Clark v. United Fire & Marine Insurance
Opinion
This was clearly a departure from necessity. If the ship had been bound under the policy to have gone first for Cork, or if an election was left to the assured, and the master had before the departure made his election to go first to that port, and had been prevented, as- here, by causes insured against, he had a fight, within the policy, to bear away to Dublin, to obtain information as to the state of the markets at Cork and Liverpool, and from thence to go to either at his choice, as his information and [309] * judgment should lead him. The plaintiff has main- [ * 368 ] tained his action, and is entitled to judgment.
After the opinion of the Court was pronounced, and the defendants were defaulted, the question of the amount of the damages, to which the plaintiff was entitled, was submitted to the determination of the Court without argument, upon an agreed statement, the substance of which will appear in the opinion of the Court, which was afterwards delivered in Boston at an adjournment of the last March term in Suffolk, by
The plaintiff, owner and interested one quarter part in the ship Olive Branch and her cargo, was insured thereon the sum of 2000 dollars, viz. 1500 dollars on the ship, and 500 dollars on the cargo, in a policy underwritten by the defendants, in which the ship is valued at 6000 dollars. The voyage insured being from Kennebunk to Cork or Liverpool, the ship was stranded in the course of it, according to the former state of facts, and the decision thereon, and having been relieved from the disaster, at some expense and loss, she arrived afterwards with her cargo at Dublin, in Ireland.
It has been agreed by the parties, that the expenses and damages incurred by the disaster, computed at the sum of 4924 dollars, shall be adjusted as a general average upon the ship, cargo, freight, and a deck load, to be included on account of some peculiar circumstances in the estimate of the loss and in the contribution. The parties also agree that, in this adjustment, the value of the property as at Dublin shall be taken, and that the ship was there worth 8000 dollars, the cargo 5510 dollars, the freight 1094 dollars, and the deck load 332 dollars; and it is considered by the parties that each particular is assessed at this valuation; and that there has been sustained and paid thereon a loss and contribution of 28| per cent. They further agree that the value of the cargo, as shipped, and at the commencement of the risk, was 2000 dollars.
*Upon this statement, the Court are to determine [ * 369 ] what sum for the loss demanded is recoverable upon this policy ; whether the whole sum, supposed to be assessed upon the plaintiff, and paid by him, upon his quarter part of the ship and cargo; or only the same rate of loss upon the sum insured, which was paid upon the supposed valuation at Dublin. The plaintiff contends that his whole interest is to be considered as insured and covered by the policy, and therefore that he is entitled to recover against his insurers the whole sum lost and paid, in the supposed general average, upon his quarter part of the ship and cargo; notwithstanding the increased valuation as taken at Dublin, by which the contribution is apportioned and assessed.
[310] Questions are continually arising on the operation and practical construction of policies of insurance — a species of contract liable to a variety of incidents, and to be enforced in a great number oi cases distinguishable from each other in the principles applicable to the decision. For rules to govern in these inquiries, there is a more than ordinary reference to established usages; and these, when ascertained, are found to be suitable applications of general principles, or not inconsistent with them, or with the tenor of the contract to be explained and enforced, are considered as authoritative upon the parties. A reference to usage is fairly implied in contracts of a commercial nature, and is to be presumed, indeed, in the construction of contracts generally, where the conclusion is not avoided by special circumstances or stipulations.
Rules of this description and authority have been derived to us from our parent country, from usages established in England, and recognized in judicial decisions there
Footnotes
7 Mass. 365 (Clark v. United Fire & Marine Insurance) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.