Clark v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: 145, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

BRANDON CLARK, § § Defendant Below, § No. 145, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID Nos. N2405000515 § N2406009737 Appellee. §

Submitted: September 25, 2025 Decided: October 16, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the

appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the

Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Through an investigation, law enforcement officers determined that the

appellant, Brandon Clark, was selling drugs from a residence on Shady Drive in

Newark.1 Officers obtained a search warrant for the residence on May 1, 2024.

Officers who were conducting surveillance of the residence that day saw Clark,

whose license was revoked, drive away from the residence in a vehicle bearing an

1 Because Clark pleaded guilty, the factual background described in this order is drawn from the police reports and warrants that appear in the record and the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing. unregistered license plate. A traffic stop was conducted, and a search incident to

arrest revealed approximately 1.41 grams of crystal methamphetamine in Clark’s

pocket. Occupants of the home told officers that a truck that was parked in the

driveway was Clark’s and that there were bundles of heroin in a black lockbox in

the truck. A K9 sniffed the vehicle and gave a positive indication for illegal drugs.

Officers then obtained a search warrant for the truck; a subsequent search of the

truck revealed more than six grams of bundled heroin in a lockbox on the floorboard

under the steering wheel and a digital scale under the center console area. A grand

jury indicted Clark for drug dealing heroin and other offenses in Criminal ID No.

2405000515 (the “Shady Drive case”).

(2) While Clark was out on bail in the Shady Drive case, he was suspected

of selling heroin from a motel where he had rented a room. Working with a

confidential source, law enforcement officers organized a controlled purchase of

heroin from Clark outside the motel on June 18, 2024. After the controlled purchase

was completed, officers detained and searched Clark and found, among other drugs,

twenty-three bags of heroin in two bundles. Clark told the officers that there were

two women in the motel room. In order to secure the room and prevent the

destruction of evidence, officers decided to conduct a “hit and hold,” in which they

entered the room, removed the women, and waited in the room until a warrant to

search the room could be obtained. After obtaining a search warrant, they searched

2 the room; in a nightstand, they found a paper bag containing 280 bags of heroin. A

grand jury indicted Clark for drug dealing heroin and other offenses in Criminal ID

No. 2406009737 (the “motel case”).

(3) Clark’s counsel filed a motion to suppress in the motel case. After an

evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court denied the motion on December 11, 2024,

indicating that a written opinion would follow.

(4) On March 6, 2025, before the court issued its written opinion on the

motion to suppress, Clark resolved both the motel case and the Shady Drive case by

pleading guilty to two counts of drug dealing heroin mixed with fentanyl in a Tier 3

quantity.2 The State agreed to dismiss the other charges in both cases. As to

sentencing, the parties agreed to recommend two years and nine months of

unsuspended prison time on each count, for a total of five years and six months of

unsuspended prison time. The Superior Court sentenced Clark as follows: in the

motel case, twenty-five years of imprisonment, with credit for twenty-two days

previously served, suspended after four years for decreasing levels of supervision;

in the Shady Drive case, twenty-five years of imprisonment, suspended after two

years and nine months for one year of Level III probation with GPS monitoring.

(5) On appeal, Clark’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw

under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that, based upon a conscientious

2 16 Del. C. § 4752.

3 review of the record, the appeal is wholly without merit. In his statement filed under

Rule 26(c), counsel indicates that he informed Clark of the provisions of Rule 26(c)

and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying

brief. Counsel also informed Clark of his right to supplement counsel’s presentation.

In his submission, Clark argues that the Superior Court erroneously denied his

motion to suppress in the motel case. He also challenges the constitutionality of the

search in the Shady Drive case. The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and

argues that the Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed.

(6) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief

under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made

a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.3 This

Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine whether “the

appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary

presentation.”4

(7) It is well settled that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives a

defendant’s right to challenge any errors occurring before the entry of the plea, even

those of constitutional dimensions.5 Clark does not challenge the validity of his

3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 4 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82. 5 Scarborough v. State, 2015 WL 4606519, at *3 (Del. July 30, 2015).

4 guilty plea, and the record supports the conclusion that Clark knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily pleaded guilty. He therefore waived the right to

challenge the searches.6 We have reviewed the record carefully and conclude that

Clark’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue.

We also are satisfied that Clark’s counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine

the record and has properly determined that Clark could not raise a meritorious claim

in this appeal.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice

6 See Burton v. State, 2025 WL 1167188, at *2 (Del. Apr. 22, 2025) (“By knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleading guilty, Burton waived the right to challenge the search or his arrest.”); Fonville v. State, 2015 WL 5968251, at *2 (Del. Oct. 13, 2015) (holding that knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea waived right to challenge search warrant or search); Robertson v. State, 2008 WL 2232680, at *1 (Del. June 2, 2008) (considering argument that Superior Court erroneously denied motion to suppress evidence obtained from an administrative search, and concluding that “[b]y entering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, . . . Robertson waived any right to challenge the constitutionality of the administrative search leading to his arrest”).