IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA MIDDLE DIVISION
CINDY LOUISE CLARK ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) 4:22-cv-01057-LSC MARTIN O’MALLEY, ) Acting Commissioner, ) Social Security Administration, ) ) Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION I. Introduction On July 24, 2023, Cindy Clark (“Clark” or “Plaintiff”) filed with the Clerk of this Court a complaint against the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”). (Doc. 1.) Clark appeals the Commissioner’s decision denying her claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. 11.) Clark timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the Commissioner is rIipI.e forB jaucdkicgiraol urenvdie w pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Clark has an eleventh-grade education and later received a GED. (TrI. da.t A Vocational Expert (“VEI”d) .stated her previous work was as a caregiver in an
assisted livinIgd . facility. ( ) She also served as an assistant manager of a lunchroom. ( ) She was forty-six years old at the time of her application for a period of disability and DIB on June 29, 2012. (Tr. at 20.)I dClark’s application for
benefits alleged a disability onset date of June 1, 2012. ( .) The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whetheSre ean individual is disabled and thus
eDloiguigbhlety f ovr. aA ppfeerliod of disability and DIB. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; , 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order until making a finding of either disabled oSre enot disabled; if no finding is made, the analysis will proceed to the next step. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determIdine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). . §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not
engaged in SGA, the evaluator moves on to the next step. The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severiItdy of the claimant’s medically determinable physical and mental impairments. .
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of impairments not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the Id result in a finding of not disabledS. ee .H Tahrte vd. eFciniscihon depends on the medical
evidence contained in the record. , 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial medical evidence in the record” adequately supported the finding that the claimant was not disabled).
Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal to one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404Id.1509 and 416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. . If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not
meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the claimaSneet’ s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the
evaluator to determine whether the claimant hSaese itdhe RFC to perform the requirements of her past relevant work (“PRW”). . §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments
does not prevent her fIrdom performing her PRW, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. . RFC, age, education, and work experience to deItdermine whether the claimant
can make an adjustment to other work. . at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If thIed clsaeiem aalnsot can perform other work, the evaluator will find her not disabled. .; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the
claimant cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find her disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g). Applying the sequential evaluation process, the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) first established that Plaintiff has not engaged in SGA since her alleged disability onset date, June 1, 2012. (Tr. at 15.) Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, obesity, somatization disorder, anxiety disorder, deprIeds.sion, and
posttraumatic stress disorder qualify as “severe impairments.” ( ) However, the ALJ also found that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal the severity of aIndy. of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. ( ) Following this determination, the ALJ established that Plaintiff has the following RFC: “[T]o perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except she is limited to unskilled work and only
occasional or superficial interaction with the public.” (Tr. at 17.) Both 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) define light work as: frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
Relying on the testimony of a VE, the ALJ determined that “considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” (Tr. at 20.) From these findings, the ALJ concluded the five-step evaluation process by stating that Plaintiff “ha[d] not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from June 1, 2012,” Plaintiff’s original alleged disability onset date, to March 20, 2015, the datIeI Io. f thSet aAnLdJ’sa rfidr sot fd Reecivsiieown. (Tr. at 21.) This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security
Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings Soef et hSet oCnoem vm. Ciosmsiomn’er ro af nSdoc (.2 S)e wc.hether the correct legal standards were
applied. , 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (citing , 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)).
This Court gives deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided that those findings are supporSteede bMyi lseus bvs. tCahnatitaelr evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. , 84 F.3d 1397, 1400
(11th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, this Court may not decide Dfaycetrs ,v . wBeairgnhh aervtidence, or substitute its judgment for the CommPhisilsliiposn evr. 'Bsa. rnhart , 395 F.3d
1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting , 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an aPdamrkienris vtr. aBtoivwee angency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Consol,o 7 v9. 3F eFd.2. dM 1a1r.7 C7o, m11m8’1r (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting , 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).
Indeed, even if this Court finds that the proof preponderates against the Commissioner’s decisSieoen ,M iitle smust affirm if the decisMioanr tiins vs. uSpuplloivratned by substantial evidence. , 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing , 894
F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard Bridges ivt.s B eonwtiernety to determine the reasonableness of the dAerncioslido nv. rHeeacckhleedr.”
, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing , 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir. 1984)). MorBeoovweern, vfa. iHluercek letro apply the correct legal standards is grounWdisg gfoinr sr ve.v Secrhsawle. iker , 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th
Csuirp.e 1r9se8d4e)d ( ocnit iontgh er grounds by Harner v, .6 C7o9m Fm.2’rd o 1f 3S8o7c., S1e3c8. 9 (11th Cir. 1982), , 38 F.4th 892 (11th Cir.I V20. 22D))i. scussion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded for two reasons: 1) the ALJ improperly substituted her own lay opinion for those of the medical experts, and 2) the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair
recorda. .( DAollce. g1e2d a tE 3r.r)o Arf tfeorr a I tmhoprrooupgehr rSeuvibeswti, twutei oafnfi romf AthLeJ AOLpJi’sn dioenci sfioorn .t he Opinion of Medical Experts
Clark contends that the ALJ improperly dismissed the opinions of several mental health experts, including her treating physician and a consulting 1 physician who examined her at the SSA's request. (Tr. at 422–25; Doc. 12 at 4.) Clark argues that the ALJ gave little or no weight to substantial evidence of her
1 The treating physician rSuelee has since been rescinded. However, it applies in this case because it was originally filed in 20 12, with the new regulations only taking effect for cases mental impairments and based the RFC determination solely on her own lay
interpretation of the medical data. (Doc. 12 at 4.) The SSA regulations dictate that an ALJ must give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion if medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques supporSt eeit and it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.15Y2b7a(cr)r(a2 v)., 4Co1m6.m92’r7 (ocf )S(o2c).. “STech.e ALJ may not make medical findings [them]self.”
, 658 F. App’x 538, 543 (11th Cir. 2016). The testimony of a treating physician must be given suLbeswtains tvia. lC oarl lcaohnasniderable weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary. , 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). “The ALJ must clearly arti c ulate the reasons for giving less weight to the
opinion of a treating physician ... [w]here the ALJ clearly articulates specific reasons for failing to givPea at et rve. aCtoinmgm p’hr yosf iScoiacn. S’se oc.pinion controlling weight, no reversible error exists.” , 678 F. App’x 833, 834 (11th
Cir. 2017). Additionally, good cause arises “where the evidence failed to bolster the doctor’s opinion, the evidence supported a contrary finding, or the doctorId’s. opinionLse wwiesre conclusory or inconsistent with his own medical records.”
(citing , 125 F.3d at 1440). However, “it is generally improper for an ALJ to substitute his own judgment for that of a Bmriegdhitcmalo enx vp. eCrot mbmec’ar uosfe S, oacm. Soencg. 743 F. App’x 347, 353 (11th CiBr.a 2rb0e1r8 v).. BTahrins hias retspecially important in cases
involving mental impairments. , 459 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (N.D. Ala. 2006). However, the Court recognizes the fact that opinions such as whether a
claimant is disabled, the claimant’s RFC, and the application of vocational factors “are not medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are
dispositive of the case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disabiili. tyC.”o 2n0s uC.lFta.Rt.i v§e§ P40h4y.s1i5ci2a7n( d ), 416.927(d).
The SSA requested that Dr. Stephens examine Clark on January 25, 2017,
and February 23, 2017. (Tr. at 422, 1330–34.) Dr. Stephens administered the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV, where Clark received a Full-Scale IQ of 61, which is considered below the average range. (Tr. at 422.) While Dr. Stephens
noted that Clark was “cooperative and put forth effort on the tests . . . [d]epression likely suppressed her scores somewhat; her scores are likely valid indicators of her current level of functioning, but likely underestimate her true
ability, given that she can drive and has held down several jobs.” (Tr. at 1339.) Dr. Stephens further opined on Clark’s intellectual ability, ability to carry out Generally, an ALJ muSsht asrtfaatrez wv. itBho wpeanrticularity the weight given to
different medical opinions. , 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987). However, an ALJ is not required to mention every piece of evidence explicitly as lonSge ea sD tyheer dv.e Bciasrinohna drot,e s not broadly dismiss the medical condition
in its entirety. 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Also, “[u]nlike the opinions of a treating physician, the opSineieo Gnisb osof na nv .e Hxaecmkilnere,r are not entitled to substantial or considerable weight.” 779
F.2d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1986). Here, Dr. Stephens was seen as a consultative physician, not a treating physician, and the ALJ did not implicitly or explicitly reject her medical opinions. Instead, Dr. Stephen’s opinions regarding Clark’s “ability to
understand, remember, and carry out instructions and interact with others” were given credible weight in the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. at 422.) The ALJ noted that at the mental examination, the claimant could recall words after a five-minute
delay and even recall her last two evening meals. (Tr. at 423.) The ALJ also noted that Clark’s remote memory was Iidn.tact, that she could drive a car, and that she has past relevant skilled work. ( ) The claimant told Dr. Stephens she
hIadd. friends, although she does little with them besides talking on the phone. ( ) “concentration, persistence, and maintaining pace and adapting or managing
oneself,” the ALJ supported her findings with substantial evidence. This evidence included that at the time of consultation, Clark’s depression was untreatedI, da.n d she was not taking any anti-depressant medication or going to
therapy. ( ) The ALJ notes that Clark’s treatment records show no objective evidence of deficits in concentIrda.tion, persistence, and maintaining pace or adapting or managing oneself. ( )
In conclusion, because an ALJ is not required to give substantial or considerable weight to consulting physicians, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Steipi.h Terne, aatnidn git Pwhayss nicoita onu tright rejected; no error exists.
Next, Clark contends that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of Dr. Fantz, Clark’s treating physician, without good cause. As written above, a treating physician's opinion must be giveCnr aswubfosrtdantial weight unless “good
cause” demonstrates something contrary. , 363 F.3d at 1159. An ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician under three circumstances: (1) the treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence
supported a contrary finding; or (3) the treating physician's opiPnhioilnli pws avs. cBoanrnclhuasrotry or inconsistent with the doctor's medical records. the weight given a treaHtuinngt eprh vy.s iScoiac.n 'Sse oc.p iAndiomni ns.o, Cloonmgm a'sr the ALJ articulates a
speci�ic justi�ication.” , 808 F.3d 818, 823 (11th Cir. 2015). While an ALJ may choose to reject a treating physician's findings when
therWe iinss cghoeol d vc. auCsoem, m"h're o'mf uSsot c.c leSaercl.y articulate [the] reasons' for doing so." , Ph6i3ll1ip sFv.3. dB a1r1n7h6a,r t,1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting 357 F.3d 1232,
1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004). If the ALJ fails to state reasonable grounds for discounting such evidence, we will not affirmId ".simply beOcawuesnes svo. mHeec rkalteironale might have supported the ALJ's conclusion." (quoting , 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984)). It is the responsibility of the agency, not the
reviewing court, to supply the justification for its decision and to suCfofiwciaerntt lvy. Secxhpwlaeinik e"rthe weight [it] has given to obviously probativSeta ewxlhs ivb.i tCsa."l ifano , 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981) (quoting , 596
F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir. 1979)). The more supportable and consistent a mAeddaimcasl vo. pSiSnAion is, the more weight the ALJ affords it in her determination. , No. 23-11233,
2024 WL 2846726 (11th Cir. June 5, 2024). An ALJ may give a treating physicians’ findings less weightE aifs lethy evy. SaSAre, Cionmcomn’sristent with the medical See also Phillips v. Barnhart, 4105563 (11th Cir. June 21, 2023); 357 F.3d 1232,
1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004). The ALJ gave two reasons for assigning Dr. Fantz’s opinion little weight. First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Fantz's opinion was not supported by objective or
other substantial evidence in the record. (Tr. at 423.) The ALJ points to Dr. Fantz’s treatment records and their lack of documIedn.t ation of exam findings, particularly objective evidence of abnormalities. ( ) Second, the ALJ noted
that Dr. Fantz did not perform any psychiatric examinations in the tweIldv.e months leading up to the completion of the medical source statement. ( ) While the statute instructs the ALJ to make every reasonable effort to obtain medical records from the individual’s treatHinagr npehr yvs. iScSiaAn “the Act does not
specify how this evidence is to be weighed.” , 38 F.4th 892 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B)). Here, the ALJ chose to give more weight to the lack of any psychiatric examinations. Additionally, while an ALJ is
required to discuss consistency, an ALJ’s opinion should be read as a who Aled aamnds “vn. SeSeAd not repeat a discussion of the facts that establish inconsistency . . .” , No. 23-11233, 2024 WL 2846726 at *3 (11th Cir. June 5, 2024). The ALJ
indicated that the lack of any examinations by Dr. Fantz in the twelve months prior to completing the medical source statement, including a “mini-mental (Tr. at 424.)
Second, the ALJ noted that Dr. Fantz was a primary care doctor and that the opinions regarding Clark’s limitations due to her mental impairments are not related to his area of specialty. (Tr. at 423.) An ALJ “generally give[s] more
weight to the medical opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her areaP oeft esrpseocni avl.t yC othmamn ’rt oo ft hSeS Am edical opinion of a source who is not a specialist.” , 4:16-cv-00080-JHE, 2017 WL 1146928
(N.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2017) (where the ALJ properly considered the physicians lack of specialization). Again, the more supportable and consistent aA mdaemdisc avl. oSSpAinion is, the more weight the ALJ affords it in their determination. , No. 23-11233, 2024 WL 2846726 (11th Cir. June 5, 2024).
The ALJ determined that Dr. Fantz opinion was to be given little weight because the opinions are not supported by objective evidence and are inconsistent with other evidence provided in the record. Both of which reasons
are sufficient to show good cause. The ALJ thus provided sufficient reasons that meet the good cause standard for giving Dr. Fantz’s opinion less weight as one of Clarbk.’ sA tlrleeagteindg Eprhryosric ioafn sA. LTJh Feraeilfionrge, ttohe P AeLrJf odridm n oHte err rD. uty to Fully and Fairly Develop the Record as to the Claimant’s Mental Impairments Stephen's opinion regarding the claimant’s ability to understand, remember,
and carry out instructions and interact with others. (Doc. 12) In the RFC, the ALJ interpreted Dr. Stephen’s use of the word “usually” to mean that Clark could tolerate occasional interaction with coworkers,
supervisors, and the public. (Tr. at 409.) Clark argues that the ALJ had a duty to clarify Dr. Stephen’s opinion about Clark’s ability to be around and get along with others. (Doc 12 at 15.) Clark contends that this term is ambiguous, and the
ALJ wrongly interpreted the term and had a duty to re-contact Dr. Stephens to clarify the word as the word “usually” could mean “how many days woIudl.d [Clark] likely be unable tWo gaesht ianlgotnogn w v.i tCho omtmhe’rr so af nSodc/.o Sre acc. cept direction?” ( ) Additionally, Clark cites to argue that the ALJ
failed to develop the record in the case. This case has no bearing, as its focus on appeal was resolving conflicts between the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and Vocational Expert testimony.
Since a hearing before an ALJ is not an adverSseaer yC powroacrete vd. iSncgh, wtheeik AeLr,J has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record. 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). Since Clark is represented by counsel in this
matter, no special duty exists for the hearing examiner to “scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts, and Cowart, elicited.” 662 F.2d at 735. However, there must be a showing of
prejudice before it’s found that the claimant’s right to due process has been violated to such a degree thaSet eth Ber ocawsne vm. Suhsat lbaela r,emanded to the ALJ for further development of the record. 44 F.3d 931, 934-35 (11th Cir.
1995). The court should be guided by whether the recIodr. d reveals evidentiary gaps which result in unfairness, or “clear prejudice” Prejudice requires a showing that “the ALJ did not have all of the relevant evidence before him in the
record, or thatK tehlele Ay LvJ. dHiedc nkloetr consider all the evidence in the record in reaching his decision.” , 761 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985). Here, Clark has fallen short in showing that the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record, as the record as a whole is neither incomplete nor
inadequate. The record was sufficient for the ALJ to evaluate Clark’s mental impairments and does not show the kind of gaps in the evidence that rise to the level of prejudice. The ALJ thoroughly considered the opinion of Dr. Stephens,
and it is not the duty of the Court to reweigh the evidence before the ALJ. Put in a different context, the extent to which the Plaintiff disagrWeeasr rwenit hv . tKhieja AkLaJz’is interpretation of that evidence is not grounds for remand. ,
No. 1:21-cv-00185-CWB, 2023 WL 4223523 (M.D. Ala. Jun. 27, 2023). Thus, no errVor. exisCtos nbcelcuasuisoen t he Court finds the ALJ’s RFC determination was adequate. Upon review of the administrative record and considering Plaintiff's
argument, this Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by good cause. For the foregoing reasons, this Court AFFIRMS the ALJ's decision. A separate order consistent with this opinion will be entered. DONE and ORDERED on August 1, 2024.
L. Scott G United States Distkéct Judge 215708
Page 17 of 17