Clark v. Board of Police Pension Fund Commissioners

66 P.2d 307, 189 Wash. 555, 1937 Wash. LEXIS 521
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 26, 1937
DocketNo. 26420. Department One.
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 66 P.2d 307 (Clark v. Board of Police Pension Fund Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clark v. Board of Police Pension Fund Commissioners, 66 P.2d 307, 189 Wash. 555, 1937 Wash. LEXIS 521 (Wash. 1937).

Opinion

Millard, J.

While serving as a policeman in the city of Yakima on October 31,1931, E. Paul Clark was disabled as a result of accidental injury sustained while riding a motorcycle. His injuries consisted of a fracture of the lower end of the right femur, approximately two inches above the condyles, and a fracture of the third and fourth metatarsal bones.

*556 Clark was confined in the hospital for three months, and thereafter at his home, in a cast, for a period of several weeks. He was unable to walk without assistance for a continuous period of about four months following the accident. As a result of the fracture, there was a half-inch shortening of the right lower extremity, which shortening was manifested by a slight curvature of the pelvis and a curvature of the lumbar spine to compensate for the shortening.

Clark was retired from the police department following appropriate action for that purpose by the board of police pension fund commissioners, and an order was entered by the board directing that Clark be paid thereafter from the police pension fund a yearly compensation equal to one-half the amount of salary attached to the rank which he held in the police department at the time of his retirement.

In April, 1936, Clark appeared before the board of police pension fund commissioners for examination and hearing, to determine whether his disability had ceased. At that time, Clark walked with a slight limp. The hearing disclosed that Clark is approximately ten per cent disabled; that, because of the shortening of his right leg, although he would be able to walk for an eight-hour period, fatigue in the right leg would begin to be noticeable after five or six hours, but that such fatigue would not harm him; in fact, exercise would be beneficial.

It was the opinion of the medical witness called by the board that Clark could not stay on a walking beat continuously, day in and day out, but, if he were assigned to some position that would not keep him continuously on his feet, there was no reason why Clark could not efficiently perform the duties of such position. Clark attends dances and indulges in the sports of hunting and fishing; and, although he testified he *557 suffered pain after Ms hunting and fishing trips, the pain is not sufficient to deter continuance of them. At the present time, he is an automoMle salesman.

He testified that he could sit in an automobile about an hour before it was necessary to get out and walk around, due to the injury he had received, and that he experienced considerable pain periodically. He further testified that at times he is unable to be on his feet continuously, and that he still spends a considerable number of nights without sleep because of the pain and suffering caused by the injury.

Of a total police force in Yakima of twenty-eight men, only seven are employed in walking beats, and there are about a dozen positions in the department, excluding those for which Clark is unfitted by reason of education, experience or intelligence, which do not involve walking, and the duties of which Clark could perform.

At the time of his injury, Clark was a motorcycle patrolman. The motorcycles have been superseded by prowler cars or traffic cars. The testimony before the board was to the effect that this man could, without pain or inconvenience, operate a prowler car. His occupation at the present time, as an automobile salesman, consists almost entirely of the same activity.

At the examination before the board, it was determined that Clark is suffering a'total permanent disability of ten per cent as the result of the injury he received October 31,1931, and that Clark has recovered from his disability to such an extent that he is able to discharge, with average efficiency, the duties of the grade to which he belongs — motorcycle policeman— which now would be that of operator of a prowler or traffic automobile. This occupation would differ very little from a great portion of the work he is now performing as an automobile salesman, which position *558 requires him to operate an automobile. The board were of the view that Clark was physically capable of performing the ordinary duties of a policeman, and that his disability has ceased. An order was entered requiring him to report to the chief of police for active duty in the police department.

On petition of Clark, the superior court for Yakima county reviewed the proceedings of the board of police pension commissioners revoking the pension and ordering Clark to be restored to active service at the same salary he received at the time of his retirement. That review resulted in affirmance of the order of the board. Clark appealed.

It is clear, contrary to the contention of appellant, that the evidence recited above is sufficient to sustain the finding that appellant’s disability had ceased. The evidence established the fact that appellant is able physically to return to work in the police department. There are at least eleven or twelve jobs in the department the duties of which he is capable of performing; in fact, under the present conditions obtaining in the department, he is capable of performing the same duties that devolved upon him at the time he was injured.

Eem. Eev. Stat., §9579 [P. C. §1200], provides for the creation of a police pension board and its duties in cities of the class of Yakima.

Eem. Eev. Stat., §9583 [P. C. §1204], under which counsel for respondents contends the disability of a policeman has ceased, if he is reasonably able to perform the ordinary duties of a police officer, reads as follows:

“Whenever any person, while serving as a policeman in any such city shall become physically disabled by reason of any bodily injury received in the immediate or direct performance or discharge of his duties as such policeman, or become incapacitated for service, said *559 incapacity not having been caused or brought on by dissipation or abuse, of which the board shall be judge, said board may, . . . retire such person from said department, and order and direct that he shall be paid from said fund during his lifetime, a yearly pension equal to one-half of the amount of salary attached to the rank which he may have held in said police department at the date of such retirement, . . . Provided that whenever such disability shall cease, such pension shall cease, and such person shall be restored to active service at the same salary he received at the time of his retirement.”

Section 9587 [P. C. § 1208] provides that a policeman, retired for disability, may be summoned before the board at any time subsequent to his retirement for examination as to his fitness for duty, “and shall abide the decision and order of said board with reference thereto; . . . ”

The above quoted portion of the statute respecting the discontinuance of the pension whenever ‘ ‘ such disability shall cease,” means no more and no less than that, whenever the disability sustained by reason of bodily injury or incapacity for service from other causes (not brought on by dissipation or abuse) shall cease, the pension shall also cease. The words “incapacity” and “disability” are synonymous.

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Bluebook (online)
66 P.2d 307, 189 Wash. 555, 1937 Wash. LEXIS 521, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-v-board-of-police-pension-fund-commissioners-wash-1937.