Clark v. Royal Globe Insurance

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Clark v. Royal Globe Insurance

158 S.E.2d 699, 116 Ga. App. 561, 1967 Ga. App. LEXIS 892

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedOctober 27, 1967

Docket43151

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 158 S.E.2d 699 (Clark v. Royal Globe Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Clark v. Royal Globe Insurance, 158 S.E.2d 699, 116 Ga. App. 561, 1967 Ga. App. LEXIS 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967).

Pincite

Opinion

Jordan, Presiding Judge.

This is a workmen’s compensation cáse involving the payment of attorney’s fees as approved by the board. The claimant employed one attorney, agreeing to pay him one-fourth of any settlement by recovery or [562]*562otherwise. This' attorney negotiated a settlement which the claimant rejected. The claimant asked this attorney to withdraw, and employed another attorney, agreeing to pay the second attorney one-third of any recovery. The second attorney thereafter represented the claimant before the .board. Both attorneys filed their agreements with the board. The board conducted a hearing with respect to attorney’s fees, determined that one-fourth of the recovery is reasonable and adequate as attorney’s fees, that both attorneys had equally participated in securing compensation for the claimant, and authorized and directed the payment to each attorney of one-eighth of the compensation paid or accruing from a specified date “unless otherwise directed” by the board. On appeal by the first attorney a Judge of Fulton Superior Court affirmed the order of the board, and an appeal from that order was filed in this court in the name of the claimant and his first attorney. The employer and insurer, as nominal appellees, have notified the court that they have no preference in the matter and will not appear unless the court desires an appearance, and the sole appearance as an appellee is in behalf of the second attorney. Held:

The single enumerated error is that the court erred in affirming the action of the board because the board had no authority to apportion or fix attorney’s fees. The appellants contend that the order should be reversed and the case remanded to the board for approval or disapproval of either or both of the contracts. The attorney-appellee filed no cross appeal but nevertheless contends that the order should be reversed with directions as to past and future services, pointing out that the first attorney represented the claimant only with respect to an unaccepted agreement, that this appellee represented the claimant thereafter in respect to the award of compensation actually made, and that a hearing on a change in condition is being held in abeyance pending the outcome of this appeal. Code Ann. § 114-714 provides in pertinent part that “Fees of attorneys . . . shall be subject to the approval of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation.” We think this authority necessarily includes the authority to approve pro tanto as well as in toto any contract between the claimant and an attorney for prosecuting the claim. In Feldman v. Edwards, 107 Ga. App. 397 (130 SE2d 350), all that this court actually determined was that the authority [563]*563was limited to the examination and approval of such contracts, as placed before the board, and that it did not include the authority to set the fees of attorneys, or to examine and approve contracts between attorneys as to the division of fees when associated to represent a claimant. The attorneys in this case were not associated, they rendered separate services on the same claim, and the board had before it two distinct contracts for approval. It is clear that the board concluded from the evidence before it that the services of each attorney were of equal value, and although the ultimate effect of the board’s action is to set the fee of each attorney and thus divide the total equally between the attorneys, the board achieved this result by approving fees within the limits of each contract and thus acted within its authority to approve each contract in part with respect to the compensation actually awarded to the claimant, as paid or to be paid. By appropriate use of the term “unless otherwise directed” the board clearly intended to reserve any further approval of attorney fees based on any additional representation of the claimant. The board having acted within its authority in approving fees within the limits of each contract between the claimant and an attorney, as presented to the board for approval, the superior court properly affirmed the action.

Submitted October 5, 1967 Decided October 27, 1967. Woodruff, Saveli, Lane & Williams, John M. Williams, for appellants. Swift, Currie, McChee & Hiers, James B. Hiers, Jr., Grace W. Thomas, Louis M. Tatham, for appellees.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen and Quillian, JJ., concur.

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Jordan, Presiding Judge.

This is a workmen’s compensation cáse involving the payment of attorney’s fees as approved by the board. The claimant employed one attorney, agreeing to pay him one-fourth of any settlement by recovery or [562]*562otherwise. This' attorney negotiated a settlement which the claimant rejected. The claimant asked this attorney to withdraw, and employed another attorney, agreeing to pay the second attorney one-third of any recovery. The second attorney thereafter represented the claimant before the .board. Both attorneys filed their agreements with the board. The board conducted a hearing with respect to attorney’s fees, determined that one-fourth of the recovery is reasonable and adequate as attorney’s fees, that both attorneys had equally participated in securing compensation for the claimant, and authorized and directed the payment to each attorney of one-eighth of the compensation paid or accruing from a specified date “unless otherwise directed” by the board. On appeal by the first attorney a Judge of Fulton Superior Court affirmed the order of the board, and an appeal from that order was filed in this court in the name of the claimant and his first attorney. The employer and insurer, as nominal appellees, have notified the court that they have no preference in the matter and will not appear unless the court desires an appearance, and the sole appearance as an appellee is in behalf of the second attorney. Held:

The single enumerated error is that the court erred in affirming the action of the board because the board had no authority to apportion or fix attorney’s fees. The appellants contend that the order should be reversed and the case remanded to the board for approval or disapproval of either or both of the contracts. The attorney-appellee filed no cross appeal but nevertheless contends that the order should be reversed with directions as to past and future services, pointing out that the first attorney represented the claimant only with respect to an unaccepted agreement, that this appellee represented the claimant thereafter in respect to the award of compensation actually made, and that a hearing on a change in condition is being held in abeyance pending the outcome of this appeal. Code Ann. § 114-714 provides in pertinent part that “Fees of attorneys . . . shall be subject to the approval of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation.” We think this authority necessarily includes the authority to approve pro tanto as well as in toto any contract between the claimant and an attorney for prosecuting the claim. In Feldman v. Edwards, 107 Ga. App. 397 (130 SE2d 350), all that this court actually determined was that the authority [563]*563was limited to the examination and approval of such contracts, as placed before the board, and that it did not include the authority to set the fees of attorneys, or to examine and approve contracts between attorneys as to the division of fees when associated to represent a claimant. The attorneys in this case were not associated, they rendered separate services on the same claim, and the board had before it two distinct contracts for approval. It is clear that the board concluded from the evidence before it that the services of each attorney were of equal value, and although the ultimate effect of the board’s action is to set the fee of each attorney and thus divide the total equally between the attorneys, the board achieved this result by approving fees within the limits of each contract and thus acted within its authority to approve each contract in part with respect to the compensation actually awarded to the claimant, as paid or to be paid. By appropriate use of the term “unless otherwise directed” the board clearly intended to reserve any further approval of attorney fees based on any additional representation of the claimant. The board having acted within its authority in approving fees within the limits of each contract between the claimant and an attorney, as presented to the board for approval, the superior court properly affirmed the action.

Submitted October 5, 1967 Decided October 27, 1967. Woodruff, Saveli, Lane & Williams, John M. Williams, for appellants. Swift, Currie, McChee & Hiers, James B. Hiers, Jr., Grace W. Thomas, Louis M. Tatham, for appellees.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen and Quillian, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

158 S.E.2d 699, 116 Ga. App. 561, 1967 Ga. App. LEXIS 892, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-v-royal-globe-insurance-gactapp-1967.

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