Clark v. Internal Affairs Department for the Marin County Sheriff
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Opinion
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LOUREECE STONE CLARK, Case No. 22-cv-04972-JSC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING 9 v. MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 10 INTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT FOR THE MARIN COUNTY SHERIFF, et ECF Nos. 4, 5 11 al., Defendants. 12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff, a detainee at Napa State Hospital (“NSH”), filed this civil rights complaint under 15 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Marin County Sheriff’s Department, its Internal Affairs Division, 16 and two individuals. 1 (ECF No. 1 at 2, 4.) Plaintiff filed 12 cases in this court, including this one, 17 in approximately six months.2 He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a 18 separate order. For the reasons explained below, the complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s 19 motions and other requests are also addressed below. 20 STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 22 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 23
24 1 Plaintiff does not indicate what governmental positions, if any, these individuals hold. 2 See Clark v. Goldstein, et al., No. C 22-2962 JSC; Clark v. Bay City Auto, et al., No. C 22-4066 25 JSC; Clark v. Marin County District Attorney, et al., No. C 22-5557 JSC; Clark v. Ahern, et al., No. C 22-6171 JSC; Clark v. Board of Equalization, No. C 22-6169 JSC; Clark v. Supervisors for 26 Marin County, No. C 22-6173 JSC; Clark v. Medical Board of California, et al., No. C 22-6174 JSC; Clark v. Commission on Judicial Performance, et al., No. C 22-6204 JSC; Clark v. Alameda 27 Cty. Dep’t. of Child Protected Services, et al., No. C 22-6172 JSC; Clark v. Global Tel*Link 1 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 2 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 3 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. 4 § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by parties who are not represented by an attorney must be liberally 5 construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 7 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 8 statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 9 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to 10 state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 11 provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 12 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 13 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 14 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a 15 claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. To state a claim that is plausible on its 16 face, a plaintiff must allege facts that "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 17 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 18 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 19 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 20 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 21 42, 48 (1988). 22 DISCUSSION 23 The complaint sets forth the following claim, which is quoted in its entirety:
24 The respondents[’] willful failure to honor my presentments placing them in default; the respondents[’] failure to, refusal to, or neglect in 25 the presentment of a verified response; the respondents[’] failure to perform in good faith; the respondents[’] acquiescence and tacit 26 agreement with all terms, conditions and stipulations set forth. Therefore this matter is deemed res judicata and stare decisis. This 27 Final Expression in the Record is intended as a complete 1 (ECF No. 1 at 3.) 2 A claim that is totally incomprehensible is frivolous. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 3 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989); cf. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (a claim is frivolous if 4 it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or is clearly lacking any factual basis). 5 Plaintiff’s claim is wholly incomprehensible. His claim refers to unspecified “presentments” and a 6 “verified response” in some unidentified case. There is no explanation for how these things form 7 the basis of a federal claim. He goes on to allege a “failure to perform,” an “agreement,” and 8 “terms, conditions and obligations” without any explanation of how this might relate to the prior 9 allegations. While such allegations might suggest a state-law contract claim, no contract is 10 alleged, and Plaintiff does not explain how any contract could form the basis for a claim under 11 federal law. Plaintiff goes on to cite the legal doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis, but how 12 these doctrines might apply to the other allegations or to any claim he might be making is neither 13 explained by Plaintiff nor apparent to the Court. For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s 14 incomprehensible and, therefore, frivolous. Because the claim is incomprehensible, moreover, the 15 Court cannot discern any way for it to be cured by amendment. See Janicki Logging Co. v. 16 Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994) (leave need to amend need not be granted where it 17 constitutes an exercise in futility). Accordingly, the case is dismissed without leave to amend. 18 Plaintiff has filed two motions for a preliminary injunction. (ECF Nos. 4, 5.) The first 19 (ECF No. 4) does not describe what form of injunction he seeks, while the second makes a number 20 of allegations regarding involuntarily administered medication at the Marin County Jail (ECF No. 21 5). These allegations bear no apparent relation to the allegations in the complaint, but in any 22 event, the need for an injunction based upon them would appear to be moot as Plaintiff is at NSH 23 and no longer at the Marin County Jail. A preliminary injunction, moreover, requires service upon 24 the Defendants or a certificate of the efforts, if any, Plaintiff has made to give notice of the motion 25 to the Defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1), (b). Defendants have not been served, and 26 Plaintiff has not certified his efforts to notify Defendants of the motion. A preliminary injunction 27 also requires Plaintiff to show his claims are likely to succeed. See Winter v. Natural Resources 1 succeed because it is frivolous.
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