Clark v. Detroit Locomotive Works

35 Mich. 82, 1876 Mich. LEXIS 240
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Clark v. Detroit Locomotive Works. Read the opinion of the Court — 32 Mich. 348
Michigan Supreme Court·Decided October 24, 1876·Published

Opinion

Makston, J.:

An action was brought against Clark to recover a balance due the locomotive works for building and placing an engine in a vessel, under a special contract. The locomotive works agreed to build and set up in a boat in Detroit an engine from the same patterns as the one made by them for the propeller “Phil Sheridan,” with certain exceptions, “the whole to be completed in a good and workmanlike manner, materials and labor first class.”

Evidence was given on the part of defendant that the contract as to building and setting up had not been performed. TJpon this branch of the case the court charged the jury as follows, and to this portion, of the charge defendants below excepted:

“It is claimed on the part of the defendant that there are certain defects in the work which was done under the contract for building the engine of the Gazelle; by its terms, and, 'indeed, by the law itself, the plaintiff was bound to do a good and workmanlike job. Even if the contract had said nothing in regard to that point, they would have been bound to do the work in that manner, that is, a good and workmanlike manner. In your consideration of the fact of whether work is done in a good and workmanlike manner, it is always proper for the jury to take into consideration the purpose of the work.

“ An engine which would be fit for one boat might not be fit for another boat, although it might be a fair engine, in itself considered, yet it might be an engine which would not be a good and workmanlike job if made for another boat.

So in regard to finish, labor, and materials, which the contract provides shall be first class; that is, first class, ^taking into consideration the uses to which this engine was to be put.

[81]*81“It is hardly necessary to state to you that it is not to be expected that the same work will be put upon one machine which might be expected for another, or that the same excellence of polish shall be put upon one piece of work which would be required for another. When a man is entering upon a contract to build a house in a good and workmanlike manner, we all understand substantially how that house should be built, the finish which should be given to the various parts and the materials to be used; but suppose it was a contract to build a barn, and that the contract also provided that it should be completed in a good, workmanlike manner, and that the material should be first class, and that the finish of it should be first class, it would be very plain to any man of common sense that the actual finish in the two pieces of work would be entirely different, and that the materials which would be used in the two might be different, although both of them would be composed of wood, or brick or stone, as the contract would require, still there might be a radical difference in the materials, and the workmanship, general finish, or in the character of the work upon the two buildings.

“ And in considering a contract of this kind, or considering work done under a contract of this nature, where this provision is incorporated, it is necessary always to consider for what the machine is to be used, or what is the purpose of the work, or to what use it is to be put; and having decided that, then the party is simply bound to do a good, workmanlike job, and if he provided that the material should be first class, and the labor first class, and the finish also first class, then he is bound to make it first class, taking into consideration the uses to which the work is to be put after the work is finished.”

We are all of opinion that the court erred in thus charging the jury. If the court, in the illustrations given, and in what was said, had been referring to the outside finish or *appearanee alone, perhaps it would have been unobjeetionable. The court did not, however, so limit it, but applied what was said generally and specifically to the finish, the materials, and the labor, and the jury could have understood the charge in no other way. The legal effect of [82]*82this charge was to authorize the jury to qualify the terms of the agreement as made by the parties, not by the subject matter of the contract, but by the use for which the boat was designed, even although that was unknown at the time the agreement was entered into. In so far as the court instructed the jury that in their consideration of the fact whether the work had been done in a good and workmanlike manner, they might take into consideration the purpose of the work, and to the illustrations given in connection therewith, there might have been no objection had the charge been confined to this. It was not, however. The court, after instructing the jury that they might take into consideration the .purpose of the work in determining whether the contract had been fulfilled in building and setting up the engine in a good and workmanlike manner, went on and said: “An engine which would be fit for ■one boat might not be fit for another boat, although it might be a fair engine in itself considered, yet it might be an engine which would not be a good and workmanlike job if made for •another boat.” Taking the charge together, this, we say, might be considered unobjectionable, but the court then, in connection therewith, continues: “So in regard to finish, labor and materials, which the contract provides shall be first class; that is, first class, taking into consideration the uses to which this engine was to be put.” Again, after giving an illustration of two different buildings, each completed in a good and workmanlike manner, yet that it would be plain to any man of common sense that the actual finish in the two pieces of work were entirely different, it is added, “ and that the materials which would be used in the two might be different, although both of them would be composed of wood, or brick, or stone, as the contract would require, still there might be a radical difference *in the materials, and the workmanship, general finish, or in the character of the work upon the two buildings.” Again, “ if he provided that the materials should be first class, and the labor first class, and the finish also first class, then he is bound to make it first class, taking into consideration the uses to which the work is to be put after the work is finished.” To my mind it is somewhat doubtful [83]*83whether the words of the contract, '“materials and labor first class,” were not as effectually construed and illustrated out of the case as if they had never appeared. The contract required the locomotive works to build and set up in a boat an engine of a certain size and of a certain pattern, and had the contract been entirely silent as to the labor, the materials, and the manner in which the work was to be done, would not the law, construing it in reference to the subject matter, have required first class work, labor and materials, especially if the boat were first class, and this without reference to the particular use to which the boat might be put, except in so far as the use designed might affect the glitter, show, or finish put upon the outside or showy parts ? In this case the parties contracted for first class labor and materials in building and setting up the engine, and this irrespective of the use to which the boat was to be put, and having so contracted, in plain and unambiguous language, we are not at liberty to so construe the contract as to render this provision inoperative.

The word “ materials,” as used in the contract and charge of the court, has reference to the metals or materials used in building the engine.

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Clark v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 35 Mich. 82, 1876 Mich. LEXIS 240 (Mich. 1876).

35 Mich. 82 (Clark v. Detroit Locomotive Works) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.