Clarence Leland v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

Fifth Circuit

Clarence Leland v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

569 F.2d 1371, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12012

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedMarch 24, 1978

Docket77-3081

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 569 F.2d 1371 (Clarence Leland v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Clarence Leland v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation, 569 F.2d 1371, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12012 (5th Cir. 1978).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

On a witness’ tip, defendant Leland was stopped by Florida police. He was advised of his constitutional rights. Upon being questioned, he admitted taking a television set from an apartment, but denied breaking and entering. He brought the police to a U-Haul trailer where he had placed the television. Later that day he made and signed a written statement. He sought unsuccessfully to suppress his written and oral statements. They were subsequently admitted into evidence at trial. He was convicted of breaking and entering, and pursued an unsuccessful state appeal. Leland then commenced federal habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. The district court denied relief. We affirm.

The sole issue presented for review is whether, at the state suppression hearing, the state court made an initial determination of the voluntariness of the defendant’s statements, as required by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). At the suppression hearing only the arresting officer and a police detective testified. The question of voluntariness was raised in three contexts: Leland’s ulcer pain, his need for medicine, and threats of prosecution for other offenses. The two witnesses denied knowledge of serious pain, brought the defendant home to get his medicine, and denied threatening him with prosecution. At the conclusion of their testimony, defendant moved to suppress and specifically raised the issue of voluntariness. The court, without explicitly finding the statements to have been voluntary, denied the motion.

A trial court need not explicitly find that a challenged statement was given voluntarily. Rather, the court’s conclusion of voluntariness “must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity.” Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 593, 598 (1967). Inasmuch as voluntariness was the only issue before the trial court at the suppression hearing, the police testimony was unchallenged by contrary defense testimony, and the defendant specifically raised the voluntariness issue in his concluding remarks, immediately after which the trial court denied the motion, a determination of voluntariness appears from the record with “unmistakable clarity.” Sims, supra ; see also United States v. Patman, 557 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1977).

AFFIRMED.

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PER CURIAM:

On a witness’ tip, defendant Leland was stopped by Florida police. He was advised of his constitutional rights. Upon being questioned, he admitted taking a television set from an apartment, but denied breaking and entering. He brought the police to a U-Haul trailer where he had placed the television. Later that day he made and signed a written statement. He sought unsuccessfully to suppress his written and oral statements. They were subsequently admitted into evidence at trial. He was convicted of breaking and entering, and pursued an unsuccessful state appeal. Leland then commenced federal habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. The district court denied relief. We affirm.

The sole issue presented for review is whether, at the state suppression hearing, the state court made an initial determination of the voluntariness of the defendant’s statements, as required by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). At the suppression hearing only the arresting officer and a police detective testified. The question of voluntariness was raised in three contexts: Leland’s ulcer pain, his need for medicine, and threats of prosecution for other offenses. The two witnesses denied knowledge of serious pain, brought the defendant home to get his medicine, and denied threatening him with prosecution. At the conclusion of their testimony, defendant moved to suppress and specifically raised the issue of voluntariness. The court, without explicitly finding the statements to have been voluntary, denied the motion.

A trial court need not explicitly find that a challenged statement was given voluntarily. Rather, the court’s conclusion of voluntariness “must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity.” Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 593, 598 (1967). Inasmuch as voluntariness was the only issue before the trial court at the suppression hearing, the police testimony was unchallenged by contrary defense testimony, and the defendant specifically raised the voluntariness issue in his concluding remarks, immediately after which the trial court denied the motion, a determination of voluntariness appears from the record with “unmistakable clarity.” Sims, supra ; see also United States v. Patman, 557 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1977).

AFFIRMED.

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569 F.2d 1371, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12012, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clarence-leland-v-louie-l-wainwright-secretary-department-of-offender-ca5-1978.

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