Clark v. Barnwell

53 U.S. 272, 13 L. Ed. 985, 12 How. 272, 1851 U.S. LEXIS 655
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 18, 1852
StatusPublished
Cited by187 cases

This text of 53 U.S. 272 (Clark v. Barnwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clark v. Barnwell, 53 U.S. 272, 13 L. Ed. 985, 12 How. 272, 1851 U.S. LEXIS 655 (1852).

Opinion

Mr. Justice NELSON

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the District of South Carolina in admiralty.

The libel was filed against the ship Susan W. Lind and owners for alleged damage to cargo shipped to the libellants, as consignees, from Liverpool to Charleston, through the neglect and fault of the master. The goods shipped were twenty-four boxes of cotton thread, which on delivery at Charleston were damaged to the amount of some fifty per cent. The spools of thread were packed in small wooden boxes fined with paper, one hundred dozen in eaeh box, and again inclosed in a large wooden box, six. small boxes in each large one, lined with paper between the small boxes. When these boxes were delivered and opened, the spools of thread in each of the small boxes were more or less stained, and spotted by dampness and mould, though the large and small boxes themselves were generally dry, as was also the paper covering the thread.

The respondents in their answer allege, that, if the content's of the boxes were in a damaged state when opened, the damage must have existed, or originated in causes that existed, before they Were delivered on board the ship, though not indicated by the external appearance of the boxes; or must have been produced by the effects of the dampness of the atmosphere in the hold of the vessel to which goods, wares, and merchandise' are exposed, and, especially such as were shipped for the libellants, in all vessels, however tight and stanch, with cargoes however well stowed, on as long and boisterous a passage as was experienced by the Susan W. Lind.; or, the same was caused by such dampness in consequence of tfie neglect of the shipper in not having packed the cotton thread in boxes calculated to exclude the damp air which otherwise it must be subject to in the transportation across the Atlantic.

*280 The vessel sailed from Liverpool on the fourteenth day of March, 1848, and arrived at Charleston, her port of destination, on the fourteenth day of May following, making a long voyage of sixty-one days, during which she encountered rough weather' and. violent gales, causing her to labor heavily, and occasionally ship water.

As we have already stated, the cotton thread, when the boxes were delivered to the consignees and opened, was found damaged on account of stains and spots, the effect apparently of dampness and mould happening in the course of the shipment.

' The bill. of lading admits that the twenty-four boxes were shipped in good order,1 and bound the respondents to deliver the .same in.like good order, “all, and every the dangers and accidents of the seas and navigation „of whatsoever nature and kind excepted.” . And the main question in the case is, whether or not the damage in question was occasioned by pne of the perils’and accidents within this clause of the bill of lading? For, as the masters and owners, like other common-carriers, may be answerable for the goods, although no actual blame is imputable to them, and- unless they bring the - case within the exception, in considering whether .they are chargeable for a particular ’loss, the question is, not whether the loss happened by reason of the negligence of the persons employed in the conveyance of the goods, but whether it was occasioned by any of those causes, which, either according to the general rules of lawy.or the particular stipulations of the parties, afford ah excuse for'the non-performance of the contract.1 After the damage to the goods, therefore, has been established, the burden lies upon the respondents to show, that it was occasioned by one of the perils from which they were exempted by the bill of lading, and, even where evidence has been thus given bringing the particular loss or damage within, one of the dangers or- accidents of the navigation, it is still competent for the shippers to show, that it might have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable skill and attention on the part, of the persons employed in1 the conveyance, of the goods; for, then, it is not .deemed to be, in the sense of the law, such a loss as will exempt' the carrier from liability, but rather a loss occasioned by his negligence, and1 inattention to his duty. Hence it is, that, although the loss occurs by a peril of the sea, yet if it might have been avoided by skill and diligence at the time, the carrier is liable. But in this stage and. posture of the case, the burden is upon-'the plaintiff to establish the negligence, as the affirmative lies .upon him. On this, ground in the case of Muddle v. Stride, 9 Car. & Payne, 380, which was an action against the proprietors of a steam vessel to recover compensation for damage to goods sent by them as carriers, Lord Chief Justice Denman, in *281 summing up to the jury observed, “if on the whole, it be left in doubt what the cause of the injury was, or, if it may as well be attributable to ‘perils of the sea’ as .to negligence, the plaintiff cannot recover; but, if the perils of the seas require that more care should be used in the stowing of the goods (articles of silk and linen) on board, than was bestowed on them, that will be negligence for which the owners of the vessel will be liable. That the jury were to see clearly, that the defendants were guilty of negligence before they could find a verdict against them.”

Now, applying these principles to the facts disclosed in the record, we shall be enabled to determine whether or not the respondents in the court below'are liable for the damage that happened to the goods in question, as they settle, with great clearness, the rule of responsibility, and, also, on whioh side the burden of proof lies to charge or exonerate them as common-carriers. And, on- looking into these facts, it will be seen, that' all the witnesses concur in the conclusion that the damage was occasioned by the humidity of the atmosphere and dampness of the ship’s hold, producing mould and mildew upon the cotton spools, and- thereby staining and spotting the thread, impairing' its strength, and rendering it unmerchantable. The article appears to be -peculiarly subject to the effect of humidity and dampness, as the paper with which it was covered in the small boxes was generally dry, and unaffected, when at the same time, the thread beneath was mildewed and stained, and what is more remarkable, in many, instances the upper layers of the spools were perfectly dry and sound, while those lying in the centre were' mouldy and spotted; and in other instances, the only part affected were the layers.in the centre.

The vessel was a géneral ship, tight and stanch, well equipped, and manned'; and was laden with a mixed cargo, consisting of cases and crates of dry goods, hardware, and about two thousand sacks of salt. The cargo was well stowed and dunnaged. The sacks of salt when discharged were dry as usual, and in good condition; and no part of the cargo, except the cases in question, appears to haye been injured in the voyage, or the subject of any complaint.

It was insisted on the argument, that the respondents were in fault in taking on board then vessel the goods in question with salt as part of the cargo ; but, the evidence is full that salt in sacks is part of a mixed cargo of nearly all the vessels engaged in the trpffe between Liverpool and Charleston.

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Bluebook (online)
53 U.S. 272, 13 L. Ed. 985, 12 How. 272, 1851 U.S. LEXIS 655, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-v-barnwell-scotus-1852.