Clark v. United States

630 F. Supp. 101, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 649, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30643
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedJanuary 9, 1986
DocketCiv. A. N-85-2053
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 630 F. Supp. 101 (Clark v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clark v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 101, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 649, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30643 (D. Md. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

NORTHROP, Senior District Judge.

On May 17, 1985, the plaintiffs, Lucy and Sheldon Clark (Clarks), instituted action in this Court seeking an abatement of a $500 tax penalty assessed against them by the Internal Revenue Service for filing a “frivolous” tax return. On December 11, 1985 the plaintiffs amended this complaint to include a claim of relief from a second penalty of $500 imposed by the Service for filing a subsequent “frivolous” tax return. The plaintiff also seeks a refund of $150.00 partial payment paid to the United States. 1

FACTS

On April 12, 1983 the Clarks filed a timely tax return with respect to their 1982 tax year. On line 31 of the first page of the return they claimed an adjustment to their gross income in the amount of $1,408.00. The taxpayers then attached a “Schedule A31” in order to explain this adjustment. “Schedule A31” consisted of a one page exposition outlining their opposition to expenditures of tax money for military advisors and equipment sent to the nation of El Salvador; expenditures of U.S. tax monies “in a manner to tempt and risk an attack of unacceptable destruction of the United States,” ...; taxes and funds spent for genocidal and offensive nuclear weapons contrary to Judeo-Christian principles; and other unspecified violations of law.

At the conclusion of this explanation, the plaintiffs purported to show a total amount of money therefore “illegally taxed and spent.” After further calculations on this same “Sch. A31” they determined that $289.00 of their tax was assessed in violation of laws. The plaintiffs alternatively calculated their tax due without considering the asserted adjustments to income. However, when théy completed their tax due on the face of the form 1040 tax return, they relied on the calculation allowing the adjustments to income based on their opposition to the military spending.

In the same manner, the plaintiffs timely filed their 1983 return. However, while the Clarks had claimed a deduction from gross income by means of their “Sch. A31” on the 1982 return, they claimed a direct reduction in tax due on their 1983 return. This tax reduction was noted on the 1983 Form 1040 by a notation “Schedule 39” on the return. 2 “Schedule 39” set forth four objections to United States policy similar to those stated in their 1982 return: objections to paying for “Central Intelligence Agency operations against Nicaraugua,” objections to the use of U.S. tax dollars to pay for the arms, munitions, and equipment furnished to the government of El Salvador; objections to the use of U.S. tax dollars to pay for the “building and deployment of genocidal nuclear weapons without *103 reasonable effort to achieve arms control agreements ... objections to financing activities in violation of other laws. The plaintiffs then determined that $598 should be deducted from their taxes.

Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the adjustment to income based on their objections to United States expenditures. On July 11 and 12, 1984, the Clarks then filed amended returns for both the tax years of 1982 and 1983, respectively, fully paying the disputed amount as calculated by the IRS, together with penalties and interest. After reviewing the amended return for 1982, the I.R.S. determined that the plaintiffs had overpaid for that year, and on October 5, 1984 sent the Clarks a refund check of $28.24.

Then, on October 15, 1984, the Internal Revenue Service assessed a penalty of $500 against the plaintiffs for filing a frivolous income tax return.

On October 30, 1984, the Clarks paid $75 (15% of the penalty), as provided by 26 U.S.C. § 6703(c)(1), and simultaneously claimed a refund of such payment, plus abatement of the frivolous return penalty. When the Commissioner failed to grant or refuse the refund claim within six months of the filing thereof, the Clarks brought this suit.

Subsequently, on April 15, 1985, the Internal Revenue Service assessed another penalty of $500 against the plaintiffs for filing another frivolous income tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6702. On May 13, 1985, the plaintiffs duly contested this assessment by remitting $75 (15% of the penalty).

The basis for the present action thus involves the legitimacy of the penalty assessed against the plaintiffs for allegedly filing two frivolous tax returns.

ANALYSIS

The plaintiffs have filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the assessment of the penalties was inappropriate because:

(1) At the time the penalty was assessed, the Clarks had fully paid their taxes; (2) the penalty provision does not apply to them on its face; and (3) the reduction/credit claimed on the returns was not frivolous.

After reviewing the pleadings, motion and memoranda in this case, the Court concludes that no hearing is necessary for decision in this matter. Local Rule 6. For the reasons set forth, the plaintiffs motion is DENIED, and the Court enters summary judgment in favor of the Defendant.

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall issue only when the pleadings before the Court establish “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In the instant case the parties are in complete agreement as to all the material facts, and the entire dispute involves the interpretation of a section of the Internal Revenue Code.

Although the defendant, United States, has not requested summary judgment the Court has determined that summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate in this case. “... [Wjhere one party has invoked the power of the Court to render a summary judgment against his adversary, it is reasonable that this invocation gives the Court power to render a summary judgment for his adversary if it is clear that the case warrants that result.” 6 Moore’s Federal Practice II 56.12 (2nd ed. 1985).

"... [Sjummary judgment may be rendered in favor of the opposing party even though he has made no formal cross-motion under Rule 56 if it appears from the papers, affidavits, and other proofs submitted by the parties that there are no disputed issues of material fact and that judgment for the non moving party would be appropriate as a matter of law.” Calvert v. West Virginia Legal Services Plans, Inc., 464 F.Supp. 789, 791, (S.D.W.Va.1979); see also Lowenschuss and Kahn, 520 F.2d 255 (2nd Cir.1975); Dabney v. Cunningham, 317 F.Supp. 57 (E.D.Va.1970). 10A Wright, *104 Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2720. For purposes of clarity, each of the plaintiffs’ assertions will be addressed independently.

I.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
630 F. Supp. 101, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 649, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-v-united-states-mdd-1986.