Clark

Court of Claims

Clark

553 F.2d 104, 212 Ct. Cl. 590, 1977 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 144

CourtUnited States Court of Claims

DecidedJanuary 27, 1977

DocketNo. 346-75

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 553 F.2d 104 (Clark) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Clark, 553 F.2d 104, 212 Ct. Cl. 590, 1977 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 144 (cc 1977).

Pincite

Opinion

“Plaintiff, a retired GS-5 employee of the United States Coast Guard, alleges that as a result of certain racially discriminatory actions on the part of the Department of Transportation he was denied promotions and, after he instituted complaint, purposely transferred and promoted into a jo'b he was physically unable to perform. Plaintiff seeks back pay for various periods beginning in 1961 and reinstatement in a GS-9 position.

“Plaintiff’s claim for back pay for positions to which he was never promoted is based upon alleged racial discrimination against him during his employment. The court concludes that in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976), and Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), it is without jurisdiction to consider claims for promotion based on racial discrimination. Allison v. United States, 211 Ct. Cl. 332 (1976); Morton v. United States, ante at 549. It is clear from the decision in Brown, supra, that any jurisdiction this court may have had over back pay claims based on racial discrimination has been divested by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. We are not unmindful of the fact that [591]*591plaintiff does not qualify for redress under the 1972 Act. Clark v. Goode, 499 F. 2d 130 (4th Cir. 1974). However, the Supreme Court has indicated that we have never had jurisdiction to give a judgment for back pay based on positions which the claimant has never held but from which he was barred by racial discrimination. United States v. Testan, supra. Therefore,

“it is ordered that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be and is hereby granted and that the petition be and is hereby dismissed.”

Plaintiff’s petition for ceriorari was denied October 3, 1977.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

“Plaintiff, a retired GS-5 employee of the United States Coast Guard, alleges that as a result of certain racially discriminatory actions on the part of the Department of Transportation he was denied promotions and, after he instituted complaint, purposely transferred and promoted into a jo'b he was physically unable to perform. Plaintiff seeks back pay for various periods beginning in 1961 and reinstatement in a GS-9 position.

“Plaintiff’s claim for back pay for positions to which he was never promoted is based upon alleged racial discrimination against him during his employment. The court concludes that in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976), and Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), it is without jurisdiction to consider claims for promotion based on racial discrimination. Allison v. United States, 211 Ct. Cl. 332 (1976); Morton v. United States, ante at 549. It is clear from the decision in Brown, supra, that any jurisdiction this court may have had over back pay claims based on racial discrimination has been divested by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. We are not unmindful of the fact that [591]*591plaintiff does not qualify for redress under the 1972 Act. Clark v. Goode, 499 F. 2d 130 (4th Cir. 1974). However, the Supreme Court has indicated that we have never had jurisdiction to give a judgment for back pay based on positions which the claimant has never held but from which he was barred by racial discrimination. United States v. Testan, supra. Therefore,

“it is ordered that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be and is hereby granted and that the petition be and is hereby dismissed.”

Plaintiff’s petition for ceriorari was denied October 3, 1977.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

553 F.2d 104, 212 Ct. Cl. 590, 1977 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 144, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-cc-1977.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack