Clark, Jr. v. Clark, Sr., Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedDecember 6, 2024
Docket5D2024-0515
StatusPublished

This text of Clark, Jr. v. Clark, Sr., Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service (Clark, Jr. v. Clark, Sr., Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clark, Jr. v. Clark, Sr., Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service, (Fla. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________

Case No. 5D2024-0515 LT Case No. 2021-CA-887 _____________________________

WILLIAM CLARK JR.,

Appellant,

v.

SOUTH STATE BANK, N.A., STATE OF FLORIDA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY-INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, and WILLIAM CLARK, SR., DECEASED,

Appellee. _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County. Gary L. Sanders, Judge.

Stanley W. Plappert, of The Florida Legal Advocacy Group, P.A., Ocala, for Appellant.

Dock A. Blanchard, of Blanchard, Merriam & Adel, P.A., Ocala, and Daniel Hicks, of Daniel Hicks, P.A., Ocala, for Appellee, South State Bank, N.A.

No Appearance for Remaining Appellees.

December 6, 2024 KILBANE, J.

William Clark Jr. (“Borrower”) timely appeals from a final judgment foreclosing a mortgage in favor of South State Bank, N.A. (“Lender”). Because Lender failed to substantially comply with the pre-acceleration notice requirement of the mortgage and failed to establish indebtedness with competent, substantial evidence, we reverse.1

Facts

In 2004, Borrower executed an adjustable-rate promissory note (“Note”), secured with a mortgage (“Mortgage”) on the subject property, to Independent National Bank. In 2010, Independent National Bank’s assets—including the Note and Mortgage—were seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and subsequently purchased by Lender.

In May 2021, Lender brought an action to foreclose the Mortgage against Borrower. Lender affirmed that all conditions precedent had been performed including “notice of default and acceleration.”

In September 2021, Lender mailed Borrower the Acceleration Notice and Demand for Payment (“Acceleration Notice”). The Acceleration Notice declared Borrower was in default for failure to make payments and asserted the entire unpaid principal balance, interest, and other costs and fees—totaling $82,013.89—were immediately due. The Acceleration Notice required Borrower to pay the full amount within 35 days.

In March 2023, Lender filed its fourth amended complaint, in which Lender again affirmed that all conditions precedent had been performed including “notice of default and acceleration as required by the terms of the Note and Mortgage, a copy of both

1 We reject Borrower’s alternative basis for reversal without discussion.

2 attached as Composite Exhibit ‘C.’” The Acceleration Notice was the only document attached as Composite Exhibit C.2

At the final evidentiary hearing, Lender called its Special Assets Manager, Matthew T. Maynor, to establish standing as the successor in interest to the Note and Mortgage. Relying on a payoff letter that was not admitted into evidence, Maynor also testified that Borrower’s indebtedness—including the principal balance plus associated costs and fees—was $93,414.26, as of the date of the hearing. An affidavit of indebtedness signed by Maynor on the date of trial was admitted into evidence. This affidavit listed additional items and raised the total alleged indebtedness to $102,063.55.

On cross-examination, Maynor was questioned regarding the Acceleration Notice, which he referred to as “an acceleration letter.” He admitted the Acceleration Notice was not intended to comply with the requirements of paragraph 22 of the Mortgage. Maynor also admitted that—without reviewing Lender’s documents—he could not testify regarding (1) which payments were paid or unpaid or (2) Borrower’s total indebtedness as of the date the foreclosure action was filed. Maynor reported that Lender’s counsel had been provided business records from two different record-keeping systems to document Borrower’s payments. These ledgers were not admitted into evidence.

In Borrower’s closing, he asserted the Acceleration Notice failed to comply with paragraph 22 of the Mortgage because it demanded payment of the accelerated debt but failed to provide him with notice of default and time to cure. Borrower also alleged there was insufficient evidence to establish he defaulted on his Mortgage or the total amount of indebtedness. Borrower contended that involuntary dismissal was appropriate under the circumstances.

2 Although the record documented Lender sent Borrower two other notices prior to filing this foreclosure action, they were not attached to the complaint or relied upon by Lender on appeal, and likewise failed to comply with paragraph 22 of the Mortgage.

3 The trial court rejected Borrower’s arguments and entered final judgment of foreclosure in favor of Lender in the amount of $102,063.55. Borrower subsequently filed a motion for rehearing/reconsideration, which was denied. This timely appealed followed.

Analysis

A. Paragraph 22 Pre-Acceleration Notice

The trial court’s interpretation of a contract—including a mortgage—is reviewed de novo. Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 207 So. 3d 899, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Reilly v. Reilly, 94 So. 3d 693, 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). “A lender cannot foreclose until it has complied with the terms of the mortgage.” Martins v. PNC Bank, N.A., 170 So. 3d 932, 936 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (citing DiSalvo v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 115 So. 3d 438, 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)). A lender’s notice of default sent pursuant to paragraph 22 of a mortgage is “sufficient when [it] advise[s] the borrower of all essential information concerning the borrower’s default and the action required to cure it.” U.S. Bank N.A. ex rel. Holders of the Home Equity Asset Tr. 2002-4 Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-4 v. Doepker, 223 So. 3d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (quoting Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Osmundsen, 204 So. 3d 118, 119 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)).

Here, paragraph 22 of the Mortgage explicitly required Lender to send Borrower notice “prior to acceleration,” informing him of certain information including how to cure the default and that the debt would be accelerated if the default was not cured. Lender asserts the Acceleration Notice substantially complied with the requirements of paragraph 22. See Diaz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 189 So. 3d 279, 282 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (citing Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Nunez, 180 So. 3d 160, 161 n.1, 162 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)) (explaining substantial compliance with paragraph 22 is sufficient). However, the Acceleration Notice demanded payment of the accelerated debt. See Snow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 156 So. 3d 538, 541–42 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (differentiating between letter accelerating debt and letter providing notice of default, right to cure, and intention to accelerate if default is not cured). This is consistent with the testimony of Lender’s witness, who conceded

4 the Acceleration Notice was an “acceleration letter” that was not intended to comply with paragraph 22.

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Snow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
156 So. 3d 538 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2015)
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Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Osmundsen
204 So. 3d 118 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2016)
Vitaliy v. Wells Fargo Bank
253 So. 3d 779 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2018)
DiSalvo v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.
115 So. 3d 438 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2013)
Correa v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n
118 So. 3d 952 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2013)
Kelsey v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc.
131 So. 3d 825 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2014)
Wolkoff v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.
153 So. 3d 280 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2014)
Martins v. PNC Bank, National Ass'n
170 So. 3d 932 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2015)
Figueroa v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n
180 So. 3d 1110 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2015)
Crawford Residences, LLC v. Banco Popular North America
88 So. 3d 1017 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2012)
Reilly v. Reilly
94 So. 3d 693 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2012)
Liberty Home Equity Solutions, Inc. v. Raulston
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Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
207 So. 3d 899 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2017)

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Clark, Jr. v. Clark, Sr., Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-jr-v-clark-sr-department-of-treasury-internal-revenue-service-fladistctapp-2024.