Clark v. Clark (In Re Clark)

211 B.R. 105, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 48, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1061, 1997 WL 402783
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJuly 16, 1997
DocketBankruptcy No. 96-4092-BKC-3P7, Adversary No. 96-545
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 211 B.R. 105 (Clark v. Clark (In Re Clark)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clark v. Clark (In Re Clark), 211 B.R. 105, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 48, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1061, 1997 WL 402783 (Fla. 1997).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

GEORGE L. PROCTOR, Bankruptcy Judge.

This proceeding came before the Court on a complaint to determine dischargeability pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and objecting to discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(3) and (a)(5). After a trial on May 14, 1997, the Court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Defendant served as an officer and a director of George Washington Life Insurance Company (GWL) from 1979 through 1990. (Tr. at 8). In 1991, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia appointed Plaintiff as Receiver of GWL. (Pl.’s Ex. 3).

2. In 1992, Plaintiff sued Defendant and other GWL officers and directors in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. Following a jury trial, the Court entered judgment against the Defendant and awarded damages totalling $2,107,521.34. (Tr. at 8-10, Pl.’s Ex. 3-9).

3. During 1993, Defendant and his wife held deferred annuity accounts with an aggregate value of approximately $145,000. Some of the investment accounts were in Defendant’s name, and some accounts were in Defendant’s wife’s name. (Tr. at 17-18). Defendant testified, however, that he had control over his wife’s accounts and ultimately had access and control over all of the funds withdrawn. (Tr. at 37).

4. In 1993 and 1994, Defendant withdrew $8,000 from his account. In 1994, he withdrew the remainder of the funds, from the other investment accounts, totalling approximately $145,000. (Tr. at 19). Also in 1994, Defendant received income of approximately $27,000. (Tr. at 10-11).

5. Of the more than $170,000 Defendant received in 1994, he claims that he deposited over half of it into an account held by himself and his wife. (Tr. at 21). However, Plaintiff produced bank statements for that account which show that only a little over $40,000 was deposited into that account during 1994. (Tr. at 24-30, Pl.’s Ex. 11).

6. Defendant testified that he used the money he received to supplement living expenses, to travel, to play golf, and to attend theater shows. Defendant testified that he customarily paid for such items in cash, and that he only retained receipts for warranty items or for expenses that might have tax consequences. (Tr. at 12-16, 71, 75). At trial, Defendant only produced receipts for three such items: one for a car repair, one for kitchen remodeling costs, and one for new carpeting. These three items totalled approximately $6,000. (Deft.’s Ex. 1-2).

7. Defendant also testified that he lost approximately $80,000 in gambling. (Tr. at 32). Although Defendant produced miscellaneous casino identification cards, theater thicket stubs, and hotel reservation slips, Defendant produced no receipts to corroborate that he lost $80,000 gambling. (Tr. at 51-52; Def.’s Ex. 5).

8. Defendant further testified that he spent the money because he was aware of the judgment from the West Virginia court and he did not want Plaintiff to get the money. (Tr. at 21, 37-38, 80).

9. Defendant filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 9,1996. On October 24, 1996, Plaintiff filed this adversary proceeding objecting to Defendant’s discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) and (a)(3), alleging that Defendant failed to satisfactorily explain the loss of cash assets and that Defendant failed to maintain records from which his financial condition could be ascertained.

10. Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks to have its debt excepted from Defendant’s discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), alleging that the Defendant breached a fiduciary duty to GWL, and that because this issue was adjudicated by the West Virginia court, this *107 Court is bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5)—Loss of Assets

Bankruptcy Code section 727(a)(5) provides:

(a) The Court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless —
(5) the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before determination of denial of discharge under this paragraph, any loss of assets or deficiency of assets to meet the debtor’s liabilities!]

11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5). Under this section, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant’s discharge should be denied. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991); Chalik v. Moorefield (In re Chalik), 748 F.2d 616 (11th Cir.1984). If Plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to overcome this burden, the Defendant must then prove his entitlement to a discharge.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5), the Defendant is required to provide a satisfactory explanation for his loss of assets. Hawley v. Cement Industries, Inc. (In re Hawley), 51 F.3d 246, 249 (11th Cir.1995). According to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, “ ‘[vjague and indefinite explanations of loses that are based on estimates uncorroborated by documentation are unsatisfactory.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 619 (11th Cir.1984)).

This Court has stated that a debtor’s explanation of loss of assets “requires more than undocumented, unsupported vague generalities ... An explanation must convince the court of the debtor’s good faith and businesslike conduct.” Grant v. Simmons (In re Simmons), 113 B.R. 741, 745 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1990). Additionally, the debtor’s explanation should not arouse suspicion as to how the assets were lost. Id. Vague assertions that money was spent on living expenses or lost through gambling, without corroborating documentation, are unacceptable. Manhattan Leasing Systems, Inc. v. Goblick (In re Goblick), 93 B.R. 771, 775 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1988).

In this case, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s discharge should be denied because he has failed to explain the loss of over $170,000. Defendant withdrew from various accounts or received as income in 1994.

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Bluebook (online)
211 B.R. 105, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 48, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1061, 1997 WL 402783, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-v-clark-in-re-clark-flmb-1997.