Clark v. Runyon

165 F. Supp. 2d 920, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22107, 2001 WL 392021
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedMarch 14, 2001
DocketCIV 4-95-737(JRT/RLE)
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 165 F. Supp. 2d 920 (Clark v. Runyon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clark v. Runyon, 165 F. Supp. 2d 920, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22107, 2001 WL 392021 (mnd 2001).

Opinion

ORDER ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE DATED DECEMBER 01, 2000

TUNHEIM, District Judge.

Class Counsel for plaintiffs brings a motion for an order to determine the disputed claims of various class members concerning allocation of the Settlement Fund. Class Counsel also moves for an order overruling claimants’ disputes and objections to Class Counsel’s determinations regarding allocation of the Settlement Fund in this case. The Court referred the matter to United States Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson.

This matter is now before the Court on claimants’ objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge dated December 1, 2000. Claimants Shannon Kochendorfer and Margia Ealy object to the recommendation that their claims be denied. The Court has conducted a de novo review of claimants’ objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts in part the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and affirms Class Counsel’s denial of the claim of Margia Ealy. With respect to the claim of Shannon Kochen-dorfer, the Court overrules Class Counsel’s denial of the claim. 1

*921 BACKGROUND

The Court issued an Order Implementing Settlement Agreement on April 21, 2000, in which it instructed Class Counsel to submit to the Court any unresolved disputes concerning Proof of Claims that had been filed against the Settlement Fund. The Magistrate Judge heard argument on Class Counsel’s motion, which involved several such disputes, on August 23, 2000. Those disputes arose when certain claimants were denied a portion of the Settlement Fund.

In order to be entitled to a portion of the Settlement Fund, a claimant was to submit to Class Counsel a Proof of Claim form that would enable Class Counsel to determine if the claimant was a legitimate member of the certified plaintiff class. 2 Once Class Counsel determined that the claimant was a member of the certified class, that person was assigned a portion of the Settlement Fund based upon the facts contained in the Proof of Claim form. A point distribution system, which attributed points to respective claimants based on the number of positive responses provided on the Proof of Claim form, was used to determine the amount of the Settlement Fund allocated to each class member. The disputes raised here that are the subject of Class Counsel’s motion are those disputes raised by certain claimants after Class Counsel allocated portions of the Settlement Fund based on the Proof of Claim forms.

OBJECTIONS

1. Objection of Shannon Kochendorfer

Claimant Shannon Kochendorfer objects to Magistrate Judge Erickson’s recommendation affirming Class Counsel’s rejection of her claim. Specifically, Kochendor-fer contends that her untimely filing of the Proof of Claim form was justified because of extenuating personal circumstances as well as because other class members had told her that the deadline for filing Proof of Claim forms had been extended from May 11, 2000 until May 30, 2000. According to Kochnedorfer, her young son had surgery in April 2000 that required significant follow-up care. Although Kochendor-fer admits receiving a letter from Class Counsel in early May informing her that Proof of Claim forms had to be returned by May 11, 2000, she maintains that she had begun to fill out the Proof of Claim form on May 5, 2000, but did not complete the form until sometime after May 11, 2000. The Proof of Claim form was postmarked May 27, 2000. She also attributes the delay in submitting the form to her need to retrieve certain information necessary to complete the form.

Kochendorfer filed a claim for 10 points. If her claim had been approved, she would have been entitled to 6 points because, according to Postal Service records, she worked either as a transitional employee or regular employee for 6 quarters during the relevant class period. There is no dispute that Kochendorfer is a member of the plaintiff class or that she suffered racial discrimination at the Post Office. Ko- *922 chendorfer essentially requests that the Court invoke its equitable power to allow her legitimate, but untimely claim.

The Court has equitable power to allow late-filed proofs of claim and late-cured proofs of claim. Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F.2d 628, 630 (2nd Cir.1972); In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 189 F.R.D. 321, 323 (D.N.J.1999). Courts have often treated requests to accept late-filed or late-cured proofs of claim as motions to extend the time to comply with a court-ordered deadline. In re Cendant Corp., 189 F.R.D. at 323. A court-ordered deadline for filing proofs of claim may be enlarged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) if the movant can demonstrate the delay was caused by “excusable neglect.” In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 906 F.Supp. 840, 844-45 (E.D.N.Y.1995); Mermelstein v. Bank of New York, 985 F.Supp. 320, 323 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (allowing three late proofs of claim). Determination of excusable neglect requires an examination of all relevant circumstances surrounding the delay. Pioneer Invest. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). The relevant factors to consider in making this determination include “the danger of prejudice to the [nonmovant], the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Id. at 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489.

Evaluation of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the delay in this case warrants permitting Kochendorfer’s claim. There is little, if any, prejudice to defendant because of the delay here. The Settlement Fund has already been established and permitting one additional claim will not materially affect allocation of settlement funds. The length of the delay in this case was minimal — only 16 days after the deadline. Additionally, there is little impact on the judicial proceedings in allowing Kochendorfer’s claim. This case has been on-going for almost 10 years and a 16 day delay has not unreasonably hampered the proceedings.

The Court must also evaluate the reasons for the delay in this case. In making that evaluation, the Court must examine Kochendorfer’s reason for the untimely filing in order to determine whether the neglect is excusable. In re Cendant, 189 F.R.D. at 325-26. Excusable neglect is an elastic concept, may encompass inadvertent delays, and is not limited strictly to omissions by circumstances beyond the control of the movant. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 391-92, 113 S.Ct. 1489.

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Bluebook (online)
165 F. Supp. 2d 920, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22107, 2001 WL 392021, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-v-runyon-mnd-2001.