Clark v. Young

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 20, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-05369
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CARMEN L. CLARK, CASE NO. 3:23-cv-5369 8 9 Plaintiff, ORDER 10 v. 11 ERIC YOUNG; MISTY YOUNG, 12 Defendants. 13

14 1. INTRODUCTION 15 The Court raises this matter on its own accord. Pro se Plaintiff Carmen L. 16 Clark pursues this action against Defendants Eric Young and Misty Young in forma 17 pauperis (IFP). See Dkt. No. 4. After reviewing the operative complaint, Dkt. No. 5, 18 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court finds that the complaint is frivolous and 19 fails to allege a basis for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Rather than 20 dismissing this case outright, the Court grants Clark leave to amend the complaint 21 within 30 days of this Order. 22

24 1 2. DISCUSSION 2 When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the 3 action if the court determines the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

4 claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant 5 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “A complaint is frivolous 6 for 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) purposes if a plaintiff fails to allege subject matter 7 jurisdiction.” Emiabata v. Bank of New York Mellon Tr. Co. NA/JP Morgan Chase 8 (SLS), No. C17-1302-JLR, 2017 WL 4838840, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2017) (citing 9 Castillo v. Marshall, 207 F.3d 15, 15 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); Pratt v. 10 Sumner, 807 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that a complaint should be 11 dismissed as frivolous on 28 U.S.C. § 1915 review where subject matter jurisdiction 12 is lacking)). 13 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]leadings must be construed 14 so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Thus, a “document filed pro se is to be 15 liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held 16 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. 17 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Courts are not to “dismiss a pro 18 se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 19 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 20 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 21 Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.1988) (per 22 23 curiam))). But even so, the duties imposed on the Court by § 1915(e) are 24 1 unwavering, and when an IFP plaintiff fails to state a claim, the action must be 2 dismissed. 3 Here, Clark sues Eric Young and Misty Young for alleged fraud. Dkt. No. 5 at

4 5. Clark alleges that “Eric Young use Carmen Clark’s name to get income to take 5 care of his son; also to purchase a truck.” Id. On the face of the complaint, Misty 6 Young’s role in the alleged fraud is unclear. Likewise, the factual specifics are also 7 unclear. Clark asserts that “Eric Young spend federal dollars forging Carmen 8 Clark’s Name to purchase material gain (‘Truck’).” Id. While this could give rise to 9 criminal charges, it is unclear how these alleged actions harmed Clark and how 10 they would give rise to civil claims she could assert against the Youngs. It is also 11 unclear whether “federal dollars” refers to welfare benefits or mere U.S. currency. 12 Even setting aside the complaint’s lack of factual clarity, the Court finds that 13 Clark fails to allege subject matter jurisdiction. Federal district courts have original 14 jurisdiction over two categories of cases: cases involving a federal question, see 28 15 U.S.C. § 1331, and cases involving diversity of citizenship among the parties. See 28 16 U.S.C. § 1332. Here, Clark pleads no federal question. As such, the presumptive 17 basis for subject matter jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship. 18 To invoke diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must allege the diverse citizenship 19 of all parties and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00. Id.; Bautista v. 20 Pan Am. World Airlines, Inc., 828 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1987). The party asserting 21 diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. Resnik v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 289 22 23 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1961). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a person is a 24 1 citizen of their state of domicile at the time the lawsuit is filed. Lew v. Moss, 797 2 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986). 3 Here, the diversity-of-citizenship requirement appears satisfied. Clark

4 alleges that she is a citizen of Washington, while Defendants are citizens of Idaho. 5 Dkt. No. 5 at 4. But the second requirement is not satisfied. Clark does not allege 6 an amount in controversy, nor does she assert that the amount in controversy 7 exceeds $75,000. See generally id. As such, Clark does not allege a basis for the 8 Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court finds that the complaint is 9 frivolous and fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 10 3. CONCLUSION 11 The Court finds that Clark’s complaint, Dkt. No. 5, is frivolous and fails to 12 allege a basis for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. But rather than dismissing 13 this case outright, the Court grants Clark leave to amend the complaint and 14 ORDERS Clark, within THIRTY (30) days of this Order, to file an amended 15 complaint that properly alleges a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court also 16 directs Clark, through the amended complaint, to clarify the factual basis for her 17 civil fraud claim. Failure to comply with this Order will result in dismissal of this 18 action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 19

20 Dated this 20th day of November, 2024. 21 a 22 Jamal N. Whitehead 23 United States District Judge 24