1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ALPHONSO RAMON CLARK, 11 Case No. 21-09230 BLF (PR) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 13 v.
14 DR. MOLLY BROWN, et al., 15
Defendants. 16
17 18 Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Napa State Hospital, filed the instant pro se 19 civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various medical professionals at 20 the “Golden Gate Conrep.” Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in 21 forma pauperis will be addressed in a separate order. 22 23 DISCUSSION 24 A. Standard of Review 25 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 26 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 27 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 1 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 2 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally 3 construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 4 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 5 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 6 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 7 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 8 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 9 Plaintiff names the following as Defendants in this action: Dr. Molly Brown, 10 psychologist and director of Golden Gate Conrep1; Dr. Elizabeth Cale, primary 11 psychologist at Golden Gate Conrep; Dr. Lynnette Suarez, psychologist at Golden Gate 12 Conrep; and Heather Tegeler, therapist at Golden Gate Conrep. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff 13 claims Dr. Brown “committed perjury on the witness stand in [his] March 2018 hearing,” 14 claiming Plaintiff was not taking his medication, which “cost [Plaintiff his] freedom.” Id. 15 Plaintiff next claims that during a weekly meeting on January 5, 2018, with Dr. Cale, she 16 began questioning him “in inter[r]ogating manner” about his relationship with his 17 roommate who claimed Plaintiff was keeping him up at night. Id. at 3. Plaintiff claims 18 that on January 6, 2018, Dr. Suarez called police, claiming Plaintiff was agitated and 19 exhibiting signs of paranoia; police arrested Plaintiff, but did not note any of these 20 behaviors in their report. Id. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that while he was in County Jail, 21 “Heather” made “licensed decision” in his case although she was not “licensed.” Id. For 22 relief, Plaintiff “never want[s] these incompetent health care providers to work in the 23 1 According to the California Department of State Hospitals website, “CONREP” stands 24 for Conditional Release Program, which is a “statewide system of community based services which treats patients with the following commitment types: Not Guilty by Reason 25 of Insanity, Incompetent to Stand Trial, Mentally Disordered Offenders, and some parolees who have been released to outpatient status.” 26 https://www.dsh.ca.gov/Treatment/Conditional_Release.html 1 medical field again,” and damages. Id. 2 There are several problems with this complaint. Assuming that the staff members 3 of Golden Gate Conrep are state actors to satisfy the second element of a § 1983 claim, 4 Plaintiff does not satisfy the first element. Except for his claim against Dr. Brown 5 involving the loss of his freedom, it is unclear from these brief allegations what 6 constitutional right was violated by the other Defendants. There is no indication that being 7 interrogated about his relationship with his roommate, calling the police because of 8 Plaintiff’s concerning behavior, and the making of decisions while unlicensed resulted in 9 the deprivation of a constitutional right. Furthermore, with regards to Dr. Brown, even if 10 her actions resulted in Plaintiff’s unlawful confinement, then such a claim must be raised 11 in a habeas action rather than a civil rights complaint.2 12 Even if the claims were properly raised in this civil complaint and adequately 13 pleaded, these four separate claims against four different individuals clearly violate Federal 14 Rules of Civil Procedure 18(a) and 20(a), the requirements for joinder of claims and 15 parties. “A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim may 16 join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing 17 party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Accordingly, “multiple claims against a single party are 18 fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against 19 Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). “Unrelated claims 20 against different defendants belong in different suits,” not only to prevent the sort of 21 “morass” that a multi-claim, multi-defendant suit can produce, “but also to ensure that 22 prisoners pay the required filing fees – for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the 23 2 Challenges to the lawfulness of confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the 24 province of habeas corpus.’” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)). If Plaintiff is challenging the 25 constitutionality of state civil commitment proceedings, he may do so by filing a federal habeas corpus action once state remedies have been exhausted. See Nelson v. Sandritter, 26 351 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1965); see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001) (a 1 number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of 2 required fees.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). With respect to the joinder of 3 Defendants, parties may be joined as defendants in one action only “if any right to relief is 4 asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out 5 of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any 6 question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 20(a)(2). “A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person – say, a 8 suit complaining that A defrauded plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to 9 pay a debt, and E infringed his copyright, all in different transactions – should be rejected 10 if filed by a prisoner.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ALPHONSO RAMON CLARK, 11 Case No. 21-09230 BLF (PR) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 13 v.
14 DR. MOLLY BROWN, et al., 15
Defendants. 16
17 18 Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Napa State Hospital, filed the instant pro se 19 civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various medical professionals at 20 the “Golden Gate Conrep.” Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in 21 forma pauperis will be addressed in a separate order. 22 23 DISCUSSION 24 A. Standard of Review 25 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 26 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 27 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 1 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 2 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally 3 construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 4 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 5 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 6 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 7 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 8 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 9 Plaintiff names the following as Defendants in this action: Dr. Molly Brown, 10 psychologist and director of Golden Gate Conrep1; Dr. Elizabeth Cale, primary 11 psychologist at Golden Gate Conrep; Dr. Lynnette Suarez, psychologist at Golden Gate 12 Conrep; and Heather Tegeler, therapist at Golden Gate Conrep. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff 13 claims Dr. Brown “committed perjury on the witness stand in [his] March 2018 hearing,” 14 claiming Plaintiff was not taking his medication, which “cost [Plaintiff his] freedom.” Id. 15 Plaintiff next claims that during a weekly meeting on January 5, 2018, with Dr. Cale, she 16 began questioning him “in inter[r]ogating manner” about his relationship with his 17 roommate who claimed Plaintiff was keeping him up at night. Id. at 3. Plaintiff claims 18 that on January 6, 2018, Dr. Suarez called police, claiming Plaintiff was agitated and 19 exhibiting signs of paranoia; police arrested Plaintiff, but did not note any of these 20 behaviors in their report. Id. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that while he was in County Jail, 21 “Heather” made “licensed decision” in his case although she was not “licensed.” Id. For 22 relief, Plaintiff “never want[s] these incompetent health care providers to work in the 23 1 According to the California Department of State Hospitals website, “CONREP” stands 24 for Conditional Release Program, which is a “statewide system of community based services which treats patients with the following commitment types: Not Guilty by Reason 25 of Insanity, Incompetent to Stand Trial, Mentally Disordered Offenders, and some parolees who have been released to outpatient status.” 26 https://www.dsh.ca.gov/Treatment/Conditional_Release.html 1 medical field again,” and damages. Id. 2 There are several problems with this complaint. Assuming that the staff members 3 of Golden Gate Conrep are state actors to satisfy the second element of a § 1983 claim, 4 Plaintiff does not satisfy the first element. Except for his claim against Dr. Brown 5 involving the loss of his freedom, it is unclear from these brief allegations what 6 constitutional right was violated by the other Defendants. There is no indication that being 7 interrogated about his relationship with his roommate, calling the police because of 8 Plaintiff’s concerning behavior, and the making of decisions while unlicensed resulted in 9 the deprivation of a constitutional right. Furthermore, with regards to Dr. Brown, even if 10 her actions resulted in Plaintiff’s unlawful confinement, then such a claim must be raised 11 in a habeas action rather than a civil rights complaint.2 12 Even if the claims were properly raised in this civil complaint and adequately 13 pleaded, these four separate claims against four different individuals clearly violate Federal 14 Rules of Civil Procedure 18(a) and 20(a), the requirements for joinder of claims and 15 parties. “A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim may 16 join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing 17 party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Accordingly, “multiple claims against a single party are 18 fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against 19 Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). “Unrelated claims 20 against different defendants belong in different suits,” not only to prevent the sort of 21 “morass” that a multi-claim, multi-defendant suit can produce, “but also to ensure that 22 prisoners pay the required filing fees – for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the 23 2 Challenges to the lawfulness of confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the 24 province of habeas corpus.’” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)). If Plaintiff is challenging the 25 constitutionality of state civil commitment proceedings, he may do so by filing a federal habeas corpus action once state remedies have been exhausted. See Nelson v. Sandritter, 26 351 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1965); see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001) (a 1 number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of 2 required fees.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). With respect to the joinder of 3 Defendants, parties may be joined as defendants in one action only “if any right to relief is 4 asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out 5 of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any 6 question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 20(a)(2). “A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person – say, a 8 suit complaining that A defrauded plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to 9 pay a debt, and E infringed his copyright, all in different transactions – should be rejected 10 if filed by a prisoner.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that, in 11 prisoner complaint seeking to join 24 defendants and approximately 50 distinct claims, 12 prisoner made no effort to show that 24 defendants he named had participated in the same 13 transaction or series of transactions or that a question of fact is common to all defendants). 14 All the claims are against different Defendants, and none of the claims arise out of the 15 same transaction or occurrence. Accordingly, the claims and Defendants are improperly 16 joined. 17 Plaintiff shall be afforded one opportunity to file an amended complaint in which to 18 state sufficient factual allegations to support his claims. Furthermore, any claims included 19 must comply with both Rules 18(a) and Rule 20(a). In preparing an amended complaint, 20 Plaintiff should keep the following legal principles in mind. 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement 22 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not 23 necessary; the statement need only ‘“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is 24 and the grounds upon which it rests.”’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 25 (citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 26 speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-56 (2007) (citations 1 “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 2 misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 3 Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under § 1983 only if Plaintiff 4 can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected 5 right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). A person deprives another 6 of a constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, 7 participates in another’s affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally 8 required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complaints. See Leer, 844 9 F.2d at 633. 10 11 CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 13 1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within twenty-eight 14 (28) days of the date this order is filed, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint to correct 15 the deficiencies described above. The amended complaint must include the caption and 16 civil case number used in this order, Case No. 21-09230 BLF (PR), and the words 17 “AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. If using the court form complaint, Plaintiff 18 must answer all the questions on the form in order for the action to proceed. The amended 19 complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent. 20 Ramirez v. Cty. Of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). Consequently, 21 claims not included in an amended complaint are no longer claims and defendants not 22 named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 23 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1992). 24 2. Failure to respond in accordance with this order in the time provided 25 will result in the dismissal with prejudice of this action for failure to state a claim, 26 without further notice to Plaintiff. 1 this order to Plaintiff. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 || Dated: April 5, 2022 he Phys homer) 4 BETH LABSON FREEMAN United States District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
16 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Order of Dism. With Leave to Amend 25 PRO-SE\BLF\CR.21\9230Clark_dwlta 26 27