Clark v. Hamilton

217 F. 229, 133 C.C.A. 223, 1914 U.S. App. LEXIS 1431
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedOctober 12, 1914
DocketNo. 4134
StatusPublished

This text of 217 F. 229 (Clark v. Hamilton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clark v. Hamilton, 217 F. 229, 133 C.C.A. 223, 1914 U.S. App. LEXIS 1431 (8th Cir. 1914).

Opinion

SANBORN, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). The first position taken by counsel for appellants to support their claim that Hamilton became a stockholder, and not a creditor, of the Smith Company, is that the claim of the defendant is founded on notes issued pursuant to the contract of January 1, 1910, and is conditioned by the terms of that agreement, and they argue that the fact that Wernicke, who, as president of the company, executed its notes to Conger as trustee for the paying subscribers, was, as was Conger also, a member of the committee who made that contract on behalf of “the new stockholders” who purchased Smith’s $50,000 of stock, sustains this view. But this contention disregards the plain facts of the case and the true relations of the parties. Hamilton was not one of “the new stockholders,” who purchased Smith’s stock and were represented by their committee, nor was he a party to the contract of January 1, 1910. He was a mere subscriber to a proposed increase of the capital stock of an old corporation. He dealt with that corporation at arm’s length, a party adverse to it, when he made and acted under his contract of subscription, and the terms of that contract and of no other govern his rights. He made that contract after the contract of January 1, 1910, had been made, and after the part of it relating to the purchase of E. Anton Smith’s stock and of the control of the corporation had been performed. He was neither a party to it, nor was he represented by the committee who made it, nor did he know its terms, and it does not condition, determine, or measure the rights or liabilities of either Hamilton, the corporation, or its creditors arising from his subscription and his payment thereon. Hamilton acted for himself, and never had any representative or agent in the transactions involved in this suit, except Conger, and the extent of his power to represent him was to loan his money to the corporation when he paid it on his subscription, and to take a promissory note of the corporation to himself as trustee for Hamilton, in accordance with the terms of his subscription contract.

The second contention is that the payments of the Grand Rapids parties to Conger were intended by them as contributions to capital and not as loans — and it rests on the contract of January 1, 1910, and fails to distinguish between the situation of “the new stockholders,” who purchased the Smith stock and were represented by the committee [232]*232who made that contract for them, and a subscriber to the stock after that agreement had been made and partly performed. It is not persuasive.

. It is- next argued that, as against creditors, the Grand Rapids parties occupy the position of stockholders of the corporation, because the' underwriters, the new stockholders, who controlled the corporation, had the power to comply with the requirements of the statutes of Missouri, and to increase and issue the stock, and because a certificate of stock is not indispensable to the creation of the relation of a stockholder. But Hamilton was not one of the new stockholders. He had no control over, or vote or influence on, the management of the corporation; nor had he any representative who had any power to act for him in directing its course. That corporation and all the parties in control of it were adverse parties to him in the contract of subscription which measured his relation to them.

It is true that where one subscribes for stock in a corporation unconditionally, and the contract of subscription is substantially performed, and he either takes his place and acts as a stockholder, or receives dividends or benefits as such, he may be estopped as against creditors from denying that he is a stockholder, although a certificate of stock has not been issued to him, or some formal prerequisite, such as publishing dr recording the vote authorizing the issue of additional stock, has not been complied with. Stutz v. Handley (C. C.) 41 Fed. 531, 538, 540; Pacific National Bank v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 227, 233, 11 Sup. Ct. 984, 35 L. Ed. 702; Hawley v. Upton, 102 U. S. 314, 26 L. Ed. 179; Manufacturers’ Paper Co. v. Allen-Higgins Co. (C. C.) 154 Fed. 906. But Hamilton never subscribed for stock unconditionally. He made a plain written contract that he would temporarily loan to the Smith Company $5,000, and that, on condition that the company would issue and deliver to him valid full-paid increased stock of the par value of $10,000, he would accept it in payment of his loan and become a stockholder. Neither the company nor the underwriters ever caused the other $5,000 required to purchase $10,000 of full-paid increased stock to be paid for it; neither took any legal steps to causé any increased stock to be issued, and Hamilton’s loan, evidenced by the promissory note of the corporation to his trustee, Conger, remained unpaid, and he remained what he was from the beginning, a creditor of the corporation. 'He is not estopped from holding this position and enforcing his claim as a creditor as against other creditors of the corporation, because he never said, did, or omitted anything which tended to deceive them into the belief that he was other than a creditor, and there is no eveidence that any of them was induced by any representation, act, or neglect of Hamilton to change his position in reliance upon any such belief. His relation of creditor was evidenced by his written subscription contract and by the corporation’s promissory note to his trustee, and he made no representation that these did not disclose his true relation to the corporation. The other creditors of the corporation have no greater rights than the corporation here. Hamilton was a creditor of the corporation when it received his $5,-000, and he is a creditor still. One who subscribes $5,000 in full pay[233]*233ment for $10,000 par value of the contemplated fully paid increase of the stock of a corporation, pays the $5,000, and obtains the promissory note of the corporation to his trustee for that amount before the corporation lias authorized the increase, on the condition, clearly expressed in the contract subscribed, that the $5,000 shall be treated as a loan to the company drawing interest at 6 per cent, until the corporation is ready to issue the fully paid stock of the par value of $10,000, becomes thereby the creditor of the corporation, and when the corporation never issues or takes any steps to issue the increase of stock, because it cannot legally issue it for a payment of 50 'cents on the dollar, without making the taker liable to pay another 50 cents on the dollar therefor, and is adjudged a bankrupt, he remains a creditor. McFarlin v. First National Bank of Kansas City, 68 Fed. 868, 871, 16 C. C. A. 46; Winters v. Armstrong (C. C.) 37 Fed. 508, 515; Bircher v. Walther, 163 Mo. 461, 63 S. W. 691; Mathews v. Columbia National Bank (C. C.) 77 Fed. 372, 373; Wolf v. Chicago Sign Printing Co., 233 Ill. 501, 84 N. E. 614, 13 Ann. Cas. 369.

Other objections to this conclusion, which have not escaped consideration, are: (1) That Wernicke about January 11, 1910, advertised that new capital to the amount of $100,000 had been subscribed; but Hamilton was not represented by Wernicke, or estopped by any action, representation, or omission of Wernicke, Conger, or any of the other new stockholders or parties in control of the corporation with regard to the issue of the increase of the stock or the subscription for it.

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Related

Hawley v. Upton
102 U.S. 314 (Supreme Court, 1880)
Pacific National Bank v. Eaton
141 U.S. 227 (Supreme Court, 1891)
Wolf v. Chicago Sign Printing Co.
84 N.E. 614 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1908)
Bircher v. Walther
63 S.W. 691 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1901)
Manufacturers' Paper Co. v. Allen-Higgins Co.
154 F. 906 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, 1907)
McFarlin v. First Nat. Bank of Kansas City
68 F. 868 (Eighth Circuit, 1895)
Winters v. Armstrong
37 F. 508 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern Ohio, 1889)
Stutz v. Handley
41 F. 531 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Middle Tennessee, 1890)
Mathews v. Columbia Nat. Bank
77 F. 372 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Washington, 1896)

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Bluebook (online)
217 F. 229, 133 C.C.A. 223, 1914 U.S. App. LEXIS 1431, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-v-hamilton-ca8-1914.