

issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. Summary judgment will thus be granted “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. However, if the moving party fails to successfully carry its initial burden, “the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., 210 F.3d at 1102-03 (citation omitted). II. Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses A. Defendants’ First Affirmative Defense (Applicability of the RLA)

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on Defendants’ First Affirmative Defense regarding the applicability of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. ECF No. 83 at 11. Under the dispute resolution mechanism of the

RLA, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate “minor disputes” that require the interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement. Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 917 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1445 (2019) (quotation and citation omitted). Plaintiff

argues Defendants have failed to identify any disputed terms within any collective bargaining agreement, and thus, the RLA does not apply. ECF No. 83 at 11. Defendants assert the factual record is not yet sufficiently developed to determine

whether there is, or will be, a dispute over terms in a collective bargaining agreement. ECF No. 101 at 10.

Labor relations between airline employees and airlines are governed by the provisions of the RLA. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 898 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188). Disputes are

classified as either major or minor. Ass’n of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Horizon Air Indus., Inc., 280 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Major disputes involve rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and “arise where there is no [collective bargaining agreement] or where it is sought to change the

terms of [an existing] one.” Schurke, 898 F.3d at 917 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation and citation omitted). Minor disputes involve grievances or the interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements “concerning rates of pay, rules, or

working conditions.” Id. Federal courts do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate minor disputes, as they are resolved through binding arbitration in front of the System Board of Adjustment. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 813 F.2d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation

omitted); see also 45 U.S.C. § 185. Here, Plaintiff asserts Defendants have not met their burden of production at summary judgment because they failed to identify specific disputed material facts,

and because Defendants have not submitted an affidavit or declaration demonstrating why they could not present facts in opposition to the motion. ECF No. 103 at 7; id. at 9-10.

As the moving party, Plaintiff bears the initial burden of production to negate an essential element of Defendants’ defense or show Defendants lack enough evidence to carry their ultimate burden at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., 210 F.3d at 1102. To support his motion for summary judgment on Defendants’ First Affirmative Defense, Plaintiff cites to a single answer in Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories in which Defendants state, To the extent the parties have a disagreement over the interpretation or application of any of the terms of Alaska or Horizon’s CBA that are relevant to resolving Plaintiff’s claims during this litigation, pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., the applicable system board would have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve such a dispute. Defendants do not yet know how Plaintiff is interpreting and applying the relevant provisions of the applicable CBAs, so Defendants cannot yet know whether the parties have a dispute regarding the interpretation and/or application of the relevant CBAs. ECF No. 83 at 12; ECF No. 73-10 at 15-16. In their Response, Defendants maintain it is still impossible to determine whether a dispute could arise until the parties begin substantively litigating the claims. ECF. No. 101 at 10. The Court agrees with Defendants. To illustrate, Claim IV alleges that Defendants failed to pay employees for military leave but paid other employees for comparable non-military leave. ECF No. 31 at 28, ¶ 82; ECF No. 101 at 10. Because it is not clear from the current record what constitutes “comparable non-military leave,” Plaintiff is putting the

terms of his and other employees’ collective bargaining agreements at issue. Plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing that the terms of the collective bargaining agreement would not require interpretation or application. Therefore,

the extent Plaintiff’s claims require an interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement, this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction may come into question. Additionally, because challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during litigation, summary judgment on the issue is not

appropriate at this time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Defendants’ First Affirmative Defense regarding the applicability of the RLA is denied.

B. Defendants’ Second Affirmative Defense (Laches) Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on Defendants’ Second Affirmative Defense of laches as to Plaintiff’s claims in Counts I-IV. ECF No. 83 at 13. Plaintiff alleges the defense of laches is barred because Congress specifically

amended the statute to eliminate the statute of limitations and because Defendant has not suffered any evidentiary or economic prejudice. ECF No. 83 at 14-15. Defendants argue laches is a recognized defense under USERRA claims and that

they can establish prejudice. ECF No. 101 at 13; id. at 15. Defendants are not currently asserting the defense of laches against Plaintiff’s individual claims, nor do they intend to assert the defense against the entire Paid Leave Class. ECF No.

101 at 12. Rather, Defendants will assert the defense of laches against individual Paid Leave Class members once members are identified. Id. In 2008, Congress amended the relevant USERRA statute, 38 U.S.C. §

4327(b), “to clarify that the original intent of Congress was that USERRA would not be subject to a federal or state statute of limitations period and specifically states that there is no time limit for a person to file a complaint . . . .” S. Rep. 110- 449, at 26 (2008). Prior to 2008, the statute specifically barred the application of

state statute of limitations but was silent as to federal statutes of limitations. See Rogers v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 772 (5th Cir. 2004) (“. . . USERRA does not provide a time limit for bringing a claim for relief, stating only that ‘no

State statute of limitations shall apply . . . .’”). Plaintiff contends the 2008 amendment also bars the defense of laches. ECF No. 83 at 14. The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the effect of the 2008 amendment on a laches defense. Plaintiff attempts to compare the amended USERRA statute to an

amended student loan collections statute. ECF No. 83 at 14. However, several district courts outside the Ninth Circuit have addressed post-2008 USERRA claims and held the defense applicable. See, e.g., Corbin v. Sw. Airlines, Inc., No. CV H-

17-2813, 2018 WL 4901155, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2018) (finding laches may bar plaintiff’s complaint if delay prejudiced the defendant); Seiler v. Hollidaysburg Am. Legion Ambulance Serv., Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:10-41, 2011 WL 4017965, at *8

(W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2011) (finding “laches is the only mechanism by which Defendant can challenge Plaintiff’s delay in pursuing his USERRA claims.”); Mock v. City of Rome, 851 F. Supp. 2d 428, 436 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying laches

analysis to find the defendants failed to demonstrate prejudice); Sumrall v. Ensco Offshore Co., No. 2:17-CV-48-KS-MTP, 2018 WL 2088761, at *8 (S.D. Miss. May 7, 2018) (stating “courts have permitted the affirmative defense of laches to prevent injustice.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s comparison is unpersuasive.

To establish a laches defense, a defendant must prove “unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and prejudice to itself.” Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Because the application of laches is

fact-specific, summary judgment on the issue is rarely appropriate. Id. Here, Defendants argue they will suffer evidentiary prejudice because the Paid Leave Class includes Alaska and Horizon pilots whose claims may stretch back to 2004, and it would be unreasonable to expect those pilots to recall when they first learned

of Defendants’ policies or of their ability to assert a claim. ECF No. 101 at 16. Defendants also argue they will suffer economic prejudice because any pilot who asserts a claim dating back to 2004 may be entitled to substantial backpay. Id.

Plaintiff is also seeking liquidated damages, which could exacerbate Defendants’ economic prejudice. Id. Here, additional Paid Leave Class members are not yet known. Because the

defense of laches will only be asserted against these putative members, the factual record is insufficient to determine whether Defendants have been unfairly prejudiced. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Defendants’

Second Affirmative Defense regarding the defense of laches is denied. C. Defendants’ Ninth Affirmative Defense (Fifth Amendment) Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on Defendants’ Ninth Affirmative Defense regarding the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. ECF 83 at 13. Plaintiff

argues he and Paid Leave Class members are entitled the same rights and benefits while on short-term military leave as those rights and benefits conferred to other employees who take leave for non-military reasons, such as jury duty,

bereavement, and sick leave. See ECF No. 31 at 28, ¶¶ 82-84. Defendants allege if Plaintiff prevails on Count IV, the Court will be required to address whether Congress is constitutionally permitted to require private employers to pay employees regular wages while those employees are on leave performing military

services. ECF No. 101 at 17-18. Defendants claim such a requirement may be an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Court finds it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question at this

stage in the litigation. There is a “fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint” that requires courts to avoid addressing constitutional questions before itis necessary. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988). Instead, “[p]rior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for a decision.” Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) (citation omitted). Presently, the factual record before the Court does not contain any evidence upon which summary judgment can be granted for this issue. Therefore, the Court finds Defendants’ Fifth Amendment question would be more appropriately resolved in a motion for summary judgment on the merits of Count IV so the Court can consider additional evidence, such as damages and expert testimony. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Defendants’ Ninth Affirmative Defense is denied. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 83) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and furnish 16] copies to counsel. DATED October 5, 2020. ig a yy Ug PA. A) fins. Okie on Xe THOMAS O. RICE <=> United States District Judge

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S