Clark v. U.S. Bank National Association

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 24-6724
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALFRED CLARK, No. 24-6724 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-00493-GMN-BNW v. MEMORANDUM* U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; WESTERN PROGRESSIVE - NEVADA, INC.; PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2026**

Before: LEE, DESAI, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Alfred Clark appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his

action alleging federal and state law claims arising from the foreclosure of his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Flaxman v. Ferguson,

151 F.4th 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2025). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Clark’s Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act (“FDCPA”) claims because Clark failed to allege facts sufficient to show that

defendants were acting as debt collectors or to state a plausible claim under 15

U.S.C. § 1692f(6). See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (prohibiting “nonjudicial action to

effect dispossession or disablement of property if . . . there is no present right to

possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security

interest”); Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S. 466, 474, 477 (2019)

(explaining that the provisions of the FDCPA do not apply if a defendant is not a

debt collector and that “but for § 1692f(6), those who engage in only nonjudicial

foreclosure proceedings are not debt collectors within the meaning of the

[FDCPA]”); Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon, 286 P.3d 249, 255 (Nev. 2012)

(explaining that a party has the right to foreclose under Nevada law if it is both the

“current beneficiary of the deed of trust and the current holder of the promissory

note”).

The district court properly dismissed Clark’s wrongful foreclosure claim

because Clark failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was not in default.

See Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 662 P.2d 610, 623 (Nev. 1983)

2 24-6724 (holding that “the material issue of fact in a wrongful foreclosure claim is whether

the trustor was in default when the power of sale was exercised”).

The district court properly dismissed Clark’s conversion claim because

Clark failed to allege that his personal property was converted. See Boorman v.

Nevada Mem’l Cremation Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 9 (Nev. 2010) (setting forth elements

of a claim for conversion).

The district court properly dismissed Clark’s breach of good faith claim

because Clark failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Perry

v. Jordan, 900 P.2d 335, 338 (Nev. 1995) (explaining that “[w]hen one party

performs a contract in a manner that is unfaithful to the purpose of the contract and

the justified expectations of the other party are thus denied, damages may be

awarded against the party who does not act in good faith” (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Clark leave to

amend because amendment would have been futile. See Hara v. Netflix, Inc., 146

F.4th 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2025) (setting forth the standard of review and explaining

that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Clark’s motion for

reconsideration because Clark failed to establish any ground for relief. See 389

Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth the

standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).

3 24-6724 We do not consider issues not specifically and distinctly argued in the

opening brief, or issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Roley v. Google

LLC, 40 F.4th 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2022).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

4 24-6724