Clancy v. Ginnerty

CourtSuperior Court of Rhode Island
DecidedApril 11, 2011
DocketC.A. No. NC-05-264
StatusPublished

This text of Clancy v. Ginnerty (Clancy v. Ginnerty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clancy v. Ginnerty, (R.I. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

DECISION
Before this Court is an appeal from a decision ("Decision") of the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Jamestown ("Board or "Zoning Board"), which denied David Clancy and Jennifer Clancy's petition for (collectively, "Clancys" or "Appellants") a special use permit. Appellants seek reversal of the Board's decision. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-69.

A full recitation of the facts and travel of this matter can be found in the December 7, 2006 decision (Decision) rendered by this Superior Court, Gale, J. in the above entitled matter. Briefly, Appellants are the owners of property located at 382 North Road, Jamestown, Rhode Island, described as Assessor's Plat 7, Lot 22. The property is located in an RR-200 zone and consists of approximately 65,340 square feet. In 2003, Appellants were granted a dimensional variance to build a glass blowing studio *Page 2 on said property. The present action emanates from Appellants' petition to the Jamestown Zoning board to obtain a special use permit allowing the sale of goods produced in their glass blowing studio.1 The matter first went before the Zoning Board in April 2005, wherein their request for a special use permit was denied. Subsequently, the Clancys appealed. That appeal resulted in the 2006 Decision, Gale, J. remanding the matter to the Zoning Board with "specific instructions to rule on the merits of the Clancy's application for a special use permit utilizing § 82-602 (A) and (B) of the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Jamestown." (Dec. 7, 2006 Decision at 9.)

After that 2006 Decision was rendered, both the Clancys and the Jamestown Zoning Board signed a Stipulation filed with the Court in August of 2007. ("Stipulation"). The Stipulation concerned the procedural posture of the remand hearing. Since the Jamestown Zoning Board's composition had changed and did not consist of five members who originally participated in the 2005 proceedings; [and in an attempt order to avoid a de novo hearing]the Stipulation named seven (7) then-current members of the Zoning Board who could consider the matter on remand.2 The persons named in the Stipulation were, Thomas Ginnerty, Richard Boren, David Nardolillo, Don Weinberg, Dean Wagner, Richard Cribb, and Richard Allphin. There was to be no additional evidence or testimony accepted. The newly constituted Board was to base its decision solely on a review of the written record.

Present at the October 2007 remand hearing were Ginnerty, Boren, Nardolillo, Weinberg, and Joseph Logan. Logan participated despite the fact that he neither *Page 3 participated in the 2005 proceedings, nor was named in the Stipulation. In fact, Logan was a member of the Board in 2005 but had recused himself from the matter originally, because, at the time, he was a member of the Jamestown Historical Society. Neither party objected to his participation.

After some discussion, the Board voted 3 to 2 in favor of granting the Clancys' petition for a special use permit. With only three votes in favor of the special use permit, and pursuant to § 82-501(B) 3 and § 45-24-52 (2), the petition was denied.3 The Clancys timely appealed.

Standard of Review
The Superior Court review of a zoning board decision is controlled by G.L. 1956 § 45-24-69(D), which provides:

"(D) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the zoning board of review or remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because of findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions which are:

(1) In violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions;

(2) In excess of the authority granted to the zoning board of review by statute or ordinance;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

*Page 4

When reviewing a decision of a zoning board, a justice of the Superior Court may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the zoning board if he or she conscientiously finds that the board's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Apostolou v.Genovesi, 120 R.I. 501, 507, 388 A.2d 821, 825 (1978). "Substantial evidence as used in this context means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and means an amount, more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Caswell v. George Sherman Sand and GravelCo. Inc., 424 A.2d 646, 647 (R.I. 1981) (citingApostolou, 120 R.I. at 507, 388 A.2d 824-825). The reviewing court "examines the record below to determine whether competent evidence exists to support the tribunal's findings."New England Naturist Ass'n, Inc. v.George,648 A.2d 370, 371 (R.I. 1994) (citing Town of Narragansett v.International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, Local1589, 119 R.I. 506, 380 A.2d 521 (1977)). Accordingly in the event that a reviewing court, after a thorough review of the record, finds a lack of competent evidence or in the alternative finds that the tribunal failed to follow statutory procedures, may remand the matter to the tribunal for new proceedings. Roger Williams v.Gallison, 572 A.2d 61, (R.I. 1990).

Analysis
On appeal, Appellants seek a reversal of the Board's decision. Specifically, they argue that the Board, once again, failed to issue specific findings of fact as to why the petition failed to meet the requirements for a special use permit. Furthermore, in light of Resolution No. 07-0030 of the Jamestown Town Council, which essentially approves the Clancys' bid to sell products on their property, Appellants urge this Court to enter *Page 5 judgment in their favor and grant the application. Due to a jurisdictional defect, this Court will not address any substantive argument raised by the Appellants.

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Related

Ryan v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. of New Shoreham
656 A.2d 612 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1995)
New England Naturist Association, Inc. v. George
648 A.2d 370 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1994)
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co.
424 A.2d 646 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1981)
Town of Narragansett v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters
380 A.2d 521 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1977)
Roger Williams College v. Gallison
572 A.2d 61 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1990)
Apostolou v. Genovesi
388 A.2d 821 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1978)
Coderre v. ZONING BD. OF PAWTUCKET
239 A.2d 729 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1968)
Paolino v. Paolino
420 A.2d 830 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1980)
Bove v. Board of Review of City of Newport
185 A.2d 751 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1962)

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Bluebook (online)
Clancy v. Ginnerty, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clancy-v-ginnerty-risuperct-2011.