Claramont v. United States

Fifth Circuit

Claramont v. United States

26 F.2d 797, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 3784

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJune 15, 1928

Docket5249

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 26 F.2d 797 (Claramont v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Claramont v. United States, 26 F.2d 797, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 3784 (5th Cir. 1928).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff in error, Danton Claramont, was convicted in the same trial which resulted in the convictions which were reviewed in the eases of Emmanuel v. United States (C. C. A.) 24 F.(2d) 905, and Smith v. United States (C. C. A.) 24 F.(2d) 907. As to him, each of the counts under which he was convicted, the first and second, charged that he did unlawfully, etc., counsel and procure the bringing into and landing in the United State from Cuba, by means alleged, of a named alien, not entitled to enter the United States; other accused being charged in the same counts with unlawfully, etc., bringing into and landing that alien in the United States. The court’s refusal to direct a verdict of not guilty is complained of on the ground that the only evidence of plaintiff in error’s participation in the transactions alleged was as to what, he did while he was in Cuba; that evidence being to the effect that in Cuba Claramont arranged with other accused to bring into and land in the United States the alien named in the first count, and was there paid for so doing, the bringing of such alien into the United States being effected by other accused. For sueh participation in the criminal offense charged in the first count of the indictment, amounting to the counseling and procuring alleged, Claramont was criminally liable, though he was not physically present in the United States when the alleged unlawful transaction was begun and consummated. By so procuring the commission by other accused of the offense charged, Claramont became amenable to the criminal laws of the United States, though at the time he was beyond its jurisdiction. Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 619, 47 S. a. 531, 71 L. Ed. 793. As to the first count, the ruling in question was not erroneous.

As the punishment imposed was not in excess of what properly could be imposed on conviction of the offense charged in the first count of the indictment, it is not material to determine whether Claramont was properly convicted under the second count.

Other questions presented were disposed of in the above-cited cases, dealing with convictions under the same indictment. The record shows no reversible error.

The judgment is affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff in error, Danton Claramont, was convicted in the same trial which resulted in the convictions which were reviewed in the eases of Emmanuel v. United States (C. C. A.) 24 F.(2d) 905, and Smith v. United States (C. C. A.) 24 F.(2d) 907. As to him, each of the counts under which he was convicted, the first and second, charged that he did unlawfully, etc., counsel and procure the bringing into and landing in the United State from Cuba, by means alleged, of a named alien, not entitled to enter the United States; other accused being charged in the same counts with unlawfully, etc., bringing into and landing that alien in the United States. The court’s refusal to direct a verdict of not guilty is complained of on the ground that the only evidence of plaintiff in error’s participation in the transactions alleged was as to what, he did while he was in Cuba; that evidence being to the effect that in Cuba Claramont arranged with other accused to bring into and land in the United States the alien named in the first count, and was there paid for so doing, the bringing of such alien into the United States being effected by other accused. For sueh participation in the criminal offense charged in the first count of the indictment, amounting to the counseling and procuring alleged, Claramont was criminally liable, though he was not physically present in the United States when the alleged unlawful transaction was begun and consummated. By so procuring the commission by other accused of the offense charged, Claramont became amenable to the criminal laws of the United States, though at the time he was beyond its jurisdiction. Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 619, 47 S. a. 531, 71 L. Ed. 793. As to the first count, the ruling in question was not erroneous.

As the punishment imposed was not in excess of what properly could be imposed on conviction of the offense charged in the first count of the indictment, it is not material to determine whether Claramont was properly convicted under the second count.

Other questions presented were disposed of in the above-cited cases, dealing with convictions under the same indictment. The record shows no reversible error.

The judgment is affirmed.

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26 F.2d 797, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 3784, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/claramont-v-united-states-ca5-1928.

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