Clark v. Wright Aeronautical Corp.

162 F.2d 960, 74 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3785
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit·Decided August 4, 1947·No. No. 2, Docket 19832·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

L. HAND, Circuit Judge.

Sarazin, a French citizen, and his exclusive licensee, Societc Francaise Tlispano-Suiza, a French corporation, the original plaintiffs, began this action on September 21, 1938. Judge Bright tried the case in April, 1942, and on May 29, 1943, Leo T. Crowley, then Alien Property Custodian, by the usual “vesting” order, transferred to himself all right, title and interest to the patents in suit, including the cause of action at bar. James E. Markham, Alien Property Custodian, succeeded Crowley; and the Attorney General has succeeded Markham. Judge Bright dismissed the complaint by judgment entered May 29, 1944, and Markham appealed on August 17, 1944. We shall disregard the formal plaintiff and the licensee, and speak of the case as though Sarazin, the patentee, were the only plaintiff. Thus the action becomes the usual one for infringement of two patents, issued to Sarazin: the first, Patent No. 2,097,227, on May 4, 1937, of which claims 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 are in suit; and the second, Reissue Patent No. 20,773, issued on June 28, 1938 (the original having been issued on May 4, 1937), of which claims 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 are in suit. Judge Bright’s opinion is reported as Sarazin v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., D. C., 54 F.Supp. 244; he has stated the issues and facts so fully that it is unnecessary for us to repeat them. In what we say we shall assume a familiarity with his opinion.

Sarazin filed his original application out of which both patents arose, on July 20, 1931; he had already, on December 19, 1930, filed a French application for what is now Patent No. 2,079,227; and on June 30, 1931, he filed another French application for what is now Reissue Patent No. 20,773. In his application in the United States he combined these two French applications; but on August 2, 1932, the Patent Office ordered the application to be divided into two parts, corresponding to the original two French applications. The first question to be considered is of the scope of the original joint application in the United States. The two separate forms disclosed — the “Link Type” and the “Baby Carriage Type” — are sufficiently described in page 245 of the opinion, taken in conjunction with Finding's 4, 5 and 6 which we quote in full in the margin.1 We may [962] proceed at once therefore to a consideration of whether the disclosures contain any germ of the notion that friction should be eliminated from the “damping” devices disclosed; and whether they, are effective, if it is not. Although in the original application Sarazin disclosed and described three figures, by which friction could be added in the “Link Type,” he now relies particularly upon the fact that these are stated only permissively- — they “may be” used. It has become a habit of the scriveners of patent applications to use the permissive form, presumably lest they should too much limit the invention; but in doing so they risk impaling themselves upon tlie other horn of the dilemma, because the specification must contain adequate instructions for the practice of the invention, and permission may easily become imprecision. For exa'mple, in this very application, the provision for friction devices was immediately followed by the phrase: “Said masses may be likewise radially movable, so that their centers of gravity may move towards or away from that of the shaft”: an inevitable result of all “bifilar” pendulums in action. Yet “bifilar” pendulums are Sarazin’s especial reliance.- We do not of course mean that an applicant may not present alternative embodiments of his invention, when the essential elements are plainly stated; but there is not the slightest justification for arguing that, because friction devices were permissively added, they are to be treated as in antithesis to frictionless devices. Frictionless dampers were not suggested in the text, and what turned out to be destructive friction was inevitable in all the figures. Reading the ■ specifications alone, no one would imagine that the absence of friction was a condition of every effective damper; and this conclusion is confirmed when we turn to the original claims.

Claim one, as originally filed, was as follows: “Means -adapted to reduce the torsional oscillations of ■ crank-shafts, characterized by the combination of interconnected masses adapted to move in. angular relationship relatively to the shaft with which said masses are connected and around which constitute a fly-wheel having negative inertia.” Claim 2 was more specific, and required the connection of the “masses” with the shaft to be “links being themselves hinged to branches keyed upon said shaft.” Read in abstractu, it is true that these two claims are consistent with a frictionless damper; but it is horn-book law that no claims are to be read in abstractu. The next five claims all contained provisions for added friction means to the action of the “masses”; they read only upon figures 2, 3 and 4 of the application and of the “Link Type” patent. The next five claims read upon figures 5, 6 and 7, of the application; they were for the “Baby Carriage Type.” Claim 8 was as follows: “Means as claimed in claim 1, wherein the mobile masses move within a hollow member integral with the shaft so that projecting bosses (preferably fitted with rolls) mounted terminally on said masses are constantly applied by centrifugal effect against hollows provided in said hollow member and that the difference between the radius of each of said hollows and that of the projecting boss appertaining thereto should constitute the radius by which said mass moves, said radius being as s.hort as may be desired.” Each of the other four claims incorporated all the elements of claims 1 and 8, thus including the words in parentheses.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Clark v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 162 F.2d 960, 74 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3785 (2d Cir. 1947).

162 F.2d 960 (Clark v. Wright Aeronautical Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Wise v. City of Norfolk
Fourth Circuit, 2000
Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp.
570 F. Supp. 810 (M.D. Tennessee, 1982)
Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Company, Inc.
375 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. California, 1974)
Wright Aeronautical Corp. v. General Motors Corp.
166 F.2d 636 (Seventh Circuit, 1948)